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Animal welfare is a concept that plays a role within both our moral deliberations and the 
relevant areas of science. The study of animal welfare has impacts on decisions made by 
legislators, producers and consumers with regards to housing and treatment of animals. Our 
ethical deliberations in these domains need to consider our impact on animals, and the study of 
animal welfare provides the information that allows us to make informed decisions. This thesis 
focusses on taking a philosophical perspective to answer the question of how we can measure 
the welfare of animals.  
Animal welfare science is an applied area of biology, aimed at measuring animal welfare. 
Although philosophy of animal ethics is common, philosophy focussing on animal welfare 
science is rare. Despite this lack, there are definitely many ways in which philosophical 
methods can be used to analyse the methodologies and concepts used in this science. One of 
the aims of the work in this thesis is to remedy this lack of attention in animal welfare. Animal 
welfare science is a strong emerging discipline, but there is the need for conceptual and 
methodological clarity and sophistication in this science if it is to play the relevant informative 
role for our practical and ethical decision-making. There is thus is a strong role here for 
philosophical analysis for this purpose. 
The central aim of this thesis is to provide an account of how we can measure subjective 
animal welfare, addressing some of the potential problems that may arise in this particular 
scientific endeavour. The two questions I will be answering are: what is animal welfare, and 
how do we measure it? Part One of the thesis looks at the subjective concept of animal welfare 
and its applications. In it, I argue for a subjective welfare view - that animal welfare should be 
understood as the subjective experience of individuals over their lifetimes - and look at how 
the subjective welfare concept informs our ethical decision-making in two different cases in 
applied animal ethics. Part Two of the thesis looks more closely at the scientific role of welfare. 
Understanding welfare subjectively creates unique measurement problems, due to the 
necessarily private nature of mental states and here I address a few of these problems, including 
whether subjective experience is measurable, how we might validate indicators of hidden target 
variables such as welfare, how we can make welfare comparisons between individual animals 
and how we might compare or integrate the different types of experience that make up welfare. 
I end with a discussion of the implications of all these problems and solutions for the practice 
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1. CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
Animal welfare is a normative as well as a scientific concept – a ‘bridging concept’ between 
science and ethics (Fraser, Weary, Pajor, & Milligan, 1997). Welfare plays a role within both 
our moral deliberations and the relevant areas of science. Animal welfare scientists study 
welfare, both to learn more about animals – their evolution, minds, behaviour and physiology 
– and for its role in normative decision-making. The study of animal welfare has impacts on 
decisions made by legislators, producers and consumers with regards to housing and treatment 
of animals. Animal welfare considerations are important because there are many human 
activities that use or affect animals, often involving a large degree of harm. Over 70 billion 
animals are farmed annually for human food production1 with around another 1-3 trillion fish 
caught per year2. Animals are used for biomedical and other types of research, estimated at 
over 25 million per year in the US alone3. They are also used for entertainment, in sports, 
circuses and zoos. Animals are kept as pets in our homes. Our actions also affect wild animals 
numbering in the trillions, both directly - through practices such as killing of pest animals - and 
indirectly, through our environmental impact. If we take animal welfare as a target of ethical 
concern, this then creates strong moral reason to evaluate the amount of harm caused to animals 
by humans, and act to reduce it. Our ethical deliberations in these domains need to consider 
our impact on animals, and the study of animal welfare provides the information that allows us 
to make informed decisions.  
 
1.1. Three questions 
There are three broad questions that make up the study of animal welfare. The first is: what 
sort of moral consideration should we give non-human animals? This is primarily a 
philosophical question, and one that has been well-explored within moral philosophy, by 
writers such as Peter Singer (1995) and Tom Regan (1983). The second question is: to which 
animals should we extend moral consideration? This is a question with both philosophical and 
scientific aspects – in first deciding which properties of animals will be morally salient, and 
then in determining which animals possess these properties. The final question, and that which 
will be the primary focus of this thesis project is: how do we measure the welfare of animals? 
This has largely been addressed as a scientific question, trying to find particular measures that 
 
1 https://www.worldanimalprotection.org.au/our-work/animals-farming-supporting-70-billion-animals  
2 http://fishcount.org.uk/fish-count-estimates-2  
3 https://www.humanesociety.org/resources/animals-used-biomedical-research-faq  
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represent the welfare of animals, but there is much room for philosophical work as well. For 
example: in clarifying what is meant by welfare, in examining the relationship between 
measures of welfare and the state itself, and in discussion of which aspects of welfare might be 
most important. Addressing these questions and issues helps strengthen the science of animal 
welfare, and has implications for its applications in animal ethics. 
 
1.1.1. What is the moral status of animals? 
The first question, and one that has been well-discussed in the animal ethics literature, 
regards the moral status of animals. That is, what is their moral status, and what sort of 
consideration should we give them in our ethical decision-making? Historically, within 
Western society, the treatment of animals was prevalently based on a religious ethic of human 
dominion. Animals were considered to have been placed on Earth by God explicitly for human 
use and so did not require moral consideration. Philosophical views tracked similar beliefs; e.g. 
with Aristotle arguing that as animals lacked reason, so too they lacked moral status (Aristotle, 
in Regan & Singer, 1976). This perspective shifted slightly in the mid 19th century with the 
emergence of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, which undermined the 
foundational concept of a fundamental difference between humans and other animals. Around 
this time, philosopher Jeremy Bentham also made a case for moral consideration of animals 
with the famous line: “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they 
suffer?” (Bentham, 1879, p. 309). This led in the late 19th century to strong public opposition 
to the practice of vivisection (experiments performed on live animals) and the founding of the 
National Anti-Vivisection Society in Britain4. 
The contemporary case for moral treatment of animals gained widespread attention 
following the publication of Peter Singer's Animal Liberation (1975) and Tom Regan's The 
Case for Animal Rights (1983). Although they took different approaches to moral theory 
(Singer as a utilitarian and Regan a deontologist), both convincingly argued that if we assume 
that humans are worthy of moral consideration, and as many nonhuman animals share the 
features we consider morally relevant, then there is no reason not to extend this consideration 
to these animals. There have also been cases made for the moral consideration of animals in 
other areas of ethics, such as virtue ethics (Sandøe, Crisp, & Holtug, 1997; Hursthouse, 2011) 
and feminist ‘ethics of care’ (Donovan, 2003; Gruen, 2011). The literature on animal ethics is 
vast and detailed (see e.g. overviews in Beauchamp & Frey, 2011; Gruen, 2011), and one that 
 
4 http://www.navs.org.uk/about_us/24/0/299/  
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I cannot hope to do real justice to here in a thesis primarily situated within philosophy of 
science, rather than ethics. There is still considerable debate as to the degree of moral status 
we should accord to animals, and how we should frame our interactions with them. Here I do 
not presuppose or argue for or any particular view within animal ethics. Throughout a range of 
views, as well as within public opinion, it is generally accepted that animals possess at least 
some moral standing and, all else being equal, it is important to consider their welfare. This is 
particularly true regarding captive animals, where humans are entirely responsible for the 
conditions for and quality of lives of the animals in their care. If we allow animals even some 
moral consideration, this is sufficient to motivate what follows regarding the importance of 
measuring and ensuring welfare. 
 
1.1.2. Which animals are moral subjects? 
It is not hugely controversial that animals possess some moral status and that their interests 
and welfare should be given consideration. This then leads to the second question, which is: to 
which animals we should extend moral consideration? This will depend on which features of 
animals we take to ground their moral status. As I will argue for in Chapter Two, here I will 
take the relevant feature to be sentience – the ability to experience positive and negative mental 
states (i.e. affect) and thus possess a welfare that can be benefitted or harmed. This is the view 
of ‘sentientism’ about moral status: “you have moral status, i.e. you are a subject of moral 
concern, if and only if you are sentient, i.e. if and only if you are capable of phenomenally 
consciously experiencing pleasure or pain” (Sebo, 2018, p. 4). Sentience research then gives 
us the targets of moral concern - those animals which possess welfare - and forms the basis for 
the practice of welfare science. This will be true, regardless of what the nature of sentience is 
found to be. 
The presence of sentience is an empirical question – whether or not certain animals possess 
subjective mental states depends on their particular characteristics and properties, not on our 
own ideas or opinions. Although there may be a ‘grey area’ of consciousness between non-
sentient and fully sentient organisms, as with the transition between life and non-life (Ginsburg 
& Jablonka, 2019, p. 456), what determines this are features of the world. However, there is 
still plenty of debate on how exactly scientists might test for sentience and what given test 
results actually mean, as will be discussed below. The traditional Cartesian perspective is that 
animals completely lack awareness; their apparent reactions to pain are merely automatic, 
unaccompanied by a mental state that we could describe as suffering (Descartes, in Regan & 
Singer, 1976), but this view has largely been rejected today. It is now commonly accepted that 
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at least some animals are sentient, as embodied by the Cambridge Declaration on 
Consciousness in 2012 – “the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in 
possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, 
including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess 
these neurological substrates” (Low et al., 2012, p. 2). We accept that at least some non-human 
animals are sentient; the empirical question is then which animals these are and how far the 
boundaries of sentience extend.  
A large part of the work in animal sentience is in attempting to identify which animals are 
sentient – in particular, which are capable of experiencing pain, as the avoidance of pain is one 
of the most basic conditions for welfare. This requires determining a set of criteria that are 
required to establish the presence of pain perception, as opposed to just nociception, which is 
the non-conscious detection of tissue damage. Several such sets have been proposed (e.g. 
Sneddon, Elwood, Adamo, & Leach, 2014), but it is still controversial which criteria should 
appear in them. There is a role here for the interplay between animal welfare science and animal 
sentience research in determining suitable criteria, as I will discuss in Chapter Eight. 
Research into animal sentience is constantly changing the boundaries of where we think 
sentience lies. Most sentience research has been focussed on vertebrates, and evidence now 
supports the conclusion that all vertebrates are sentient, due to similarity in nervous system and 
brain structure (Proctor, 2012). The sentience of fish has been the subject of more recent debate. 
On the one hand, opponents argue that fish could not be sentient, as they lack the brain 
structures and connectivity thought to be responsible for creating conscious experience in 
mammals (Key, 2016). On the other hand, the behavioural evidence strongly supports the 
presence of fish sentience. Fish will avoid noxious stimuli, they will change their behaviour 
and become less responsive to novel stimuli when injured, and will show behavioural changes 
when under the effects of analgesics, which act in other animals to suppress the conscious 
experience of pain (Proctor, 2012). There is also a plausible proposed neural mechanism for 
processing pain experience, albeit a different one than in mammals (Sneddon et al., 2014) and 
the general consensus is now on the side of fish sentience. 
Data on invertebrates are less clear. Jones (2013) goes carefully through the current evidence 
to conclude that even some insects and crustaceans must feel pain, and the presence of innate 
analgesics in some snails and earthworms may also be suggestive of their capacity for pain. 
Broom (2016) considers that there is sufficient evidence for sentience in all vertebrates, 
cephalopods and decapod crustaceans, and thinks that cognitive ability in stomatopod 
crustaceans (mantis shrimp), spiders and some insects, including bees and ants, makes them 
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good candidates for investigation. Ginsburg & Jablonka (2019, p. 351) attribute sentience to 
vertebrates, cephalopods, arthropods (insects and crustaceans) and possibly some annelids 
(worms). Where behavioural evidence for sentience is observed in invertebrates, it has often 
been dismissed as automatic reflex, as the physical setup of their nervous systems is so different 
(Proctor, 2012). However, if sentience depends on the functional properties of the neural 
system rather than a specific architecture, then there is the possibility of the same function 
being multiply realisable, using different morphological structures. Where there is behavioural 
evidence to suggest otherwise, the absence of the accepted physical substrates should not be 
sufficient for dismissal. What is needed is assessment across a range of physiological and 
behavioural criteria, and insects meet many of those proposed thus far (Sneddon et al., 2014). 
The evidence is certainly suggestive enough to encourage further exploration. As currently 
only a small fraction of extant species and even taxonomic groups have been studied to 
determine sentience, the boundaries are still unclear. 
Studies in animal sentience inform animal welfare science as to the appropriate targets for 
study – once an animal species has been identified as sentient, the conditions for its welfare are 
then an open question. The conceptual and methodological underpinnings of sentience research 
and welfare science will also inform each other in important ways, as I will detail in Chapter 
Eight. 
 
1.1.3. How do we measure animal welfare? 
Once we’ve accepted that animal welfare is morally important, and that there are some 
animals that possess the relevant capacities for welfare, the final question is then how we can 
measure their welfare and investigate under what conditions the lives of these animals will be 
improved or worsened. There has historically been scepticism about our ability to gain 
information about mental states, which we are unable to access directly, though this view is 
uncommon today. The behaviouristic tradition of the early and mid 20th century relied solely 
on descriptions of environment and behaviour – stimulus and response – to describe animals 
(Panksepp, 2005). Mental states were not considered appropriate targets for study, and instead 
focus was shifted to external, observable behavioural variables. It is true that studying sentience 
is difficult, as it relates to subjective mental experiences, which are necessarily private and 
cannot be directly related to particular anatomy or physiology. Even with developments in 
neuroscience linking brain activity to specific emotions, we still cannot gain complete certainty 
about the mental states of others (Proctor, 2012). Particularly since we cannot communicate 
directly with animals through speech, we are entirely reliant on indirect indicators of sentience. 
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However, this does not mean we cannot be confident in the knowledge we can gain through 
these means. There has been widespread opposition to this sort of scepticism: “that one cannot 
oneself experience the feelings of another person or animal does not mean that one has no 
access to the other’s feelings at all” (Wemelsfelder, 1997, p. 9). Many areas of science – 
including human psychology - similarly rely on indirect access to their targets, but are still able 
to progress successfully. Animal sentience or welfare research should not require a higher 
standard: “whilst other areas of science will often make do with imperfect data, animal 
sentience is required to buck the trend and provide unequivocal proof” (Proctor, Carder, & 
Cornish, 2013, p. 883). We must of course be cautious about collection and use of our data 
under these conditions. Jones (2013) argues that “since our epistemic access to the mental lives 
of animals is even more limited than access to each other’s minds, we must be cautious about 
cognitive attributions, and selective about the kinds of evidence for such attributions we have 
at our disposal” (2013, p. 3). We should thus be looking for “robust and valid evidence of 
animal sentience” (Proctor, 2012, p. 630). Although some prominent animal welfare 
researchers (e.g. Dawkins, 2008) still contend that subjective experience is ‘untestable’, as we 
cannot determine whether observed indicators are necessarily linked to corresponding 
subjective states, we should not require such certainty. Though we may never have direct 
access to the contents of mental states, we can refine our background theory and methods to 
obtain increasingly accurate data that is best explained by the presence of subjective experience 
(a claim I will develop further in Chapter Five). Through careful observation and 
experimentation, we may still hope to gain solid understanding of animal mental states and 
welfare.  
I will argue further for this position – that subjective mental states are measurable – in 
Chapters Two and Four, as well as discussing in Chapter Five how we might find valid 
indicators of animal mental states. These problems mean that we need extra caution in 
collecting and interpreting data, but not that we should abandon research of this type entirely. 









1.2. Animal welfare science 
Animal welfare science is an applied area of biology, looking at how we can measure the 
welfare of animals. It draws on work in a range of biological sciences, including behavioural 
ecology, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, animal behaviour, genetics and cognitive science 
(Dawkins, 2006). Where we are concerned about animals and their welfare – such as when 
working with animals, using their products, or just as a result of caring about them - it is 
obviously critical to understand how to measure welfare; how it is that we can know when they 
are doing better or worse. As I will argue in Chapter Two, animal welfare should be understood 
as consisting in the subjective experience of animals over their lifetime, and thus animal 
welfare science is at its core, a scientific inquiry into the contents of animal experience. The 
private nature of subjective experience raises particular issues for measurement, and these will 
be addressed throughout this thesis. Even for those who may not accept this view of welfare, 
the problems discussed are still relevant; they will arise for any view which accepts that 
subjective experience comprises at least part of the welfare of animals. 
Animal welfare science aims at measuring the welfare of animals. Scientists use different 
indicators, such as changes in behaviour or of physiological variables such as heartrate, to 
measure the changes in welfare under different conditions. So, we might want to test whether 
chickens are less stressed in the company of conspecifics, and could look for the presence of 
stress hormones to find out. Or we might want to see whether a mouse prefers woodchip 
flooring to sawdust flooring and use a choice test to see which one it chooses.  Or we might 
want to determine whether a high level of visitor contact is detrimental to a bear in a zoo, 
through measuring levels of stereotypic behaviour. All these are examples of the practice of 
animal welfare science. 
Animal welfare science is important because without objective measurement, all we can do 
is rely on our best guesses as to what animals might want, or what is good for them, and these 
guesses can often be wrong. For example, many zoo visitors prefer monkeys to be displayed 
in naturalistic open-air enclosures, thinking them better for welfare (Kagan & Veasey, 2010). 
But the monkeys feel differently – cage-style exhibits often provide more climbing surfaces 
and opportunities for activity, promoting good welfare (Browning & Maple, 2019). Similarly, 
chickens being caught up for transport can be harvested from their cages by hand, or by 
machines. Most people assume human handling would be preferable for welfare, but changes 
in heart rate and fear behaviour indicate the machine handling is better for the chickens 
(Duncan, Slee, Kettlewell, Berry, & Carlisle, 1986). Although one might think that animals 
would minimise the amount of work they need to do to receive food, preference tests show that 
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in many cases, animals will choose to work for food over obtaining it for free (a phenomenon 
known as ‘contrafreeloading’) (Osborne, 1977). These sorts of counterintuitive results are not 
uncommon, and it is for this reason we need an objective science of animal welfare to gather 
information about what is good or bad for welfare, from the point of view of the animals 
themselves. We need to find and use valid and reliable external measures of the internal 
experiences of animals, ones that are not influenced by the subjective values and opinions of 
experimenters. 
Animal welfare science is a relatively new discipline, having come into prominence in the 
1970s and 1980s and continuing to grow and develop, tracking a general increasing public 
interest in animal welfare concerns (Lawrence, 2008). Its origin followed the publication of 
Ruth Harrison’s Animal Machines in 1964 (Harrison, 1964), detailing the conditions of animal 
housing within intensive agriculture, and the subsequent Brambell report on animal welfare 
(Brambell, 1965) commissioned by the British government. This report highlighted the 
production practices of most concern, listed what they considered to be the most important 
welfare provisions, and outlined the need for scientific research into animal welfare. This led 
to an increase in applied animal behavioural studies, looking to develop methods for seeing the 
world from the ‘animal perspective’ (Lawrence, 2008). The publication of Animal Suffering by 
Marian Stamp Dawkins in 1980 (Dawkins, 1980), critically assessing the different methods of 
measuring welfare, was an important landmark in the development of this new science. 
Historically, there has been a primary focus on animal pain and suffering (see e.g. Dawkins, 
1980). Welfare science has looked to measure whether (or how much) animals are suffering, 
and under what conditions this occurs. Almost all studies in welfare science focussed on 
measures of suffering, such as behavioural and physiological signs of fear and stress. This tied 
to an idea that absence of negative states was sufficient for good animal welfare (Mellor & 
Stafford, 2008). It is true that the primary goal of animal welfare interventions is usually to 
prevent suffering, due to its greater urgency and impact. However, there is increasing 
recognition that while the prevention of suffering is necessary for welfare, it is not sufficient. 
As well as removing these negative experiences, there is a need to focus on providing positive 
experiences (Yeates & Main, 2008; Sandøe & Jensen, 2011). Once suffering is removed, and 
animals are existing at a neutral baseline, it is not the case that there is nothing more that could 
be done. Welfare is more than just the absence of suffering – it is also the presence of positive 
states, such as pleasure or satisfaction. For those working with animals in situations such as 
zoos, in which (if all is going well) there should be limited suffering, there is still reason to be 
interested in how to improve welfare. In considering animal welfare and the question of what 
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animals want, we should move beyond the mere prevention of suffering to include the 
promotion of positive states. There is then space here to find measures of positive welfare – 
signs of improved welfare above this neutral baseline. Modern animal welfare science works 
on measuring both positive and negative welfare states. 
 
1.3. The role of philosophy in animal welfare science 
Animal welfare science is not a science that has been the focus of much philosophical 
attention. Although philosophy of animal ethics is common, philosophy focussing on animal 
welfare science is rare. By contrast, the measurement of human wellbeing is the subject of huge 
amounts of work within psychology, economics and philosophy. Despite this lack, there are 
definitely many ways in which philosophical methods can be used to analyse the 
methodologies and concepts used in this science. One of the aims of the work in this thesis is 
to remedy this lack of attention in animal welfare.  
To make the scope of this work clearer, with regards to the role of philosophical analysis, 
we can draw a comparison to another scientific discipline which is similar in many ways and 
has been the recent focus of philosophical study. This is the science of conservation biology. 
Conservation biology is centrally the science of how to measure and preserve biodiversity. 
There are many similarities between the two disciplines: 
• Both aim at finding measures of a central target concept: conservation biology 
focuses on biodiversity, and animal welfare science on welfare, but both contain 
similar issues in defining and using a central concept 
• Both require the use of surrogate measures to get at the target: conservation biology 
uses many surrogate measures - such as species richness or levels of endemism – to 
represent biodiversity in a region, while animal welfare science uses indicators such 
as physiology or behaviour to represent the underlying state of welfare in an animal 
• Both are value-laden: both sciences are aiming to measure and promote something 
that is considered to be of value and the concepts must therefore do normative as 
well as scientific work 
• Both are multi-disciplinary: both sciences draw on the work of many disciplines 
within the sciences and humanities 
• Both have a practical and a theoretical component: both sciences work in a 
theoretical manner - determining which are the best measures for the particular 
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target; and then in a practical manner – using these measures to make judgements 
about particular situations 
• Both must often work with partial and incomplete data: because of the importance 
of action in conservation or welfare protection, these disciplines cannot wait for 
complete data to become available before making decisions 
• Both require consideration of trade-offs: in considering promoting the central value, 
both disciplines must consider trade-offs in use of resources to maximise outcomes, 
as well as trade-offs with other competing values (e.g. human interests) 
• Both raise issues of commensurability: both sciences must try to compare measured 
values between quite different entities – welfare in distantly related species, or 
biodiversity in dissimilar ecosystems 
The goals of philosophical work in animal welfare science are thus similar to those in 
conservation biology – to elucidate the central concept, to analyse how surrogate measures 
might map onto this concept, and to examine what areas of research might best lead to the 
desired outcomes for the science. Similarly too for health science, another discipline which has 
a descriptive and normative component, requires the use of proxy measures, and involves 
calculating trade-offs between competing values. 
As discussed in Section 1.2, animal welfare science is a strong emerging discipline, but there 
is the need for conceptual and methodological clarity and sophistication in this science if it is 
to play the relevant informative role for our practical and ethical decision-making. There is 
thus is a strong role here for philosophical analysis for this purpose. 
 
1.4. Overview of the thesis 
The central aim of this thesis is to provide an account of how we can measure subjective 
animal welfare, addressing some of the potential problems that may arise in this particular 
scientific endeavour. The two questions I will be answering are: what is animal welfare, and 
how do we measure it? 
Part One of the thesis looks at the subjective concept of animal welfare and its applications. 
There are multiple ways of understanding animal welfare, and what it consists in. The most 
common views are subjective experience, physical functioning, teleology (naturalness) and 
preferences. In Chapter Two, I argue for the subjective welfare view; that animal welfare 
should be understood as the subjective experience of individuals over their lifetimes. A welfare 
concept needs to play both scientific and normative roles, and I will describe how the subjective 
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welfare concept meets the requirements of being normatively significant, fundamental and 
measurable. I address some potential objections to understanding welfare subjectively, 
particularly those coming from the literature on human wellbeing. I then go on to examine the 
other candidate welfare concepts and argue that none of them succeed; in fact they are only 
relevant to welfare insofar as they impact on subjective experience.  
The way we understand welfare will have effects on our science and our ethics. In Chapter 
Three, I will look at how the subjective welfare concept informs our ethical decision-making 
in two different cases in applied animal ethics. The first is the practice of management 
euthanasia used in zoos: where otherwise healthy individuals are killed when surplus to the 
requirements of breeding programs, in order to create space for other animals. The second is 
in de-extinction programs: in which cloning, genetic engineering or back-breeding techniques 
are used to re-create extinct species. In both of these cases, I discuss the potential welfare harms 
- as understood subjectively - and how we might look at trading these off with other competing 
values to make decisions on the acceptability of these practices.  
Part Two of the thesis looks more closely at the scientific role of welfare. Understanding 
welfare subjectively creates unique measurement problems, due to the necessarily private 
nature of mental states. As discussed above, this shouldn’t make us think that measurement of 
welfare is impossible, but should give us reason to be cautious about our methods and of how 
we interpret our results. I begin in Chapter Four by addressing the question of whether 
subjective experience is measurable – not in the general sense of detecting subjective states as 
discussed above, but whether it is an appropriately quantifiable target for scientific inquiry. I 
will examine welfare through the lens of measurement theory and argue that welfare is 
meaningfully quantifiable and we can do so using a ratio scale.  
One problem arising from measurement of subjective welfare is in how we validate our 
measurement indicators. We cannot directly access the mental states of others, and so must use 
indirect proxy indicators for our measurement. For such indictors to be valid, it must be the 
case that they are measuring the intended target state, and not some other object. Indicators can 
usually be validated through looking for correlation between target and indicator under 
controlled manipulations, but where we cannot access the target state directly, this is not 
possible. In Chapter Five, I address this issue and outline a procedure, using robustness 
analysis, that allows us to validate the indicators of hidden target variables such as welfare. 
Another problem in measurement of welfare is how we can make welfare comparisons 
between individuals. Often, we will need to make such comparisons – such as when deciding 
on fair allocation of resources – but as we don’t necessarily have reason to think that the welfare 
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capacities of different individuals are the same, we can’t make direct comparisons. In Chapter 
Six, I describe the similarity assumptions we need to make in order to make such comparisons, 
and the conditions under which they are likely to be justified. I also discuss what we might do 
in cases where the assumptions fail to hold. 
Taking animal welfare to consist in the subjective mental states of animals also poses an 
additional problem, as there are a large variety of such states. It is not obvious that these are of 
the same kind, such that we could compare them in making decisions about trade-offs between 
different positive and negative experiences, or combine them all into a single metric of welfare. 
In Chapter Seven I argue that we have good reasons to think that there is a ‘common currency’ 
underlying different mental states, that will allow us to compare or combine these states as 
needed for assessing welfare or making management decisions. I will also describe the 
procedures by which we might go about determining the weightings of different mental states 
in their contribution to overall welfare. 
Finally, in the Conclusion I will discuss the implications of all these problems and solutions 
for the practice of welfare science and indicate useful future directions for research. In 
particular, continuing animal sentience research - examining the evolution and functioning of 






PART ONE – THE SUBJECTIVE 










As discussed in Chapter One, the goal of animal welfare science is to measure the state of 
welfare in an animal, and how it changes under different conditions, using a variety of 
behavioural and physiological indicators. This science therefore requires use of a meaningful 
welfare concept, describing what it is we’re trying to measure – what comprises the state of 
welfare itself. In this chapter I argue that subjective welfare – the experience of positive and 
negative mental states by the animal - should be understood as the primary state of animal 
welfare, and that this concept fulfils the requirements for a concept of welfare. I will also 
describe the common competing concepts - a tripartite welfare concept, under which welfare 
consists in feeling good (subjective welfare), functioning well (physical welfare) and living 
naturally (teleological welfare), and a preference-based concept under which welfare consists 
in meeting animal preferences – and show how the other proposed components (physical, 
teleological and preferences) can be collapsed onto subjective welfare. These components may 
form an important part of the conditions required for the realisation of good welfare, but do not 
themselves comprise the state of welfare. 
To clarify some terminology: I will use the term ‘state’ of welfare to refer to the base state 
that we are interested in. The state of welfare is that underlying property that constitutes 
welfare; that thing which is affected by changes in conditions and in virtue of which we say 
that welfare is increasing or decreasing. This is what will be captured by the subjective welfare 
concept I will describe. This state is typically understood to be continuous, on a continuum 
from good to poor welfare. The properties of welfare and its measurement will be described in 
more detail in Chapter Four. Next there are the conditions for welfare – those things that will 
serve to increase or decrease welfare, such as, say, food quality or social companionship. These 
are factors which are instrumentally important for welfare, as they impact on the state itself, 
but do not themselves determine welfare (Kagan et al., 2015). Welfare science is concerned 
with finding out what these are for different species. Finally, there are the indicators of welfare, 
those behavioural and physiological measures that are used to determine whether an animal is 
experiencing good or poor welfare (see e.g. Kagan & Veasey, 2010). For example, we might 
imagine investigating a pig in a sow stall – we could look at measures of stereotypic behaviour 
and blood cortisol levels, in comparison with a pig on straw bedding. The behavioural measures 
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and hormone sampling would be the indicators of welfare. The housing (sow stall or straw bed) 
would be the conditions for welfare. What it is that’s being improved or worsened under these 
conditions would be what comprises the state of welfare. These distinctions are laid out in 
Table 2.1. 
 
 Definition Examples 
Welfare state Property that constitutes welfare  Subjective experience, physical 
health, preferences 
Welfare conditions Things that make life better or worse Housing type, diet, social 
interactions 
Welfare indicators Measures used to determine changes 
in welfare 
Heart rate, choice tests, blood 
cortisol, vocalisation 
Table 2.1: Distinctions in welfare terminology 
 
In order to practice this science, it is plainly important to have a meaningful concept of 
welfare. We need to be clear on exactly what it is we mean when we speak of welfare – what 
it is that comprises this state in an animal. Without knowing exactly what it is that we’re trying 
to measure, we can’t hope to assess which conditions matter, or which indicators will be the 
most accurate. 
This also has applications for those who interact with animals, such as those who keep 
captive animals. As a large part of their job should be ensuring the greatest welfare of their 
charges, it is of central importance that there is a clear understanding of what welfare is, to 
prevent spending time and resources on providing conditions that may appear to increase 
welfare without actually doing so. Think, for example, of the zoo manager who may decide to 
house all primates on ‘island’ style exhibits, rather than aviary-style cages, in the thought that 
it is more naturalistic and creates a sense of freedom. Instead, the arboreal animals are denied 
the cage walls and roof they could have otherwise enjoyed using as locomotory surfaces (see 
Browning & Maple, 2019). It is thus important that a conception of welfare be tied to the 







2.2. The case for subjective welfare 
The concept of welfare plays two roles – a normative role and a scientific role. It is therefore 
important that the concept we use is sufficient for both of these roles. The overall goal of the 
science and practice of animal welfare is to determine how to maximise welfare, an end which 
is considered morally important. Thus, in order to fill the normative role, welfare must be 
something that is valuable, something that matters morally. Fraser et al. (1997) describe welfare 
as a ‘bridging concept’, linking science and ethics. This requires a concept that is “amenable 
to scientific study” (Fraser et al., 1997, p. 188) but also reflects the underlying ethical concerns 
people attach to welfare. 
The scientific role of welfare is primarily as a target for investigation – a state we want to 
measure and to understand – and therefore in order to fill the scientific role, it must be 
something that is measurable. If we take welfare to be the appropriate target for investigation, 
a central concept in itself rather than a property or proxy of some other state, it must also be 
something which is fundamental. As well as playing a normative role in our moral 
deliberations, welfare can play an explanatory and predictive role in biological sciences. As I 
will discuss in Chapter Seven, welfare (understood as the combination of negative and positive 
experiences) may also play a role in determining how animals make trade-offs and decide on 
particular actions and so understanding this type of integrated subjective experience will help 
us understand animal behaviour. 
Webster (2005, p. 2) also differentiates between the scientific and the moral roles that the 
concept of welfare needs to play. In this work, he suggests that the concept will vary depending 
on the different application – with scientists taking something like Broom’s (1986) concept of 
coping within an environment, considering physical and mental states, physiological and 
behavioural needs, while those concerned with ethics focus more upon the subjective 
experience, and the fact that animal feelings matter to the animals. It is clear that there are 
different roles for the concept, and these may have different requirements. However, in the end, 
we want these to refer to the same entity, and so require a single concept to work in both areas. 
If we were to adopt a different concept for the moral role than for the scientific role, we would 
then lose the ability to use the findings from welfare science in our moral deliberations, without 
constructing an additional framework to map one concept to the other. As informing moral 
decision-making is one of the primary functions of animal welfare science, using different 
concepts would be detrimental. We need a concept that captures the basic state that is of 
scientific interest, and morally relevant. 
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The conception of welfare I will be arguing for is a subjective concept. Subjective welfare 
theory takes welfare to consist in the subjective mental states of the animal, often also called 
‘affects’5 (Mellor, 2012). These states include (among others) hunger, breathlessness, pain, 
fear, curiosity and joy. Positive mental states add to welfare, negative mental states subtract 
from it. This is similar to the hedonist position in human welfare (Crisp, 2017), though not 
necessarily committed to pleasure as the only positive mental state. A note on terminology here 
– throughout the thesis, I will be using terms such as ‘pleasure’, ‘enjoyment’, ‘happiness’ and 
‘satisfaction’. These are meant only as general terms, as stand-ins for the suite of positive 
mental states, whatever they may be, and not as any type of commitment to what the nature of 
these states may actually be. As per Duncan (2009), “the strong negative feelings are often 
lumped together as ‘suffering’ and the positive feelings as ‘pleasure’” (2009, p. 2); though I 
continue the practice here, it does not imply a strong commitment to the grouping of these 
states. In Chapter Seven, I will take a closer look at the types of positive and negative 
experiences that comprise welfare, and how they may relate to one another and interact to 
create the overall state of welfare, taking up the issue of commensurability. 
Under a subjective conception, welfare consists in the experience of an animal over its 
lifetime6. This then requires an animal be sentient – i.e. capable of some form of subjective 
experience – in order to have welfare. Some writers have argued that this is a form of 
‘sentientism’, where non-sentient forms of life (or even non-life) are excluded. However, this 
is not meant to imply a strong claim about what matters morally. Although, as I will argue, 
welfare is of moral importance, this does not necessarily mean it is the only thing that is. Non-
sentient organisms may have a ‘good’ in a weaker sense that could still be considered in moral 
decision-making. But sentience is morally important - though perhaps not the only type of 
moral claim, it is a unique one (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011). 
The subjective conception of welfare is common throughout the animal welfare literature. 
Singer (1995) considers sentience – the ability to experience pleasure and pain – as grounding 
animal interests, which he takes as central to welfare. Tom Regan (1983) describes animal 
welfare as “the experiential quality of their life, as considered over time” (1983, p. 96), where 
this ‘experiential quality’ refers to life from the point of view of the animal; their subjective 
 
5 Some preference-based accounts of human welfare are referred to as ‘subjective’ as they are grounded in 
(subjective) preferences. Here I use subjective welfare to refer to the narrower ‘hedonistic’ view and will consider 
preferences separately in Section 2.4.3. 
6 There are additional considerations as to whether it is simply the total number of experiences that matter for 
welfare, or also their distribution throughout the lifetime. These ‘shape of life’ concerns are important, but will 
not be considered here; it is sufficient for this work to take some function of lifetime subjective experience as 
determining welfare. 
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experience7. Grandin (2009) focuses her discussion on animal welfare on providing for the 
emotional needs of animals: “I believe the best way to create good living conditions for any 
animal . . . is to base animal welfare programs on the core emotion systems in the brain” (2009, 
p. 3). This is strongly based in a subjective view of welfare, in which what really matters are 
the mental states underlying particular behaviours or husbandry conditions (emotions in this 
work being taken as conscious experiences). Maple and Perdue (2013) use the concept of 
‘wellness’, defined as “a balance of mind, body, and spirit that results in an overall feeling of 
well-being” (2013, p. 49) – importantly here it is the overall ‘feeling of well-being’, or 
subjective experience, that is central. Recently, work by David Mellor (e.g. Mellor, 2016) has 
argued for a ‘Five Domains’ model of welfare, where the four physical domains (nutrition, 
environment, health and behaviour) matter only in relation to their impact on the fifth domain, 
of subjective experience. In this model, subjective experience is considered to be the central 
state comprising welfare, with the other four domains acting as conditions affecting this. 
Subjective welfare is a commonly used conception of welfare and, I will argue, is the best way 
of understanding animal welfare, as it is normatively significant, fundamental, and measurable. 
This debate mirrors one in human wellbeing, where this subjective or ‘hedonic’ view of welfare 
is typically rejected. In Section 2.3.2 I will discuss the reasons why, and argue that the reasons 
we have for accepting or rejecting such a concept in the human case will not necessarily also 
apply in the animal case. The goal of this chapter is to establish the subjective welfare concept 
for animals and thus I take no strong stand on whether the same considerations apply in the 
human case. 
 
2.2.1. Subjective welfare is normatively significant 
Firstly, let’s look at the normative role for welfare. Welfare is morally important. “Any 
conception of animal welfare inherently involves values because it pertains to what is better or 
worse for animals” (Fraser et al., 1997, p. 188). It is a central target for many moral theories 
(Crisp, 2017). Many of our ethical deliberations revolve around ways to increase or ensure 
welfare, or wellbeing. Utilitarian ethical theories take welfare as the primary target of moral 
behaviour, with the aim of performing acts which maximise welfare (Sinnott-Armstrong, 
2015). Deontological ethical theories focus primarily on rights (Alexander & Moore, 2016), 
but particularly within the animal realm, these are often aimed in service of protecting interests 
 
7 Though Regan would take capacity of welfare of this type as insufficient for moral consideration; an animal 
must also possess additional mental capacities that make it what he calls the ‘subject of a life’. 
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or welfare (Cochrane, 2012; Regan, 1983). Welfarist theories take welfare to be the only thing 
that is morally important (Crisp, 2017).  As welfare plays a central role in many moral theories, 
the concept we use to fill this role must therefore contain something we consider valuable. As 
I will now show, subjective experience succeeds in doing so. 
It is highly intuitive that sentience, or subjective experience, is morally important. This is 
suggested by the fact that much of the work on why we should care about animals - why we 
should consider them morally important - focuses on their subjective experience. Sentience is 
a primary target for most utilitarian ethical theories, tracing back to Bentham (1879), who 
endorsed a ‘sentiency criterion’ for utilitarianism (Frey, 2011), “to an extent that this criterion 
has become virtually identified with utilitarian approaches to the moral status of animals” 
(Beauchamp, 2011a, p. 9). This has been reinforced by more modern work by Peter Singer 
(1995), who also identifies sentience as the ground for moral consideration. Many other views 
in animal ethics also take sentience, or some form of subjective experience as necessary (if not 
sufficient) for moral standing. Tom Regan (1983) in his work on animal rights focusses on 
being the ‘subject of a life’ as grounding rights, which requires sentience alongside additional 
capacities such as agency and a sense of identity over time. Other work on rights grounds rights 
in possession of interests, which arise from the capacity to experience pleasure or suffering 
(sentience) (e.g. Beauchamp, 2011b; Cochrane, 2012; Gruen, 2011). Korsgaard’s Kantian-
based animal ethics focusses on possession of a ‘natural good’ - grounded in sentience, or 
having an awareness that can make things good or bad for an individual - as creating grounds 
for duties towards animals (Korsgaard, 2011). Even virtue ethicists can see recognition of the 
sentience of nonhuman animals as giving rise to virtues such as compassion and respect in our 
interactions with them: “any of the vices listed above and the virtues opposed to them may be 
manifested in relation to our treatment of and attitudes to sentient animals” (Hursthouse, 2011, 
p. 124). 
This focus on the moral importance of subjective experience also comes across in much of 
the work in animal welfare science. It is emphasised in the early work of Dawkins (1980, 1988, 
1990, 1998) – that animal welfare concerns the subjective experiences of animals, in particular 
their suffering. Fraser (1999) states that “the study of animal welfare is at least partly an attempt 
to understand the animal’s own perceptions of its quality of life” (1999, p. 183).  The general 
claim is that it is the first-person experience of their own good which makes sentience morally 
significant: “It is the fact that sentient beings care about how their lives go that generates a 
distinctive moral claim on us” (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011, p. 33). In some cases, this seems 
intended as a stronger claim about self-awareness, but for the most part rests simply on the 
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capacity to experience. Singer (1995) similarly argues that “a stone does not have interests 
because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its 
welfare” (1995, p. 8). Almost all the major contributions to the literature emphasise the moral 
relevance of subjective experience, reinforcing the intuitive pull of this claim: that subjective 
experience is valuable. 
As well as being composed of something of normative worth, we want our welfare concept 
to identify the bearers of this worth. As welfare is morally important, it follows that if a creature 
is one such that it can experience greater or lesser welfare, then this is the sort of creature we 
should care about. If welfare matters morally, then so do the bearers of welfare. Beings capable 
of experiencing welfare are those which should form a part of our moral deliberations8. In 
defining the concept of welfare and what it consists in, we will also be making some ruling on 
what types of beings invoke this sort of care. Subjective welfare allows us to make this 
distinction. As per Jeremy Bentham’s famous quote: “The question is not, Can they reason? 
nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Bentham, 1879, p. 309). It is the capacity for 
pleasure and suffering, as experienced subjectively, that provides cause for moral concern and 
delineates those we should give consideration to from those we shouldn’t. 
Our moral consideration of those beings we attribute with subjective experience certainly 
seems to differ from the consideration of those beings or objects that are thought to lack it. 
Sentience provides an experience of good-for-the-animal, as opposed to merely ‘good of its 
kind’, which we may see in plants, or human artifacts. “They are aware of how they feel and it 
matters to them” (Webster, 1994, p. 249). It is the states of pleasure or suffering that make 
animal welfare important – why most people would consider it problematic to pull the ear off 
a cat but not the branch off a tree. If then, the reason we care about animal welfare at all is 
because it matters to the animal, then it seems logical to say that it is this experience that is 
constitutive of welfare. Subjective experience is necessary for moral consideration and thus 
subjective welfare is normatively significant. This of course still leaves open the possibility 
that other things may also be normatively significant, and in Section 2.4 I will identify other 
possible contenders and argue that they are only instrumentally so, in virtue of their effects on 




8 Though, as mentioned earlier, may not compose the entire moral community; we may have other reasons to 
value other organisms or objects, but this will usually be a weaker consideration. 
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2.2.2. Subjective welfare is fundamental 
There are a couple of ways in which we can consider subjective experience to be 
fundamental to welfare, such that facts about welfare are grounded in facts about subjective 
experience. The first is that it is a necessary component of welfare – it does not seem possible 
to characterise welfare without it. As previously discussed, almost all accounts of animal 
welfare include subjective experience. Even the alternative accounts discussed later in the 
chapter, such as preference satisfaction, typically include subjective experience as a part of the 
account, alongside other properties. Subjective experiencing is a necessary prerequisite for 
welfare considerations. None of the other views typically grant welfare status to beings or 
objects without sentience, even if they take welfare to consist in something more than merely 
the sentient experience itself. A plant may do better or worse in some way under particular 
conditions, but it does not seem to most that it has a welfare that is being harmed. Although it 
is certainly true that it may in some sense do better or worse, this is not considered a welfare 
concern. “Although plants, bacteria, viruses and cells in cultures are alive and may be said to 
have needs, there is no reason to believe they have interests. That is, there is not a shred of 
evidence that these things have any awareness or consciousness and consequently we cannot 
say that the fulfillment and thwarting of these needs ‘matters’ to them anymore than getting oil 
matters to a car” (Rollin, 2006, p. 104). A plant or single-celled organism can function more 
or less well under particular conditions, can even act to promote its own survival, but this does 
not seem enough to grant it welfare. There needs to be something more, and this something 
more is subjective experience. It is a fundamental necessary component of welfare. Even for 
those who might nevertheless wish to deny this strong claim, it is still the case that where an 
animal has the capacity for subjective experience, the content of this experience is central to 
its welfare.  
The second is that it is intrinsically important to welfare. That is, it is not a concept that can 
be understood as important due to its instrumental effects on some other component (or set of 
components) of welfare; it cannot be collapsed onto any other state. There is no further 
‘something else’ that subjective experience influences in order to create welfare change. I will 
demonstrate this in Section 2.4 and show that the reverse is actually true - subjective experience 
underlies all the other components that can be thought of as important to welfare. These can all 
be understood as instrumentally important through their effects on subjective experience and 
thus can be collapsed onto subjective welfare, establishing that it is the more fundamental 
concept. 
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Finally, it seems that subjective experience could also play a fundamental psychological 
role. Webster (2005) describes psychological processes in animals as the reception, 
categorisation and interpretation of stimuli. The animal experiences something, perceives it, 
then categorises the experience according to its conceptual framework and ends with an 
interpretation of the experience that is either a positive or a negative emotion. This final stage 
is subjective experience, which then forms the basis for learning, motivation and behaviour. 
Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019) similarly propose a model in which animals encounter different 
stimuli, and the effects of their interactions with these will cause feedback in the form of 
subjective experience and a ‘felt value’ which will then help guide future motivation and 
action. In Chapter Seven, I will look at how this categorisation and compiling of experience 
can then function to help animals consider trade-offs between competing demands and thus 
make decisions for action, so that other psychological processes flow from this more 
fundamental state. Similarly, work on cognitive bias demonstrates how mood - an overall 
emotional state integrating a variety of affects and roughly equivalent to welfare experience at 
a time - can influence behaviour and decision-making (e.g. Baciadonna & McElligott, 2015; 
Clegg, 2018; Mendl, Burman, Parker, & Paul, 2009). Subjective experience is thus likely to be 
a fundamental psychological process, and one that can play a causal and explanatory role in 
other processes and behaviours. 
 
2.2.3. Subjective welfare is measurable 
Welfare is the central target of welfare science, which aims to measure changes in welfare 
under different conditions. It is thus crucial for this scientific role that welfare is something 
measurable. Although not all concepts used in science may refer to measurable states, 
measurement is certainly the aim of animal welfare science and thus measurability matters 
here. Perhaps the biggest potential problem with a subjective conception of welfare, is thus 
whether it can ever be of any practical use as a scientific concept in this sense. As subjective 
states are necessarily private, how is it that we might ever measure them, to know anything 
about the welfare of other animals?  
In essence, this concern is a version of the problem of other minds. That is, how it is we 
might know whether creatures other than ourselves (including other human beings) have minds 
at all, as opposed to being complex non-conscious ‘machines’, and how we might gain access 
to the contents of their experience. This is a problem in philosophy even for knowing the minds 
of other humans, where we can use language to attempt to communicate. For animals that 
cannot communicate in this way, it is even more difficult to ascertain their private mental states. 
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For many decades, the tradition of behaviourism in psychology, starting with Watson (1913) 
held that we could not investigate conscious states; that in fact it was unscientific to ask such 
questions. We could only ever have information on what animals do, never what they think or 
feel. However, within animal studies, this tradition has become less popular and most scientists 
accept “that some bodily states and behaviour can be used as reasonably reliable guides to what 
a human or other animal is experiencing” (Dawkins, 1980, p. 11). If we accept that these sorts 
of tests are accessing subjective experience, then it is measurable. Indeed, unless we think 
subjective experience is epiphenomenal, having no causal impact on the world, then there must 
be behavioural and physiological effects of mental states, which we can then detect and can 
form the basis for measurement (see Chapter Four for discussion of why subjective welfare is 
also a measurable entity). 
The arguments for assuming the presence of other minds take the form of arguments from 
analogy and parsimony – we assume others have minds because of their similarities to 
ourselves, and because we have no reason to assume ourselves to be the privileged unique. 
These same arguments can apply in the case of animals. Although they are different from us in 
many ways, there are behavioural, physiological and evolutionary similarities that would 
suggest that they also possess minds. While the sceptical worry may be correct that we can 
never be certain that we have accurately gauged the mental state of an animal, there certainly 
seem to be methods by which we can make a close estimate, using their behaviour and 
physiology. Tests such as preference tests appear to give powerful information as to the mental 
states of animals; at the very least to reveal what they find rewarding or aversive. 
There are then of course further issues to do with the measurement of welfare, which I will 
address in the second part of the thesis, such as how accurately we can measure it, what type 
of measurement scale we can use, and whether we can compare welfare experience across time 
or across individuals and between different types of mental states. These concerns are 
important ones and will be discussed in detail in later chapters. For now, it is sufficient to 









2.3. Objections to subjective welfare 
2.3.1. Torpid Tigers 
I have shown that we have good reason to think that subjective experience is constitutive of 
the state of welfare, and that it is adequate for both the normative and scientific roles the 
concept must fulfil. What, then, are the potential problems with it? The primary objection to a 
subjective welfare account is that it will end up being too narrow, requiring other components 
to fully capture welfare (as per the tripartite conception that will be discussed further on). That 
is, we might have an animal that perfectly meets the subjective criterion for welfare, but we 
would still not want to say it is experiencing ideal welfare, without adding some other 
conditions. 
Take this animal, the ‘torpid tiger’9. Tigers can be challenging for zoo managers, as they are 
wide-ranging carnivores in the wild, and in captivity can become frustrated if unable to perform 
roaming, hunting and killing behaviours (Szokalski, Litchfield, & Foster, 2012). This 
frequently manifests in pacing, and tigers are often seen moving up and down a single fence of 
their exhibit on what is clearly a well-worn path. Now we imagine that one zoo manager, eager 
to combat this obvious welfare issue in tigers, begins a breeding program. They select only the 
quietest tigers, those that seem to prefer sleeping to roaming or hunting. After a few 
generations, they have created the ‘torpid tiger’. This animal shows no desire to hunt or kill, as 
evidenced by its lack of interest in enrichment items designed to channel these behaviours. It 
does not pace, instead choosing to rest and sleep throughout its days, rousing only to eat when 
necessary10. It seems this animal has great subjective welfare – it has what it wants and is happy 
all the time. And yet, our instinct is that there is something wrong with this picture. There is 
something lost in the ‘tigerness’ of this animal. It does not have ideal welfare11. This is similar 
to the ‘adaptive preferences’ criticism of subjective welfare concepts in the human case, which 
will be discussed in Section 2.3.2. 
There are two lines of response to this case. The first is to refute that there is any real 
problem with welfare, claiming instead that the problem simply lies within our own 
expectations. The second is to identify the lack not within the tiger itself, but in where we set 
our baseline – by what standards we judge the ‘best’ level of subjective welfare. 
 
9 This example and discussion also appears in Browning, H. (2019a). The natural behaviour debate: Two 
conceptions of animal welfare. Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science: 1-13. 
10 A similar real-world example is presented by Sandøe et al. (2014), with blind hens who do not engage in feather-
pecking or cannibalistic behaviour when kept in intensive housing systems and thus may have increased welfare. 
11 A similar challenge is sometimes presented, with the example of whether it would be considered beneficial to 
animals’ welfare to consistently drug them into a state of happiness, and I think roughly the same set of replies 
presented here also applies in that case. 
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In the first instance, it seems entirely possible to refute that there is a welfare problem here 
at all. Perhaps our intuitions are just incorrect. Rather than our feeling of ‘wrongness’ reflecting 
any welfare problem with our torpid tiger, it simply reflects our own biases - as Rollin (2006) 
puts it, “a queasiness that is at its root aesthetic” (2006, p. 128). We are conditioned to seeing 
tigers in particular ways, to enjoying certain features of them. When we see a tiger that lacks 
these features, we are disappointed. This certainly seems to be the case with the multitude of 
zoo visitors who constantly express their dismay at seeing sleeping animals, apparently 
unaware that most animals – particularly big cats – also spend the majority of their time in the 
wild sleeping. The problem lies not with the welfare of our perfectly content tiger, but simply 
in our own categorisations of what animals should be like. Indeed, it seems that the burden of 
proof may rest on the shoulders of those who feel troubled, to justify why it is that the perceived 
problem is one of poor tiger welfare, rather than, say, a human concern with aesthetics, or the 
ethics of manipulating tiger lives.  
This response may still be unsatisfying. It does not get to the heart of our feeling that there 
is a problem in welfare itself – that this animal is not experiencing welfare as high as it should 
be. In response, we need to examine where we set our baseline for welfare. When we are saying 
an animal has good or poor welfare, we need to be explicit as to what this is in comparison to. 
Rather than setting the comparison point at zero, so that any animal in a positive state is doing 
well, we could instead look at the maximum possible for the animal. It is not enough to simply 
say that an animal is perfectly content within itself – that it doesn’t know any differently. What 
we really want is a comparison between the experience of this animal in its current situation, 
and how it could be in its best possible situation. Although the torpid tiger is not experiencing 
any suffering, and is content with its days of sleeping, there may be a range of positive mental 
states it is lacking - those associated with achieving the goals of hunting or killing. Even if the 
tiger would not choose these activities, it does not follow that it would gain no subjective 
benefit from them – the activities we select are not always those which bring us the greatest 
pleasure (see discussion on ‘liking’ vs ‘wanting’ in Section 2.4.3). This is not to say that these 
pleasures are in some way of a more valuable type than others, but that our intuitions are that 
they are simply more pleasurable. If we simplified welfare into something like ‘happiness 
units’, it could turn out that the number of attainable units for a torpid tiger are not as many as 
it could otherwise have had, had the situation been different (see Chapter Six for discussion on 
making such welfare comparisons between individuals). The tiger is then said to have reduced 
welfare, not because it is suffering, but because it is not in the best possible state it could be in. 
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Even if this tiger is experiencing its best possible welfare in terms of the maximum 
happiness it can obtain, we may think we have harmed its welfare by creating it such that it can 
only obtain this reduced level of happiness. There is a welfare problem for our torpid tiger if 
its experience of subjective welfare is lower than that of a traditional tiger that has its needs 
met. A content torpid tiger may still have better welfare than a frustrated traditional tiger. But 
it does not have welfare as high as a content traditional tiger and has thus in this way been 
deprived. Though it may be true that where conditions cannot be improved for the animal in 
terms of providing additional behavioural opportunities, breeding such that it does not 
experience frustration at this lack could actually be better for welfare in these cases (see also 
discussion in Sandøe et al., 2014). I take it that in most cases, it is possible (even if costly) to 
improve conditions and this will then still be the better option for improving welfare. The 
choice between a frustrated traditional tiger and a content torpid tiger is thus a false one, as 
there is another superior alternative potentially available (Sandøe et al., 2014). We have 
reduced the tiger’s welfare by breeding it to be such that it is not capable of experiencing a 
fuller range of positive states. It is this that leads us to see a welfare problem with our torpid 
tiger. This is, of course, not to say that it is therefore impermissible to create such a tiger or 
that we are obligated to only create tigers with the best possible welfare. This relationship 
between permissibility of an action and potential welfare harm will be discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
 
2.3.2. The human case 
One potentially strong objection to the subjective conception of welfare, is that it is one that 
is widely rejected in the human case. The most common conceptions of human wellbeing are 
a preference-satisfaction account (that welfare consists in the satisfaction of preferences) and 
an objective list theory (that welfare consists in meeting a set of objective criteria set out as 
necessary for wellbeing), as well as hybrids of these views. Given that the subjective 
conception of welfare is so unpopular in the human case, we might think that this counts against 
it in the animal case. Why should we think that welfare in humans is an entirely different kind 
of thing to that of other animals? 
I have two responses to this objection. The first is that I am far from convinced by the 
arguments against subjective welfare in the human case. The second is that there do seem to 
be important differences between humans and other animals, that could ground such a 
difference in welfare. The reasons for rejecting a subjective account of human welfare do not 
then apply to non-human animals. 
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In debates about the nature of human welfare, the subjective conception is often rejected. 
The primary objection against this account is that it fails to capture some objective goods we 
think are important for welfare (Crisp, 2017). The classic thought experiment supposed to 
illustrate the insufficiency of a subjective view of welfare is that of Nozick’s ‘experience 
machine’ (Nozick, 1974). In this experiment, Nozick asks us to imagine we are presented with 
the offer to be hooked up to an experience machine. The machine will provide us with a virtual 
reality experience that is entirely pleasant to us, in which all those things that we wish for are 
provided. Further, we will have no recollection of having been made this offer, and will 
experience this as though it were our genuine life. Despite this, the intuition of most people is 
that it would be undesirable to take up such an offer. This is thought to demonstrate that there 
is more to welfare than simply positive experiences and thus refutes the ‘subjective’ conception 
of welfare (Crisp, 2017). 
Firstly, there is good reason to be suspicious that our intuitions are reliable when thinking 
about this case. People presented with the case cannot imagine it correctly – given that our 
current selves know about the machine, we are unable to properly imagine the future experience 
of not knowing that we are in it, once we enter, and thus we still take on the feeling of some 
harm that we would actually not experience. Weijers (2014) found that when the case was 
presented in different ways, people’s intuitions about the acceptability of the experience 
machine changed dramatically. Primarily, when the case was presented as discovering you 
were already in an experience machine, and the offer was to unplug and live a slightly worse, 
but more authentic life, far fewer people chose to leave the machine. This suggests other 
psychological mechanisms, such as a status-quo bias, are at play when considering the thought 
experiment, and lowers our confidence in our intuitions as a reliable guide in this case.  
Further, even if we were to accept that the intuitions were reliable, I think the conclusion 
drawn from them is mistaken, and turns on what we think represent conditions for welfare, 
rather than the state of welfare itself. That is, the subjective account of welfare still handles our 
intuitions with regards to the experience machine, if we allow that pure hedonistic pleasures 
may not be the only things that bring us positive mental states – that aspects such as our feeling 
of autonomy may also serve such a role. Then it becomes clear that even if we consider our 
welfare to be compromised in using the experience machine (and it is not clear that it is not 
instead a clash between welfare and other values)12, this is not necessarily because we have an 
 
12 DeGrazia (1996) would seem to agree with this judgement [about the experience machine], that perhaps in this 
case we are relying on intuitions about goods that are not welfare: “Suppose . . . internalism is correct: your well-
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objective conception of welfare, but could also be because we consider autonomy to be an 
important component of our own welfare, perhaps more important than pure pleasure. If this is 
the case, then the knowledge of (or belief about) our own autonomy therefore simply brings us 
a subjective benefit rather than being a good in and of itself. Autonomy would thus be valuable 
because we like it. As Crisp (2006) points out, lists of ‘objective goods’ such as these only 
count as counterexamples if they are examples of goods that are “both widely accepted as a 
contributor to well-being, and never enjoyed” (2006, p. 637). As the examples offered – 
autonomy, achievement – are things which we tend to enjoy the feeling of possessing or 
attaining, they do not serve to weaken the case for a subjective conception of welfare.  Indeed, 
it seems odd to consider someone’s welfare to have been compromised if they have no strong 
feelings towards their future autonomy and have joyfully accepted the offer, now contentedly 
living the life of the experience machine. This argument then does not seem to rule out 
subjective welfare in this richer sense. 
Even if one were to reject this and insist that there are some things that have a direct benefit 
to human welfare, outside of their subjective value to an individual, it still does not seem that 
this must affect our decision in the animal case. This is because, although the list of those 
components considered important for human welfare in an objective sense may vary, very few 
of these apply to the animal case. For example, it is difficult to imagine what autonomy may 
mean to an animal in any deep sense, or authenticity. “Given our historical and moral emphasis 
on reason and autonomy as nonnegotiable ultimate goods for humans, we believe in holding 
on to them, come what may . . . in the case of animals, however, there are no . . . higher priority 
values, like freedom and reason lurking in the background” (Rollin, 2006, pp. 126–127). If, 
say, it turns out that great apes or other animal groups, do have understanding of such ideals, 
then perhaps we would have reason to accord their preferences such primacy, but for most 
animals this is unlikely to be an issue. Although this does not rule out the use of an objective 
list for animals, perhaps containing other goods, there would need to be a separate case made 
for this, as the arguments made in the human case are insufficient. This then does not give us 
reason to reject the subjective conception of welfare. 
The other type of welfare concept preferred in the human case is preference-satisfaction. In 
Section 2.4.3, I will discuss why this account of welfare can be collapsed onto a subjective 
 
being is affected only if your body or mind is. This still allows the possibility that external goods matter morally, 
even if they do not benefit the person to whom they are external . . . suggesting that considerations of well-being 
do not exhaust what is morally important. Maybe not all wrongs are harms.” (1996, p. 224). 
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account. However, even if we do not accept this as relevant to the human case, this seems to 
be because of the type of rich preferences described, which require cognitive and cultural 
sophistication beyond the capacities of most animals, resting on a deep belief-desire 
psychology and a strong sense of self and agency persisting over time, that many animals do 
not possess.  
Another primary line of argument against the subjective welfare concept (as well as 
preference satisfaction accounts) is that of adaptive preferences (e.g. Khader, 2011). Like the 
torpid tiger, this type of thought experiment is supposed to capture the problems with subjective 
accounts of welfare in the human case. For example, we may have a woman living in the slums 
of a poor country, with very little food or opportunities for self-expression. However, due to 
her limited experience of the world, she does not wish for more. She is completely contented 
with her lifestyle, experiencing only positive mental states – therefore having good subjective 
welfare. By contrast, we have a woman living in a wealthy country, in a comfortable middle-
class house. She has all her material needs well met, and as a result is able to find the time for 
her creative pursuits. Again, she feels only positive mental states and has good subjective 
welfare. However, we surely do not wish to say that both these women have the same level of 
welfare. As this example is similar to that of the torpid tiger, my responses to it are of the same 
form. 
Firstly, I can say that the difference here is not one of welfare. If both women really do have 
the exact same level of subjective welfare in terms of their positive mental states, then I am 
happy to concede they have the same welfare overall. I would suggest that our intuitions 
otherwise lie outside of considerations of welfare. Instead, we may be worried about something 
like injustice, or instead be imagining ourselves in this situation, where we can’t conceive of 
ourselves having truly positive mental states as a result. 
Secondly, it seems unlikely that two women in these situations really do have the same level 
of subjective welfare. The poor and hungry woman is likely to experience negative effects of 
physical deprivation, feelings of hunger or illness that will impact her mental state. A subjective 
mental state is more than just lack of wishing for something different, it will contain feedback 
from physical functioning etc.  Even if this is not the case, if she does not experience any 
negative mental states, this does not automatically mean that she has the same level of 
subjective welfare as the second woman. As in the torpid tiger case, this is a question of 
baselines. Subjective welfare does not necessarily reach a maximum simply because of the 
absence of negative mental states. There is still the possibility for a greater number or richness 
of positive states. It may differ between individuals as to what creates the fullest level of 
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positive subjective states, but we can imagine for humans that things such as creative self-
expression may rank highly. Therefore, someone lacking this may have a lower level of 
subjective welfare than someone who has it, even if its absence is not noticed or causing 
frustration. Our baseline for comparison shouldn’t be a neutral state of merely lacking negative 
feelings, it should be the fullest experience of positive feelings. If, given all this, we still wish 
to say that the first woman contains the same level of subjective welfare as the second woman, 
I don’t see any reason to say there is a problem with her welfare. 
Working through these examples, it seems that there is nothing in the case of the parallel 
debate on human welfare that rules out the ‘subjective’ conception of welfare for the animal 
case and since there are positive reasons to accept it, as detailed above, we should do so. This 
may mean that we need to accept different concepts of welfare for humans and for animals, 
based on differing capacities and interests13. I suspect that we have reason to prefer using the 
same concept for both animal and human welfare - and for the reasons outlined in this section 
that it is probably a subjective welfare concept in both cases - but it is not my project here to 
draw conclusions about human welfare and I will not defend this view. My aim has been simply 
to show that the parallel debate in the human wellbeing literature does not provide reason to 
reject a conception of subjective welfare for animals.  
 
2.4. Competing accounts 
I have provided here a positive account for why we should consider subjective welfare to 
be a good candidate for composing the state of welfare. I will now show how other proposed 
accounts are insufficient for the task. They are actually describing conditions for welfare that 
can be collapsed onto subjective experience, so that where these factors are important for 
welfare, they are only instrumentally so in virtue of their effects on subjective experience. I 
will do so by showing that for any proposed welfare component C: 
• Cases in which C impacts welfare are cases in which it impacts subjective experience 
• Cases in which C does not impact subjective experience are not relevant to welfare 
concerns 
• We cannot trade off a decrease in subjective welfare for an increase in C 
• We can trade off a decrease in C for an increase in subjective welfare 
 
13 This may lead to some animals, such as great apes, possessing the ‘human’-type welfare, and possibly some so-
called ‘marginal’ humans possessing the ‘animal’-type welfare, but in terms of providing a concept for use in 
animal welfare science and ethics, this will not be a problem for most cases. 
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When these points are all true, it will be the case that although C may be an important 
condition for welfare, it is not an intrinsic component, and subjective welfare is the more 
fundamental state composing welfare. 
There are two primary alternative accounts of animal welfare: a tripartite account which 
considers welfare to consist in multiple components – subjective, physical and teleological; 
and a preference-based account which considers welfare to consist in meeting the preferences 
of animals. 
The first account – the tripartite – is probably the most common. Under this framework, 
welfare consists in feeling good (subjective welfare), functioning well (physical welfare) and 
living naturally (what I call teleological welfare) (e.g. Fraser, 1999; Webster, 2005). This is 
similar to the ‘objective list’ theories of human wellbeing, where these three components form 
the list of conditions that must be met for good welfare. We have already discussed subjective 
welfare. Physical welfare refers to the physical functioning of an animal, its bodily health and 
comfort. Teleological welfare refers to the ‘naturalness’ of an animal, how closely its behaviour 
and lifestyle match that in which it has evolved to live. This tripartite theory might seem like 
an appealing alternative as it recognises the importance of subjective experience, but also 
includes other things we might think are central for welfare. However, there are potential 
problems in using a tripartite concept like this – in adjudicating conflicts between the different 
components, and that the components themselves are not actually necessary for welfare. 
As acknowledged by Maple and Perdue (2013), the components of each of these may differ 
and can thus create conflicts (2013, p. 26). For example, a concrete and tiled cage that allows 
for proper cleaning and disinfecting will provide maximally for physical welfare in terms of 
health, but will strongly detract from psychological welfare due to lack of stimulation, and 
cannot be considered at all natural. By contrast, addition of natural pieces of cage furniture, 
such as logs, will increase naturalness and provide increased mental stimulation, but may 
harbour disease-causing organisms. Allowing the animal free choice of diet would greatly 
increase subjective experience (at least in the short term, as I will discuss later on), but will 
have negative physical effects in terms of weight gain and malnutrition. 
In cases such as these, it does not seem that there is a good way to adjudicate between these 
competing demands. There is not a common currency by which we can compare changes in 
each of the different components, or combine them into a single welfare score14. If each of 
these factors is seen as equally primary in welfare, then there is no reason that one should win 
 
14 See Chapter Seven for discussion of a similar possible worry for different types of mental states. 
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out over another. Using this framework seems like it could lead to problematic conclusions. 
For instance, we might imagine an animal kept in full health in a highly natural enclosure, but 
finding this a source of constant distress. We surely would not want to say that this animal has 
better welfare than a happy animal in an enriched unnatural enclosure, even if the ‘overall’ 
measure is higher. Our intuition in these cases points us towards giving greater weight to the 
subjective experience of the animal within the environment. 
Dawkins (2004) provides an example to illustrate how calculations of this type can fail, a 
case in which different components contradict one another and subjective welfare should be 
considered as the most important. When hens are given access to an ‘enriched’ environment 
(containing materials such as litter for dustbathing), they will preferentially choose this 
environment. However, the hens also show a rise in cortisol levels (indicating stress) and 
decrease in shell thickness of the eggs they lay. Considered as a list, two measures (cortisol 
and shell thickness) have indicated poor welfare, while only one has supported positive welfare 
(choice). We may then conclude that the environment is not beneficial to the animal, but 
Dawkins argues that this would be a mistake: “What the birds wanted is thus not just another 
measure of welfare, but a necessary piece of evidence that gives valence and meaning to the 
more physiological measures” (2004, p. 54). The preferences of the birds is the indicator most 
closely tied to their subjective experience, and though still fallible (animals – and people – are 
not always good at knowing what is best for them), it is considered to be the one more central 
to indicating welfare (in Section 2.4.3 I will show why it is the link to mental states, and not 
simply preferences themselves, that matters here). 
In contrast to a list-based account, one in which only a single item constitutes welfare – in 
this case, subjective experience – has the benefit of allowing us to make calculations of overall 
welfare without needing to search for some additional common currency with which to 
consider trade-offs. Of course, this still leaves open the issue of considering trade-offs and 
comparisons within the category of subjective experience, and this will be addressed in Chapter 
Seven. When considering whether some change will be beneficial to the welfare of the animal, 
we need only ask, ‘Will it improve the overall subjective experience of life by the animal?’ If 
the answer is yes, it is a worthwhile welfare improvement; if the answer is no, then even if the 
improvement seems more natural or perhaps enhances physical health, an alternative should 
be considered. As I will show, it will often be the case that improvements to physical health or 
naturalness will lead to increased welfare through their effects on subjective experience, but 
where they do not, they do not then have any further welfare value.  
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2.4.1. Physical welfare 
First consider physical welfare. It is undeniable that physical functioning is important for 
welfare. It’s extremely unlikely that an animal that is unwell, or in discomfort, is going to have 
good welfare. However, we can account for this as an effect of the unpleasant subjective 
experience of these conditions. Cases in which physical health impacts welfare are cases in 
which it impacts subjective experience, and where it does not do so, we don’t think there is a 
welfare concern. Illness and injury are almost always associated with strong negative 
subjective states, such as pain: “Usually when an animal is ill, it will also feel ill, so that taking 
care of its mental state (i.e., how it feels) will automatically take care of its physical health. 
However, there may be cases in which the animal is not in full physical health, but feels all 
right, and we conclude that its welfare is all right” (Duncan & Petherick, 1991, p. 5018). 
However, when the subjective experience associated with physical health is not negative, it 
does not seem that welfare is compromised. To motivate this, imagine an animal with impaired 
physical functioning that doesn’t seem to have any associated subjective welfare lack. Animals 
are notoriously good at coping with physical injuries and deformities. I once worked with a 
lemur who had lost an arm in an accident, and would quite happily tripod around his habitat. 
He was able to do almost everything a normal lemur could do, and it thus seems odd to say that 
his welfare was compromised by his physical lack. Similarly, if an animal has an infection, but 
we are able to give it medication to relieve all symptoms so that it subjectively feels well, it 
doesn’t seem that we want to say it is experiencing poor welfare, as we watch it move about 
and enjoying life as it did before.  
We might want to deny this still true in the case of a physical ailment which creates no 
subjective suffering but shortens life – this is impaired physical functioning with no subjective 
component, but in a case where we want to say welfare is impacted. However, a subjective 
concept can account for the welfare problem in premature death, as this is removing the 
possibility of future positive experiences. As described earlier, welfare consists in the 
subjective experience of an animal over its lifetime. An animal which dies young, will have 
lower lifetime welfare than it would have had if it had lived a longer life. This issue, of the 
relation of length of life to welfare, will be discussed further in Chapter Three. These examples 
all show that cases in which we think physical health is impacting welfare are actually cases in 
which we are concerned about the impact on subjective experience, and in the absence of such 
an impact, welfare is not harmed. 
Let us consider the cases of trading off one for the other. If both physical and subjective 
welfare are equal components of welfare, then it seems we could decrease one while increasing 
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the other, leaving total welfare the same. However, this is not the case. Many zoos used to try 
this – to keep animals in sterile concrete cages to help avoid disease, while causing the animal 
psychological harm in the forms of boredom and frustration. This practice has been largely 
discontinued, primarily because the harm to subjective welfare was considered to outweigh 
any benefit to physical health. 
What of the reverse – a case in which we decrease physical welfare without also decreasing 
subjective welfare? As described in the cases above, for a physical lack without corresponding 
distress, or a subclinical or managed disease, we do not see a welfare problem: “An animal 
with a tumour it cannot feel does not have a welfare problem, even if it does have a health 
problem” (G. Mason & Mendl, 1993, p. 302). Performing surgery under anaesthesia is another 
example – it is extremely physically invasive, but as the animal is not conscious, it is not 
considered harmed by the procedure. We do not consider it a problem to decrease physical 
welfare if subjective welfare is not also impacted.  
One example raised by opponents to the subjective account is one in which subjective 
pleasure is increased through allowing an animal to eat large amounts of junk food, with a 
corresponding decrease in physical health as the animal becomes fat and sick over time. This 
is intended to show that we can’t only consider subjective experience. However, as a fat and 
sick animal is typically going to have many associated negative mental states, such as 
sluggishness and frustration from lack of mobility, it is not easy to separate the two 
components. If there is decreased lifespan (as there almost certainly would be), then the welfare 
impact of this can be accounted for through lack of future positive experiences, as discussed 
above. If it truly is the case that the sum of the gustatory pleasures experienced by the animal 
outweigh the negative feelings associated with obesity and illness, and those future positive 
experiences that may be excluded, then in these cases it may just be true that the animal is 
experiencing good welfare, despite possible intuitions to the contrary.  
Although there may be difficulties in establishing how to compare measurements of 
subjective welfare over time, this is not necessarily just a problem for the subjective welfare 
conception – proponents of a physical welfare concept are also wanting to retain subjective 
welfare, and comparing physical changes to subjective ones may be even more intractable. The 
issue of comparing subjective experience over time will be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
Physical functioning is likely to be highly important for welfare in most cases, but this is as 
a condition for subjective experience, rather than primary in itself. It may also function as a 
useful indicator – where we think physical functioning will be impacting on subjective states, 
we can use measures of health to track subjective welfare. However, physical health itself is 
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not a necessary part of the state of welfare and it will matter for welfare only inasmuch as it 
impacts on subjective experience. 
 
2.4.2. Teleological welfare 
I turn now to a more controversial position – what I have called teleological welfare; 
whether naturalness forms a central part of welfare. Perhaps we might aim to rescue physical 
functioning in cases described above, by pointing out that these animals may be prevented by 
their physical lacks from behaving in natural ways, and so this is where welfare is harmed. 
However, again there is no strong reason to think this is the case. There does not seem to be 
any necessary link between naturalness and welfare, whether we take natural to mean 
functioning according to an evolved design (or telos) or simply the conditions the animal 
experiences in the wild (see Browning, 2019a for a more complete discussion). There are many 
highly natural states, that seem to be quite bad for the welfare of the animals experiencing them 
– think starvation, predation, conspecific aggression. And perhaps many unnatural states that 
appear to enhance the welfare of animals – such as great apes using electronic devices for 
mental stimulation (Perdue, Clay, Gaalema, Maple, & Stoinski, 2012), or animals receiving 
veterinary interventions such as parasite removal.  
Natural behaviour is important for welfare where it impacts subjective experience, and its 
performance will often correlate with increased subjective welfare. Animals have evolved with 
psychological reward systems that make many natural behaviours feel good to them (though 
some evolved natural behaviours such as predator avoidance will have associated negative 
affects, and we do not usually want to say that these are associated with good welfare). In trying 
to find optimal conditions for animal welfare, it will often be the case that the natural 
environment and behavioural repertoire will be the best starting points. For example, Dawkins 
(1989) analysed the time budgets of red junglefowl (Gallus gallus) as a model for domestic 
fowl (Gallus domesticus). She found that even when fed regularly, the junglefowl still spent a 
lot of time in foraging activities, which suggested they might be important, and flagged this as 
a starting point for further testing on domestic fowl. Špinka (2006) also argues that natural 
behaviour can be a useful criterion for animal welfare as it may be the easiest way of meeting 
the animal’s desired ends, provide positive emotions and have longer-term effects on health 
and welfare that may not be assessed. For example, mink that are allowed the opportunity to 
play in water will later show more play behaviour in their cage (Špinka, 2006). Veasey et al. 
(1996) suggest that, all other things being equal, it is probably better for a captive animal to 
spend its free time performing natural behaviours, and a captive animal performing all relevant 
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wild behaviours is probably (but not definitely) less likely to be suffering than one that is not. 
However, as gestured to earlier, in cases where natural behaviour is not linked to subjective 
states (or where it is linked to negative states), naturalness is not doing any additional work for 
welfare. 
Even those who seemingly advocate a teleological view of welfare appear to base it on 
subjective experience. Rollin (2006) has been one of the primary advocates of the concept of 
telos in determining animal welfare. However, it seems that underlying his view is a subjective 
concept of welfare. He is at pains to stress that only sentient animals are capable of having a 
telos of moral importance, as it must be such that it matters to the animal. He considers it 
“necessary that we can say sensibly of the animal that it is aware of its struggle to live its life, 
that the fulfilling or thwarting of its needs matter to it” (2006, p. 100). He further goes on to 
say that it is the suffering caused by frustration of these interests that gives it moral importance: 
“The animal must be capable of being aware that the thwarting of the need is a state to be 
avoided, something undesirable” (2006, p. 102). Although he rejects a simple pleasure/pain 
framework, he includes other possible negative mental states, such as frustration, boredom, 
anxiety etc. In this sense, then, telos can simply be viewed as a useful shorthand, a way of 
getting at what is likely to matter to the animal. 
Another writer who emphasises a teleological view is Nussbaum (2004, 2011). She argues 
for the importance of a ‘dignified existence’ for animals, which entails pursuing their own 
interests to flourish naturally: “It is good for that being to flourish as the kind of thing it is” 
(2004, p. 306). She calls this view neo-Aristotelian in its implicit reference to telos: “the 
Aristotelian idea that each creature has a characteristic set of capabilities, or capacities for 
functioning, distinctive of that species, and that those more rudimentary capacities need support 
from the material and social environment if the animal is to flourish in its characteristic way” 
(2011, p. 228). From this she builds a list of objective ‘entitlements’ animals should possess. 
On the face of it, she appears to wish to differentiate herself from a subjective view of 
welfare, arguing that “there seem to be valuable things in an animal’s life other than pleasure, 
such as free movement and physical achievement” (2004, p. 304), valuing these things even if 
they are not the source of positive experience to the animal. However, she also believes that 
not all natural functions will be equally valuable: “there is waste and tragedy when a living 
creature has the innate, or ‘basic’, capability for some functions that are evaluated as important 
and good, but never gets the opportunity to perform these functions” (2004, p. 305, italics 
added). We must thus somehow evaluate which of these we wish to preserve and here she does 
seem to fall back on subjective concerns, arguing that we should try to avoid the “pain of 
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frustration” (2004, p. 311) for animals denied particular opportunities. So again, we might see 
this work as a teleological view in practice, but grounded in a subjective conception. That is, 
teleological considerations may inform our decisions about what is likely to matter for welfare, 
but this is true in virtue of its effects on subjective state. 
We don’t allow a trade-off to increase naturalness at the expense of subjective welfare. 
Allowing animals to suffer large parasite burdens, or fight one another to the death, while 
closely tied to ‘natural’ states or evolved functions, are considered unacceptable practices and 
decrease subjective welfare. Conversely, decreasing the naturalness of an animal’s life in order 
to increase its subjective wellbeing does not seem problematic – come back to our apes on 
iPads, or monkeys in cages as opposed to more naturalistic open-air enclosures. 
The underlying assumption to this claim for the importance of naturalness in welfare appears 
to be that the wild state represents the best possible welfare for animals. This is a version of 
the ‘appeal to nature’ fallacy: the mistaken belief that because something is natural, it must be 
good. It is a clearly dubious assumption, as there are many examples of animals suffering in 
the wild. Individuals are often physically injured, malnourished, stricken with disease and 
exposed to unfavourable environmental conditions. As mentioned, evolved behaviours such as 
predator-avoidance will have associated negative mental states. In a behavioural sense, it is not 
the case that wild animals are free to perform all their natural behaviours. Animals suffering 
from illness or injury will clearly have a more limited behavioural repertoire. Additionally, 
many subordinate animals will be denied the opportunity to access particular food resources, 
or mates, through competition with conspecifics, or threat from predators. Animals in the wild 
are far less free than is commonly assumed.  
As shown here, there is no necessary connection between naturalness and welfare. There is 
no reason to think that the conditions experienced by wild animals have any link to welfare, 
and though many evolved functions are associated with positive experience, where they are 
not, we do not think they are beneficial to welfare simply in virtue of their naturalness. 
Although natural behaviours will often increase welfare, this is because of their impact on 
subjective experience and not because of their intrinsic value. Natural behaviour may 
sometimes be a condition for welfare, as many natural behaviours are pleasurable, and the 
performance of natural behaviours may help indicate good welfare, but teleological welfare is 





2.4.3. Preference-based welfare 
As described earlier, one popular account of welfare in the human case is that welfare 
consists in the satisfaction of preferences. That is, for your life to be going well is for your 
preferences to be satisfied, and for it to be going poorly is for your preferences to be frustrated. 
Some writers (e.g. Dawkins, 2003) apply a similar account to animals, grounding welfare in 
the choices they make. Under this view, if animals have what they want (providing it doesn’t 
impact negatively on physical health), then they have good welfare. 
However, the preference account can also be collapsed back onto subjective welfare. That 
is, preference-satisfaction is only important because satisfaction of preferences produces a 
strong feeling of subjective wellbeing, while their frustration is associated with negative 
feelings. In the human case, this move is resisted. After all, humans might want things which 
don’t feel good, and these preferences are still considered important for their wellbeing. For 
animals though, without the attendant desires for autonomy or authenticity, preference-
satisfaction does not seem to consist in anything more than subjective experience. Without 
higher-order preferences, it is difficult to imagine exactly what preferences would be if not just 
the positive association with one state of affairs and the negative association with its frustration. 
Because this will often be a very strong link, it will almost always be the case that satisfying 
preferences will produce (at least short-term) increases in subjective welfare, while denying 
preferences will decrease welfare due to the associated frustration.  
The cases in which we think preference-satisfaction impacts welfare are just cases in which 
these subjective states occur. If an animal had no real affective response to the satisfaction of 
particular preferences – was in some sense subjectively neutral towards it – this does not seem 
a concern for welfare. Further to this, some preferences may unexpectedly create negative 
mental states. In these cases we would want to say that welfare had been harmed, even though 
preferences were satisfied (controlling for the subjective effects of preference satisfaction or 
frustration). In the human case, some would want to say that having your preferences thwarted 
is detrimental to your welfare even if you never know about it, such as if your children die after 
your own death. This objection is unconvincing in the animal case, largely because animals are 
unlikely to hold preferences for objects or states of affairs outside their immediate experience. 
Although preferences and mental states are closely linked, it is the impact on subjective 
experience that makes preference-satisfaction important. 
This line of argument could be pursued in reverse – to argue that where preferences and 
mental states overlap, it is instead preferences that are primary. DeGrazia (1996) takes this 
view – accepting the link between mental states and desires, he defines pleasure as coming 
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from an experience desired for the way it feels, and therefore increasing pleasure just is meeting 
these desires (1996, p. 124). Subjective welfare in his view therefore collapses onto preference 
satisfaction. If preferences and subjective welfare were identical, as in this view, then there 
would be no reason to prefer one to the other – they are the same thing. Something would only 
be preferred to the degree that it was liked by the individual. Those who advocate this view do 
so because they believe that preferences are an accurate guide to liking (Camerer, 2006). 
However, it is not true that they are identical, as these processes are separable. The ‘wanting’ 
and ‘liking’ systems in the brain, (roughly analogous with preferences and subjective pleasures 
respectively) are not the same thing as one another (Berridge, 1996).  
‘Wanting’ systems, underlying preferences, are mediated through dopamine (Berridge, 
1996). These cause a particular object or experience to become more attractive, and increases 
motivation to seek it out (Berridge & Robinson, 1995). ‘Liking’ systems, which create positive 
subjective experiences, are mediated through opioids (Berridge, 1996). These systems are 
found through different parts of the brain and can be activated separately – so that an animal 
can like something they don’t want, or want something they don’t like (Berridge, 1996). This 
has been established through studies that use different indicators for each system – using 
behavioural measures such as consumption or level of work for wanting, and change in facial 
expressions for liking. Manipulations of dopamine can increase the behaviours indicative of 
appetite (wanting) without showing any effect on facial expressions indicating palatability 
(liking) (Berridge, 1996). This separation may be familiar to anyone who has experienced 
compulsive or addictive behaviour they did not enjoy – this is activation of the ‘wanting’ 
system without the ‘liking’ system. In most cases, activation of the ‘liking’ system will cause 
activation of the ‘wanting’ system: “wanting may be conceived as the imprinting of what was 
once liked and disliked” (Spruijt, van den Bos, & Pijlman, 2001, p. 160). The reverse is not 
true – things can be wanted without being liked (Berridge, 2009). 
Liking, or affect, is also likely to be the more psychologically fundamental process. 
Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019) provide a detailed description of the probable evolution of and 
functioning of animal consciousness. Under their model, animals start by encountering various 
stimuli and receiving feedback from their interactions with these, in the form of positively or 
negatively valenced subjective experiences. This feedback then guides learning and memory, 
which guides future motivation and action. Preferences here are thus the output of a valuation 
system: “the neural states are motivating because they ascribe value to actions and percepts 
based on the overall (systemic) homeostatic state of the body in the world” (Ginsburg & 
Jablonka, 2019, p. 367). If this is the case, then something is preferred because it is judged 
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valuable, not the other way around (see further discussion on the role of affect and motivation 
in Chapter Seven). 
These two systems – liking and wanting - are often closely linked, but can come apart. In 
these cases, we need to determine which it is that matters to welfare – the preferences or the 
subjective experience. Thinking about examples in which this occurs can help us judge which 
we think is more important, and these lead us to prefer subjective experience. Compulsive 
behaviours that are strongly ‘wanted’ but occur without enjoyment - such as gambling, or 
repetitive stereotypic behaviours in animals - would not be considered to increase wellbeing; 
while experiences that were not desired but were enjoyable, such as an unexpected encounter, 
do increase wellbeing. Impact on subjective experience is what matters. 
This conclusion is further strengthened through consideration of acceptable trade-offs: 
whether we would consider it acceptable to decrease subjective welfare in order to satisfy more 
preferences, or to frustrate some preferences in order to increase subjective welfare. Intuitively, 
the latter is acceptable, while the former is not. There are many preferences held by animals, 
the satisfaction of which could decrease their subjective welfare, either now or in the future. 
Animals will not always understand the choices that they are making, and they are unlikely to 
have the ability to make good decisions for their future welfare (after all, even humans often 
do poorly in this regard).  For example, most animals have a strong desire for fatty and sugary 
foods, consumption of which can lead to poor health (and, as discussed, poor subjective 
welfare). Addiction to drugs will lead to a strong desire for their consumption, which is 
detrimental to health and often to psychological wellbeing. Many animals will have desires for 
aggressive behaviour when faced with competitors, but acting on these desires can lead to stress 
and injury. If we were to allow animals to have all the things they desired, then under the 
preference-satisfaction account they would have good welfare (saving the effects of current 
preference-satisfaction on the ability to satisfy future preferences), but these examples illustrate 
why we would not think this to always be the case.  
For the same reason, it seems acceptable to make the trade-off in the other direction – to 
allow a decrease in preference satisfaction where it will create an overall increase in subjective 
welfare. We would be happy to deny an animal something it wants, if we know it will actually 
gain greater pleasure from some alternative state of affairs. It is not the case that all things that 
will bring positive mental states are those things which an animal will directly choose, as they 
will not be fully aware of the potential outcomes of all their choices. As Nussbaum (2004) 
points out, animals may do well with conditions they do not know to prefer: “what the 
[preference satisfaction] view cannot consider is all the deprivation of valuable life activity that 
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they do not feel” (2004, p. 305). They may not have the necessary information to prefer these 
activities, but would enjoy them if they experienced them. We may thus have cases where we 
frustrate preferences, in favour of creating pleasure, and in these cases the intuition is that we 
have not harmed the animal but instead increased its welfare. 
In the human case, this objection is dealt with through appeal to a modified set of 
preferences. These can be higher-order preferences, or preferences about our preferences, such 
as a preference not to gamble excessively, regardless of our strong desires at the time. These 
preferences are usually grounded in our own sense of self, and our overall desires for the 
features of our life (Griffin, 1986). They require an understanding of the self, and one’s 
continuation through time. As most animals are unlikely to hold higher-order preferences of 
this type - lacking this sort of psychological cohesion and self-reflection - this move won’t 
work to overcome the objection in the animal case15. 
The second way the preferences may be modified is through constructing some sort of 
idealised preference set an individual might hold if they had a greater knowledge and 
understanding of what is good and bad for them. There are two problems with this response. 
Firstly, it is unclear what the criteria would be for building such an idealised set of preferences. 
If it is just those things which would make us happiest, were we to know about them, then this 
is just the subjective experience view I have been arguing for. If it is based on increasing some 
other set of important goods, this starts to look like an objective list theory, and my previous 
discussion of this view applies. Secondly, and most importantly here, even if this would work 
for humans, it is difficult to imagine what an ideally rational version of a parrot looks like, or 
what it would want. By the time we constructed a set of preferences that some ideal parrot 
would hold, taking into account their values, and adding understanding of current and future 
consequences of actions, this seems to be far from the abilities of any actual parrot. If we were 
able to work according to our ideal parrot, this animal would be so vastly different from an 
actual parrot that its preferences may not be a good guide to what our real parrots would want, 
meaning many of their actual preferences would be frustrated. 
There is still a role for preference satisfaction in understanding welfare. Preference 
satisfaction is likely to be an extremely important condition for welfare, in that satisfaction of 
preferences will usually lead to increased welfare, due to the attendant positive subjective 
experience. Preferences have evolved to track those things which are important for the survival 
 
15 It may turn out that some animals - great apes for instance - do possess these cognitive abilities, and so perhaps 
for them some version of preference satisfaction may work as a welfare concept, if it can overcome the other 
problems mentioned. 
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and reproduction of animals, which can often be associated with positive experience (Spruijt 
et al., 2001) (though, as discussed in the section on teleology, these links can come apart for 
captive animals). Over an animal’s lifetime, preferences develop in accordance with those 
things they have found rewarding or aversive via associative learning (Berridge, 1996), and 
thus often track well with subjective welfare. Frustration of preferences and motivated 
behaviours can often create negative affect (Gygax, 2017), and so meeting preferences will 
also increase subjective welfare in this way. Preferences are also likely to be a very useful 
indicator for welfare, with the preferences of an animal showing us what they find to be positive 
or negative and how strongly they are motivated to obtain or avoid certain conditions (Kirkden 
& Pajor, 2006). However, it is not the case that these themselves will be central to what welfare 




I have argued here that a subjective account of welfare – that animal welfare consists in the 
subjective experience of an animal over its lifetime - best captures what is important about 
animal welfare, in both the normative and scientific roles. I have shown that this account is 
preferable to the most commonly used competing accounts – the tripartite account in which 
animal welfare consists in subjective, physical and teleological welfare; and the preference-
based account – and that these accounts can be collapsed onto the more fundamental 
component, subjective welfare. 
If we accept this view, it has implications for the practice of welfare science, some of which 
will be examined in the second part of this thesis. In particular, it means we should narrow the 
focus to indicators that will map onto the subjective experience of an animal, rather than those 
that might currently only measure physical states or amount of natural behaviour. This does 
not necessarily lead to a large-scale revision within welfare science. Many of the measures 
used will already be doing this. It does mean that we have a means of adjudicating when 
different indicators might be telling us different things – we should go with what ties most 
closely to subjective experience. Finally, we should still keep physical, teleological and 
preference-related considerations in our toolkit. These conditions will frequently map closely 
onto welfare and are useful both as indicators and conditions for welfare. However, we should 




3. CHAPTER THREE – APPLICATIONS IN 
APPLIED ANIMAL ETHICS 
 
Accepting the subjective welfare concept has implications for animal welfare science, and 
how we measure welfare, as will be addressed in Part Two of the thesis. However, it also has 
implications for applied ethics. As described in the previous chapter, animal welfare is a 
normative as well as a scientific concept. I argued for a subjective conception of welfare in part 
because it is morally significant. In this chapter I will look at some of the specific implications 
that holding this subjective welfare concept will have for problems in applied animal ethics 
and how welfare of this type can interact with other values in decision-making. Here I will 
address two cases which have not previously been much discussed in this area – management 
euthanasia in zoos, and de-extinction programs. 
 
3.1. Management Euthanasia and Animal Welfare16 
3.1.1. Introduction 
In February 2014, Copenhagen Zoo became the subject of a media frenzy when they 
euthanized a young male giraffe, subsequently using his body for a public autopsy and 
eventually as food for the carnivores. This was controversial because the euthanasia took place 
not due to illness, but because he was surplus to requirements. Since then, similar incidents 
have followed, with similar responses (e.g. Nicholls, 2018; Parker, 2017), and much debate 
both for and against the practice. Those against argued that it was ‘wrong and disturbing’ to 
kill a healthy animal and use the body in such a way (Maple, 2014); while those in favour 
responded by pointing out that the killing was done humanely so the giraffe did not suffer, and 
that the limited resources of zoos created these difficult decisions in maintaining viable 
breeding populations (Rincon, 2014). This debate is not new in the zoo industry, with the 
problem of management euthanasia, or ‘culling’, having been discussed for decades (e.g. Lacy, 
1991; Lindburg, 1991). In this chapter I will look at both sides of the discussion – coming from 
the animal ‘rights’ and ‘welfare’ positions respectively – before describing an alternative way 
of seeing the welfare position that might speak against the practice, and looking at some of the 
conditions under which it might be considered acceptable. 
 
16 A version of this chapter section has been published as: Browning, H. (2018a). No room at the zoo: 
Management euthanasia and animal welfare. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. 31: 483-498. 
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Within zoos, the practice described above – the killing of otherwise healthy surplus animals 
– is referred to as ‘management euthanasia’. Euthanasia in general refers to humane or painless 
killing (most commonly through lethal injection performed under anaesthesia); it is a term 
based in ancient Greek that roughly translates to ‘good death’. Euthanasia is typically 
associated with the practice of ending the life of an individual that is terminally ill or in chronic 
pain, so that the choice to end life can be considered an act of mercy or kindness and is also a 
‘good’ death in this way17. What differentiates management euthanasia from this usual practice 
is that the animals involved are otherwise healthy. The decision is not made from consideration 
of their expected quality of life but instead, the animals euthanized are those considered surplus 
to the requirements of the institution: that is, those animals that are not on the overall 
management plan and which the institution lacks the resources to support. The practice of 
management euthanasia, though not often made public, is relatively common, with estimates 
that European zoos within the European Association of Zoos and Aquaria (EAZA) euthanize 
between three and five thousand animals each year (Barnes, 2014). There are suggestions that 
this is also occurring within American zoos, though numbers are not available (Parker, 2017). 
Surplus animals can arise from a variety of causes. The simplest is uncontrolled breeding. 
If animals are allowed to breed without restriction, very soon the population will grow beyond 
a size that any particular institution has the resources to support. This sort of practice is rare in 
zoos, where populations are carefully managed for genetics and demographics. However, even 
in carefully controlled breeding programs, surplus can arise. In polygynous species, which are 
common in, for example, primates and hoofstock, an equal sex ratio at birth will lead to a 
surplus of adult males in the population as only a few are required for breeding. Maintenance 
of genetic diversity will require careful breeding of only those individuals which have under-
represented genetics, and so any animals from already well-represented lines will be surplus to 
breeding requirements. So too for post-reproductive animals, those which have already made 
their breeding contribution to the next generation. Creation of viable self-sustaining captive 
populations requires careful use of all available spaces to house genetically and 
demographically valuable breeding animals, and using spaces to house surplus animals can 
threaten the viability of such programs (Penfold, Powell, Traylor-Holzer, & Asa, 2014). Powell 
& Ardaiolo (2016) list the common reasons for surplus – large litters, uncontrolled breeding, 
 
17 Some writers, e.g. Regan (1983) consider that the second requirement - the death being in the interests of the 
individual - is also essential for a practice to be considered euthanasia rather than killing. Here I simply follow 
the common usage within animal industries of ‘euthanasia’ as referring to the manner of killing rather than its 
intention. 
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unexpectedly high offspring number or survival, requirement for ongoing breeding to preserve 
fertility, sex ratio and presence of post-reproductive individuals. It is inevitable that even the 
most carefully managed breeding programs will create some surplus animals, which the 
institution must then manage in some way. 
Often, opponents to management euthanasia cite alternatives that zoos should be using 
instead of culling animals. There has been a lot of writing done on these potential alternatives 
and their benefits and drawbacks (e.g. Asa, 2016; Glatston, 1998; Lacy, 1991; Lindburg, 1991; 
Lindburg & Lindburg, 1995; Penfold et al., 2014) and I will only summarise them here, to 
show that they are not always viable. For the purposes of the rest of this chapter, I will assume 
that when we are talking about management euthanasia, it is for situations in which there are 
no good alternatives available. The first alternative management strategy is to try and prevent 
or minimise the creation of surplus in the first place. This involves both careful strategic 
planning on which animals to breed and when (Hutchins, Willis, & Wiese, 1995), and use of 
contraception to prevent unplanned breeding. Neither of these methods is perfect. As discussed 
above, even well-managed programs will create some surplus, and contraception options can 
often have negative physiological and behavioural effects (Asa, 2016; Glatston, 1998; Penfold 
et al., 2014). Animals (particularly females) kept on contraception for too long can have 
difficulties in breeding in the future, threatening the long-term viability of breeding programs 
(Penfold et al., 2014), and can be at risk for health problems such as cancers. Prevention of 
breeding, particularly through separation of the sexes, can lead to behavioural problems and 
the potential for decreased welfare through lack of opportunities to perform beneficial breeding 
behaviours (Penfold et al., 2014). 
There are then, obvious problems with preventing the creation of surplus animals, both in 
lack of effectiveness and undesirable side-effects. Other alternatives are aimed at other ways 
of managing these surplus animals once they do exist – housing within the institution, dispersal 
to other institutions, and release to the wild. Housing within the institution is the strategy 
endorsed by Kagan et al. (2015), who contend that “high-quality environments must be 
provided for animals removed from plans, ‘retired’ from breeding programs, or removed for 
other reasons” (2015, s3). Housing within the institution is usually possible, but as resources 
are limited, doing so will necessarily take resources away from other animals – taking up space 
that might be used for more valuable breeding animals, or resources that could be used to 
improve the housing and husbandry of other animals in the zoo. I will turn later to examination 
of these sorts of trade-offs, but suffice to say for now, that no zoo can continue to house all 
surplus animals over time without large potential costs to breeding programs and the welfare 
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of other animals. Dispersal to other institutions holds similar problems. Within any region, 
accredited zoos are managed as a whole, with spaces allocated throughout the region for 
particular breeding programs. This means that although in the short term, other institutions may 
have space to take on surplus, eventually the same problems that arise for a single institution 
will arise for the region, as all zoos reach carrying capacity. Dispersal to non-accredited 
institutions is problematic as they often will not meet suitable welfare standards for the animals. 
Lindburg (1991) has suggested creation of large-scale ‘holding facilities’ to which a number 
of zoos could contribute, and use to house their surplus. Here though, similar resource problems 
will arise, as resources are always scarce and those used for these facilities will necessarily be 
taken from that which could be used for management of other zoo animals within breeding 
programs. Release to the wild is not a viable option for most species. Even the most carefully-
managed release programs are not often successful (Harrington et al., 2013). Captive-born 
animals do extremely poorly in the wild unless they undergo extensive training for release, 
which requires resources that are likely to be unavailable, and is usually unpleasant for the 
animals. For most species, there is also no suitable habitat available for release, that isn’t under 
threat or already at carrying capacity and so fierce competition, fighting and predation are 
highly probable, and will lead to decreased welfare. Release of most animals would be 
condemning them to a much slower and more unpleasant death than that of management 
euthanasia. 
In some cases, these potential alternatives can work to reduce creation of surplus, or manage 
surplus animals where they are created, but there will be many cases in which they are not 
possible or appropriate. Although almost all zoos will aim to use alternative options where 
possible, their use always requires trade-offs in other areas, such as decreased resources to put 
towards other animals, or breeding programs. There will still be situations where, all things 
considered, management euthanasia may be one of the better available options. The question 
of interest here should then be, when (if ever) is management euthanasia permissible, and under 
what conditions? The aim of this chapter is not to definitively answer this question, as the 
answer is likely to be highly context-sensitive and reliant on the values at play in particular 
institutions. Instead, I aim to discuss some of the considerations that are likely to play a role in 
forming an answer – considerations of the rights and welfare of the particular animal, as well 





3.1.2. Two sides – the rights and welfare views 
Opinions about the practice of management euthanasia tend to differ depending on the 
underlying ethical framework at play. There are two major frameworks within animal ethics – 
the rights view and the welfare view18 (Lindburg, 1999). Although these two views agree about 
many of the issues to do with our treatment of animals, they differ in the underlying motivations 
and ideology. They also form the basis for the two sides of the debate on management 
euthanasia, with most of the arguments against the practice being grounded in the rights view, 
and the arguments in favour coming out of the welfare view. Here I will briefly describe each 
of these views, and what they say about the practice of management euthanasia. 
The rights view sees our responsibilities towards animals as being grounded in their rights 
as sentient beings. As animals are individuals with their own lives, thoughts and feelings, this 
creates a moral duty in others not to interfere with these. One of the early developers of this 
view is Tom Regan (1983), who sees the morally relevant feature of animals as being that they 
are “subject[s] of a life”, with their own individual set of beliefs and desires, their own 
wellbeing, which ground their individual rights. Rights can include welfare rights - those things 
which prevent physical or emotional harm - as well as additional rights, such as to “some form 
of protection of their lives and liberty19, irrespective of the impact on their welfare” (Gray, 
2017, p. 91). This view comes out of deontological ethical theories, in which other individuals 
should be treated as ‘ends in themselves’ rather than ‘means’ towards our own goals, and it is 
not generally considered acceptable to infringe on the rights of an individual for some greater 
overall benefit (Alexander & Moore, 2016). In respecting these rights, animal rights advocates 
typically oppose any use of animals for human ends. One prominent organisation which 
operates within this framework is PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), who 
consistently fight for the abolition of human use of animals (Lindburg, 1999).  
The arguments against management euthanasia typically come out of the animal rights view. 
It seems clear that within this framework, if we should not use animals for human ends, then 
we definitely should not end their lives for human reasons, such as the allocation of resources. 
To do so would violate the right to life. This is one of the most fundamental rights as without 
life, it is impossible to enjoy other rights. Although there are situations in which rights can be 
 
18 There are other potential ethical frameworks through which we can view our treatment of animals, such as 
virtue ethics or feminist ethics of care (see e.g. Beauchamp & Frey, 2011; Gruen, 2011), but these are by far the 
two most common and as they are the two which frame this particular debate, they will be the only two considered 
here. 
19 Liberty not necessarily here implying complete freedom from captivity, but at least some measure of choice 
and control for animals within their environments; though many in the animal rights camp would take captivity 
itself as a violation of rights. 
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overridden when the stakes are sufficiently high (such as protecting stronger or more important 
rights), this is not the case for management euthanasia. The potential benefits in terms of 
increasing the welfare of other animals, or of increasing the success of breeding programs, are 
not of the sort that could be considered to override the right to life of the euthanized animal. 
Although there may be competing rights and values at play in the protection of biodiversity (as 
will be discussed in Section 3.1.4), these are not generally considered by rights theorists to be 
of sufficient strength to override rights to life. Rights are typically accorded to subjects, which 
the earth and its ecosystems are not. Under a rights view, the practice of euthanasia is only 
acceptable when it is aimed to directly benefit the animal itself, through ending suffering. This 
is what Regan (1983) terms ‘preference-respecting’ euthanasia; where in the case of animals, 
were the animal able to voice an opinion, it would choose this option for itself – typically in 
situations such as chronic or terminal illness. Because of this, it is considered morally 
permissible. Management euthanasia, by contrast, is a decision to kill a healthy animal whose 
preference would be to go on living, and for this reason is morally unacceptable. In the context 
of the question ‘when, if ever, is management euthanasia permissible, and under what 
conditions’, we can see that the answer from a rights perspective is therefore going to be 
‘never’. 
In contrast to the rights view, the welfare view sees the moral status of animals as grounded 
in their experience as sentient beings, those capable of experiencing pleasure and suffering. 
Our responsibilities towards them are then those of providing the best possible welfare to make 
their lives go as well as possible. Welfare here is usually understood in terms of the subjective 
welfare concept I argued for in Chapter Two – as subjective experience, over the lifetime of 
the animal. That is, an animal’s total welfare is equivalent to something like the weighted total 
of positive and negative mental states experienced (see e.g. Phillips, 2009). It is important to 
consider lifetime welfare, as experiences can have differential impact depending on life context 
(Houe et al., 2011). Those experiences causing negative mental states, such as fear or pain, will 
decrease welfare, while those experiences causing positive mental states, such as joy or 
satisfaction, would increase welfare.  
Our treatment of animals should then aim to maximize welfare in terms of the quality of 
this experience. In practice, this is most often understood as the prevention of cruelty, so that 
no (or minimal) suffering will be inflicted on animals throughout their lives. Importantly, 
differing from the rights view, this does not exclude the human use of animals in areas such as 
science, farming, or recreation, as long as the animals are not harmed in so doing, or if the harm 
is outweighed by a greater overall benefit (though, as I will argue, as the harms of death are 
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greater than they may first appear, the benefit will also have to be larger). The welfare view 
emerges from a utilitarian moral framework, in which an action is judged on the overall 
outcome for all those affected (in this case, in terms of welfare) (Lindburg, 1999). This means 
that it is acceptable to perform actions which compromise the welfare of an individual as long 
as there is some larger overall benefit. One major proponent of this view has been Peter Singer 
(e.g. Singer, 1995), who considers the prevention of suffering (and, to a lesser extent, the 
promotion of pleasure) as the ultimate moral good. The values of the welfare view can be seen 
in the actions of organisations like the RSPCA, which operate to protect the welfare of animals; 
focusing on ensuring their humane use rather than eliminating their use. 
Due to these differences in the underlying moral framework, the welfare view then 
approaches the subject of management euthanasia quite differently than the rights view. In 
general, defenders of the practice, particularly those within zoological institutions, have been 
situated within the welfare view. Under the traditional welfare view (one I will argue against 
in the section that follows), management euthanasia is typically not considered to be 
problematic, as it does not harm the welfare of the animal. This is because, as long as the animal 
has previously been well-cared for, with predominately positive experiences, and the 
euthanasia is competently performed, the animal will not experience any suffering and thus 
welfare is not compromised. As, under the welfare perspective, the quality of subjective 
experience is what matters, a painless death does not create a welfare problem.  
This perspective, that death is not a welfare issue, is relatively common within the animal 
welfare view (Jensen, 2017; Yeates, 2010). Jensen (2017) considers this to be because ‘welfare’ 
is typically considered to mean ‘welfare at a time’. Yeates (2010) attributes it as a side-effect 
of a subjective conception of welfare, under which it is assumed that those things which matter 
to welfare are only those which an animal can subjectively experience. “In order for something 
to be good or bad for an animal, it has to be experienced as good or bad; and in order for this 
to be possible, the animal must be alive and conscious at the time … It follows that since there 
is no experience of the state of being dead, the concept of welfare does not apply to that state” 
(Jensen, 2017, p. 616). As death is necessarily the absence of such experiences, it can neither 
harm nor benefit the animal, and the only concerns for welfare are the circumstances 
surrounding the death. In cases of management euthanasia, so long as the sum of experiences 
for the animal’s life has been positive (presuming it has been well cared for) and the act of 
euthanasia itself caused no suffering, the animal has had good welfare. Several writers 
defending the practice of management euthanasia use this line of argument: “culled individuals 
do not experience reduced welfare” (Powell & Ardaiolo, 2016, p. 197); “culled animals do not 
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experience reduced welfare compared to living animals, unless they are culled inhumanely” 
(Penfold et al., 2014, p. 25). As advocates of this view think that management euthanasia does 
not compromise welfare, it can therefore be an acceptable tool to use when necessary; and 
given the underlying utilitarian framework, it can be justified whenever there is an overall 
benefit arising from its use (though these calculations must also take into account other possible 
negative effects, such as harm to public opinion regarding the zoo, or to the personal feelings 
of the keepers involved, as will be discussed further on).  
Under a traditional welfare view then, the answer to our question ‘when (if ever) is 
management euthanasia permissible, and under what conditions?’ would be, ‘when there is 
some overall benefit to be had’. As the harm to the euthanized animal is minimal, in this view 
this would mean that (other factors taken into account), in principle the practice may be 
permissible for even quite small benefits. However, it is still the case that many within the 
welfare view are also opposed to the practice. Although this is sometimes attributed to our own 
feelings and attachments to the animals (Lacy, 1995), in the next section I will describe another 
possibility through an extension to the usual welfare view, which considers a greater harm to 
the animal from management euthanasia. This then changes the types of conditions under 
which we may find it acceptable; and I argue that we would need more compelling reasons in 
justification than previously thought, to outweigh the welfare harm. 
 
3.1.3. Extending the welfare view 
The view that death is not a welfare issue, is not satisfactory to many “who consider animal 
welfare to be an appropriate basis for decision-making in animal ethics but also consider that 
an animal’s death is ethically significant” (Yeates, 2010, p. 229). Even under the welfare view, 
there is often a sense that killing is not harmless to welfare. “There are many who work at least 
partly within the animal welfare tradition who may consider the killing of a healthy animal to 
seem, at least in some cases, morally undesirable” (Yeates, 2010, p. 230). This seems true in 
the management euthanasia debate – although defenders of the practice are typically operating 
under the welfare view, there are those within the view who opposed it (e.g. Maple, 2014). To 
understand why, we need to expand the welfare view to allow for the welfare harm of death; 
which can be done through understanding that welfare is more than just ‘welfare-at-a-time’ as 
described above, but should also include exclusion of positive states (Yeates, 2010) and 
lifetime welfare (Jensen, 2017), as I argued for in Chapter Two. 
As described above, the aim of the welfare position is to maximise the welfare of captive 
animals, where welfare is understood as the subjective experience of an animal over its lifetime. 
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This tends to focus on prevention of suffering, with the apparent underlying assumption that 
the maximal state of welfare is one in which there is no suffering. However, if we consider the 
nature of subjective experience, it should be clear that this can vary along both sides of the 
spectrum – into negative experience (suffering) and positive experience (pleasure) – and can 
change in magnitude along both these lines. Maximising welfare then does not just involve the 
prevention of suffering, but also the promotion of positive experiences. When we are 
considering whether the welfare of an animal has been negatively compromised, it is not 
enough to simply look at whether it has dropped below a neutral baseline level into the 
negative. As argued for the ‘torpid tiger’ example in Chapter Two, we should instead set our 
comparative baseline higher – at some optimal positive state of flourishing, and look at how 
we may be failing to reach this. Under this view, we can compromise welfare not just through 
the infliction of suffering, but through the failure to provide positive opportunities. Something 
like this view is discussed by Regan (1983) who differentiates between ‘harms’ to welfare – 
those actions which directly create negative experiences – and ‘deprivations’ – those actions 
(or lack of) which deprive an animal of opportunity for positive experiences. Here then, we can 
see a welfare problem arising for animals that are given insufficient opportunities for achieving 
positive welfare states, even when they do not experience any suffering. 
It is important to keep in mind the second part of the welfare definition discussed earlier, 
that is subjective experience over a lifetime. This means welfare can be measured as something 
like the sum total of experiences over time (e.g. Phillips, 2009, pp. 8–9), rather than some sort 
of average of overall quality of experience20. All other things being equal, an animal with a 
longer lifespan is likely to have better welfare than one with a shorter life, as this life will 
contain more positive experiences. Jensen (2017) argues that something can be bad for the 
welfare of an animal if it makes the animal worse off than it would have been under some other 
possible scenario. In this case, longevity is an important consideration as a longer life will 
typically be better than a shorter one – “to say that death is bad for this person means that she 
would have had a better life, had she continued to live rather than die at this time” (Jensen, 
2017, p. 617). In fact, he argues that really all our welfare assessments of animals are based on 
comparisons with some other possible state – we want to know whether an animal is better or 
worse off in their current state than they may be under some proposed intervention, and this 
can apply also to premature death. The early termination of life is a harm to welfare through 
 
20 For the latter view, see e.g. Penfold et al. (2014): “Welfare reflects a combination of positive and negative 
mental, physical, and emotional states that are co-dependent and vary over time. Longevity of an animal does not 
translate into “better welfare”, as welfare is not a cumulative characteristic for the individual” (2014, p. 25). 
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the removal of future opportunities for positive welfare experiences. This perspective also 
explains why medical euthanasia is typically not considered a welfare problem – because for 
these animals, the future is not expected to hold many, if any, opportunities for positive 
experiences and instead is expected to be overwhelmingly negative. In this case, we are actually 
benefitting welfare through the early termination of life and the reduction of negative 
experiences. 
Yeates (2010) points out that most of our welfare evaluations involve a comparison between 
different states (for example, in terms of their duration and severity) and that any state can only 
be considered good or bad in comparison to another. Since we routinely compare states when 
one or the other is not present, it is no problem to compare the presence of states with their 
absence (such as through death). Indeed, if we are not able to make such comparisons, it is 
difficult to make sense of the practice of humane euthanasia for veterinary reasons – this 
involves a comparison between the presence of the negative states that a sick or dying animal 
may experience, and the absence of these states that will occur with its death. “Non-existence 
means that all and any states of the animal that could otherwise have been present are actually 
absent … the overall welfare of an existent animal can therefore be compared to the absence 
of that overall state, i.e., to its non-existence” (Yeates 2010, 236). These calculations can apply 
to the value of death in cases where we expect the potential future of an animal to be largely 
positive or negative – “if the presence of a life would have positive value overall then death is 
a harm; if it would have negative value overall then death is a benefit” (Yeates 2010, 237). 
This then gives us a “a prima facie responsibility for an agent not to kill an animal that would 
otherwise have a life worth living” (Yeates 2010, 239).  
Death then can be considered a welfare issue “insofar as it leads to the exclusion of relevant 
positive states” (Yeates 2010, 229) or “when the animal is deprived of good experiences or 
other good things in life” (Jensen 2017, 618). This gives us a position within the welfare view 
which speaks against the practice of management euthanasia. Where an animal might otherwise 
have been expected to have a life consisting of largely positive states, management euthanasia 
harms the welfare of that animal by depriving it of those future states. As there is some 
(potentially quite large) harm to the welfare of the animal through euthanasia in these cases, it 
will require a quite large benefit in trade-off to make the practice permissible. Although the 
answer to our question ‘when (if ever) is management euthanasia permissible, and under what 
conditions?’ may remain ‘when there is some overall benefit to be had’, under the extended 
welfare view, the magnitude of that benefit must be much larger to justify the practice. 
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3.1.4. Considerations and trade-offs 
I have shown that even under a welfare view, management euthanasia may be more 
problematic than has been thought, as it compromises welfare through the deprivation of 
possible future positive experiences. All other things being equal, an animal with a long life 
will have higher welfare than an animal with a shorter life and the practice of management 
euthanasia then creates a welfare deprivation, which will require stronger justification in order 
to be acceptable. In answering the question of when management euthanasia is permissible, 
and under what conditions, it is necessary to also consider the other positive and negative 
outcomes that may arise from the practice, either in a specific instance, or in general. “In 
addition to the complexity of the welfare evaluation on its own, a decision whether or not to 
kill an animal will be complicated further by other external factors, such as productivity, 
economics, and health of other animals … these other factors might entail that, in some cases, 
the killing of an animal might be justified” (Yeates 2010, 238). We will then be able to do some 
sort of weighing of different factors to determine the best course of action in each case. In this 
section, I will look at some of the possible factors that may need to be considered in making 
such calculations – both under a monist perspective (considering only a single value – that of 
welfare maximization), and a pluralist perspective (considering multiple competing values). It 
is not my intention here to try and provide some sort of strict weighting that could be used in 
making these calculations, but only to draw attention to the potential considerations that must 
be kept in mind when making such decisions. In the end, decisions will depend on the specific 
circumstances and values for a particular situation or institution. 
 
3.1.4.1. Monist (welfare) 
Norton (1995) draws a distinction between a monist system of value, under which we only 
consider one value, and a pluralist system, under which we must adjudicate between multiple 
competing values. Under both of these systems, there are potential circumstances which create 
additional considerations in deliberating on management euthanasia. I will look first at a monist 
view, under which maximization of welfare is the primary concern. We have already 
considered how the act of management euthanasia can decrease the welfare of the euthanized 
animal, in depriving it of the opportunity for future pleasures. Here, I will look at some potential 
welfare harms that may occur as a result of failing to implement management euthanasia, that 
may then weigh in favour of the practice under these conditions. These relate both to the 
expected welfare of the euthanized animal, and welfare of other animals in the collection. There 
is certainly reason to think that there will be situations in which the expected welfare of surplus 
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animals over time will not be overwhelmingly positive. Additionally, there will be situations 
in which the welfare of other animals will be negatively affected to such a degree that the 
overall welfare of the group may be decreased through prevention of management euthanasia. 
As described earlier, management euthanasia is usually considered because of a lack of 
viable alternatives. That is, that the other possible options for the animal are not good ones, 
and may not lead to higher welfare in the long term. Additionally, those in the position of 
making management decisions about specific animals are rarely those who control overall 
resource availability, further constraining available options. Consider keeping the animal 
within the institution. Leaving the animals in their existing enclosures, with the current social 
group, is often not beneficial. This can lead to overcrowding, potential disease transmission 
and social disturbance, such as fights between individuals. This was the case for Marius the 
giraffe, who was reportedly experiencing aggression from his father (Parker 2017). All of these 
are going to cause suffering and lower welfare. The most common alternative option is off-
display housing, keeping the animals in another enclosure somewhere away from the public 
areas of the zoo. These enclosures are usually smaller and less well-furnished than the display 
exhibits, because resources tend to focus on those areas used by the public. They are also not 
often designed with particular species in mind, as they may be used for a variety of animals as 
needs arise, and so will not meet the needs of the animals as well as specialised display exhibits 
do. Animals housed in these enclosures will usually have decreased human contact, which is 
something they often find positive, and may also be housed away from conspecifics. All these 
factors can cause distress and decrease welfare. 
The options for rehoming outside the zoo are also likely to be inadequate. As described, 
sending the animals to other accredited institutions is rarely possible, as they will have usually 
already bred or acquired animals to meet their capacity. Instead, dispersal options are often 
limited to smaller non-accredited institutions, where welfare standards cannot be guaranteed. 
The lack of funding in such institutions means they are unlikely to meet the needs of the animals 
as well as they should. Release to the wild is also unlikely to be successful, and as described 
earlier, is highly likely to compromise the welfare of the animals involved. 
These points show that there are many cases in which management euthanasia may be 
considered the best option for the animal, as rather than removing opportunities for future 
pleasure, it is removing the likelihood of future suffering. In these cases, it begins to seem 
closer to a case of preference-respecting euthanasia, where were the animal given the ability to 
voice a preference, it may prefer death to a life of ongoing deprivation. In addition to this, we 
should also consider welfare effects on other animals in the zoo. There will be cases where 
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keeping the animal alive may cause a decrease in welfare in many other animals, decreasing 
overall welfare of the group. Within a large institution, although maximising the welfare of 
each animal is important, there needs to be a balance in which the total welfare of the animals 
across the zoo is as high as possible21. There will be some cases where management euthanasia 
is the option that will best achieve this. 
There are two ways in which the presence of surplus animals is likely to decrease the welfare 
of other animals – the first is directly, through their immediate presence, and the second is 
indirectly, through diverting resources. As described above, holding too many animals in an 
enclosure can result in crowding, illness and social stresses such as aggression, which can affect 
all the animals in the group. There may also be a loss of breeding opportunities for the other 
animals. Zoos will breed to fill the space available, and surplus animals taking that space will 
restrict the breeding of others. Breeding creates many opportunities for positive welfare, in 
courtship, mating and parent-offspring bonds; opportunities that will be lost if breeding is 
prevented. “Breeding is a fundamental motivator of all animals. The life cycle of breeding, 
birthing and raising young is an engaging and satisfying behaviour for many animals” (Gray 
2017, 80-81). The prevention of these behaviours could be described as an “arguable 
unkindness” (Parker 2017). However, there are those who doubt the real benefit of these 
opportunities: “The absence of breeding opportunity does not meet the definition of suffering 
or poor welfare. In nature, socially dominant animals do most of the breeding. Subordinate 
males are often found at the periphery of female herds led by mature matriarchs. This is true 
for hippos, elephants, buffalos and many other species. Do weaker males enjoy a lesser quality 
of life in nature? The case can be made that the mere opportunity to compete for access to 
females is a life-enriching experience” (Maple 2014, para. 6). These animals will typically take 
the chance to breed when available, and may even work for it, but this does not necessarily 
mean they suffer in the absence of it. More work may be needed to quantify the level of welfare 
cost experienced by animals prevented from breeding. In addition to this, maintaining 
additional surplus animals will use resources that could be used for increasing the welfare of 
animals more central to the larger aims of the collection. Resources such as money, and keeper 
time, can be used to improve the exhibits and husbandry of other animals. If the resulting 
resource deficit is large, it can result in a decrease in overall welfare. It may sometimes be the 
 
21 This is not necessarily the only consideration in welfare calculations – for example we might want to add 
something like: no animal should have their welfare drop below a certain baseline even if it maximises welfare 
overall. 
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case that the euthanasia of a single animal may be a means of increasing overall welfare of 
animals across the institution.  
 
3.1.4.2. Pluralist (other values) 
Even if all we value is animal welfare, I have shown that there may be reasons in favour of 
management euthanasia in particular cases. However, there are also many other values that 
may come into play when making decisions of this type. Maximising the welfare of the animals 
in their care is a huge part of the aim of a zoological institution. However, there are also many 
other things a zoo may wish to achieve, which will not always be in line with absolute 
maximization of welfare. “Moral pluralism is the view that we value many things in different 
ways, and that these differing values are sometimes in conflict. Further, these values may be 
incommensurate, so that they cannot be weighed in a common metric” (Norton 1995, 104). We 
may often need to make decisions within complex webs of competing values. 
The first and probably most important value active in zoos is that of conservation and 
breeding programs, including the conservation value of public education and connection with 
wildlife (Lukas & Ross, 2005; Pearson et al., 2014; Powell & Bullock, 2014). In general, zoos 
no longer take animals from the wild and so must breed genetically compatible animals with 
high precision in order to maintain a healthy gene pool in captivity and ensure the future of the 
captive populations. The existence of surplus animals can get in the way of this, as described 
above, when they prevent ongoing breeding. Spaces that are allocated to housing surplus 
animals will be directly detrimental to the breeding program. Additionally, where these 
programs are necessary for direct conservation, such as release, the problem is of even greater 
importance. If the existence of a surplus animal interferes with an effective conservation 
program, this could be a strong consideration in favour of management euthanasia. 
This clash of values, between the welfare of individual animals and the preservation of 
species or environments, is found throughout conservation biology. (Norton 1995). On the one 
hand, we value individual animals and seek to maximise their welfare. On the other, we value 
flourishing ecosystems and the continued existence of species. Often, concentrating on one of 
these ends requires sacrifice in the other. Norton (1995) argues that our responsibilities will 
differ depending on context. In the wild context, outside of human interference, the value of 
wildness and ecosystem preservation is dominant, and we are willing to compromise individual 
welfare to achieve this. In the domestic context, where we have taken animals into our care, 
our responsibilities towards them individually become more important. The issue with zoos is 
they seem to straddle both contexts – the animals have certainly been taken into human care, 
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with the attendant responsibilities, but also are there for the purposes of supporting 
conservation of their wild conspecifics, with some sacrifices possibly necessary to achieve this 
goal. There is unlikely to be a simple answer as to which of these values should take precedence 
in the zoo context, as it will depend on many other factors, such as the level of threat the wild 
population is under and the type of action the zoo is taking to assist (e.g. breeding for release, 
fundraising, public education). However, there will be some cases where it seems the demands 
of conservation will outweigh the welfare deprivations of management euthanasia. 
Another important goal of zoos is public education and engagement. This is in service of 
conservation objectives, but in modern zoos, raising awareness on the plight of endangered 
species, and leading action to help preserve them, are probably more important than direct 
conservation action through breeding programs. Effective global conservation relies on the 
concern and action of the wider public, and zoos have a unique role in inspiring care for the 
natural world. In this case, it seems likely that management euthanasia will most often harm 
this outcome. Part of the effectiveness of such an approach is public engagement with 
individual animals; developing an emotional bond with them and then transferring that care to 
conservation efforts. The rising popularity of personal animal encounters in zoos seems to attest 
to this. Management euthanasia can harm that bond, decreasing perceived value of individual 
animals in favour of the group. There are different potential roles for zoo animals - “An animal 
can be a city’s shared pet, or it can be a quasi-agricultural team member whose work is to be 
seen and to breed and, perhaps, to die young.” (Parker 2017, para 26). Although some have 
advocated for this focus on groups, it does not seem that the public engage in the same way 
with large groups. If management euthanasia harms public engagement with zoo animals and 
thus harms conservation goals, this is a reason against its use. The huge public outcry against 
Copenhagen Zoo, including death threats (Parker 2017) seems to support this. Similarly, when 
management euthanasia causes public outcry, these harms to zoo reputation can decrease 
attendance, which as well as decreasing opportunities for education, will further decrease 
available resources for remaining animals. Although some of the effects of public impact can 
be reduced through education about zoo population management and the reasons behind 
decisions to euthanize, this is unlikely to improve problems with individual engagement, 
especially with children, who are often considered the most important target audience.  
There is the problem of managing the conflicting narratives of zoos as caring sanctuaries 
for animals versus the clinical nature of euthanasia and dissection as presented at Copenhagen. 
Zoo animal welfare expert Terry Maple described the Marius incident as “a huge public-
relations blunder” (quoted in Parker 2017, para. 71) and “counterintuitive to the mission of the 
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zoo community globally” (Maple 2014, para. 3); claiming that the negative effects this had on 
the zoo visitors and supporters served to undermine the good work zoos are doing in 
conservation, and overall zoo credibility, not just for Copenhagen but around the world. “It 
seems as though the public (and especially critics of zoos) do not judge each zoo as an 
individual institution, but more as a part of a larger zoo community. A crisis kicked off by one 
zoo could affect other zoos as well” (Schäfer 2015, 179-80). If zoos are to continue with the 
practice, it seems important that they are able to communicate it in such a way as to keep the 
public on side. 
One final value to consider is that of human emotions. Management euthanasia can be 
difficult for people, who grieve the loss of particular animals. This is particularly true for 
keepers, whose job relies on their bond with their animals and their commitment to maintaining 
and improving the lives of these animals. Euthanasia of favoured animals is going to be 
upsetting to keepers and this emotional distress, as well as being in itself a negative, can also 
prevent them from bonding and doing their jobs as well in the future. Lacy (1991, 1995) argues 
that these sentiments from keepers are actually currently the primary motivating factor against 
management euthanasia; that even where arguments based on animal rights or welfare are put 
forward, these are actually a justification to protect our own feelings. Powell & Ardaiolo (2016) 
surveyed keepers and managers on their reaction to particular management euthanasia 
scenarios and found that keepers were more likely than managers to disapprove of management 
euthanasia, particularly with animals they are more prone to bond with, such as primates. 
Maple (2014) points out that “the bond between zoo animals, zoo managers and zoo patrons is 
based on mutual emotional ties between humans and animals that often originate in childhood. 
Zoo animals are valuable ambassadors between the wild and human world rather than a 
commodity displayed for the amusement of humans” (para. 11). This emotional impact is also 
an important consideration that may weigh against euthanasia in many cases. 
 
3.1.5. Conclusion  
Management euthanasia, the practice of euthanizing healthy surplus animals, is 
controversial. Traditionally, those arguments against the practice have come from the animal 
rights camp, who see it as a violation of the rights of the animal involved. Arguments in favour 
come from the animal welfare perspective, who argue that as the animal does not suffer, there 
is no harm in the practice and it is justified by its potential benefits. I have argued that an 
expansion of the welfare view, encompassing longevity and opportunities for positive welfare, 
give stronger considerations against management euthanasia, which then require greater 
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benefits to justify its use. I have also presented some of the other considerations that may play 
a role in making decisions about management euthanasia; from both the perspective of 
maximising welfare, and in consideration of other values, such as conservation. It has not been 
my aim here to make a definitive stand about the acceptability of management euthanasia, but 
to point out that in making such decisions, the welfare of the animal should be given more 
weight than is perhaps usually considered, when only suffering is taken into account. In the 
end, each institution will need to make decisions for itself, based on the overall context of the 
zoo and the particular circumstances surrounding each individual animal (Lacy 1991).  
 
3.2.  De-extinction and animal welfare22 
3.2.1. Introduction 
De-extinction is the process through which extinct species can be brought back into 
existence. There is some disagreement as to whether this actually results in the resurrection of 
a species or just something closely resembling the species (see discussion on this point in 
Section 3.2.4). For the welfare concerns discussed in this chapter, however, the distinction does 
not play a strong role. The process is usually undertaken with the aim to reintroduce species to 
the wild and restore ecosystems (Shapiro, 2017). It is controversial, with debates tending to 
focus on scientific viability, or the ethical issues accompanying such a project, with animal 
welfare concerns mentioned only briefly if at all. However, as pointed out by Kasperbauer 
(2017), there is good reason to think that the welfare of the animals involved will be poor. In 
this chapter, I will expand on the potential types of welfare harm that de-extinction programs 
can cause. In particular, when thinking of welfare subjectively, this gives increased reason to 
focus on the potential forms of psychological suffering. This welfare harm should be an 
important consideration when making decisions on de-extinction projects, and in the final part 
of the chapter I will look at the potential benefits of such projects and argue that in most cases 
they are insufficient to outweigh the potential welfare harm as it stands. With further 
development of the technology and careful selection of appropriate species as de-extinction 
candidates, these problems may be overcome. 
There are three methods through which de-extinction can be achieved: selective breeding, 
cloning and genetic engineering (Cohen, 2014; Shapiro, 2015). Each of these has different 
benefits and drawbacks and each is useful for different cases. The first of these methods is 
 
22 A version of this chapter section has been published as: Browning, H. (2018b). Won’t somebody please think 
of the mammoths? De-extinction and animal welfare. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. 31: 785-
803. 
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selective breeding, or back-breeding. In this process, current relatives are selectively bred for 
those characteristics that defined the extinct species. For example, in order to re-create 
mammoths, elephants could be successively bred for their larger and hairier variations, until 
something closely resembling a mammoth is created. There are currently a few programs using 
back-breeding to attempt to recreate extinct species - projects attempting to bring back the 
quagga are selectively breeding zebras (Cohen, 2014), and to bring back Auroch through 
selective breeding of modern-day cattle (Shapiro, 2017). The process is limited by the 
availability of sufficiently similar relatives that are still capable of expressing the desired traits. 
The second method is somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), or cloning. This requires the 
nucleus of a cell taken from a recovered member of the species to be implanted into an egg cell 
of a related surrogate species. This creates a zygote genetically identical to the donor animal 
of the target extinct species (barring mitochondrial DNA). The zygote is then gestated and 
birthed by the surrogate animal. A famous example of the use of this process was in the creation 
of ‘Dolly’ the sheep. This has also been attempted for de-extinction purposes, in the cloning of 
the Pyrenean ibex, or Bucardo, where a clone was made of the last living individual; though 
this clone did not survive long after birth (Cohen, 2014). There has reportedly been some 
success in using this technique for creating new embryos of the extinct gastric-brooding frog 
(Cohen, 2014). This process is only possible where entire cells of the extinct species are 
available (which is only the case for very recent extinctions) and where appropriate surrogate 
species can be identified (Shapiro, 2017). 
The third de-extinction method is genetic engineering. Here, DNA is recovered from 
preserved specimens of the extinct species. As it is almost never entirely intact, it is spliced 
with the DNA of a related species to create the closest possible genetic match to the original 
target. The spliced genetic material is then used to create a zygote to be gestated and birthed 
by an extant surrogate animal. Most current work on de-extincting mammoths is using this 
method, as the remaining mammoth DNA exists only in fragments. It is also the primary 
method in use for de-extinction of the passenger pigeon (Cohen, 2014). This is what Shapiro 
(2017) considers the “most likely route to de-extinction” (2017, p. 4) as it only requires 
fragmentary DNA from the target species, which can then be expanded into a whole genome. 
It is limited primarily through availability of preserved DNA, which rules out long-extinct 
species, and like the cloning techniques, requires the use of closely related living species both 
for use of their DNA for gene editing, and as surrogate mothers (Shapiro, 2017). 
All of these methods for de-extinction are being used in current projects on various species, 
and each presents potential animal welfare problems, which I will detail in Section 3.2.2. In 
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Section 3.2.3 I will argue for the moral status of these animals within our deliberations. This is 
not merely hypothetical – de-extinction projects are happening now, and the welfare concerns 
for the animals thus created should be the focus of attention when evaluating these projects. 
Before turning to the issues de-extinction raises for animal welfare, I will briefly note some 
of the other issues that have been raised for de-extinction projects. In the past few years, de-
extinction has become the centre of increasing scientific and philosophical focus, with a 
number of books and papers published on the scientific feasibility of and ethical issues 
surrounding such projects. The first of these is the question of whether or not the animals 
created through these methods count as members of the original species, due to differences in 
genotype, phenotype, history and development (Shapiro, 2017), and whether this matters. 
Another set of issues relate to scientific feasibility; whether the breeding and cloning methods 
can even work, and which animals are most likely to be successful if reintroduced (K. E. Jones, 
2014). Finally, there are the other ethical concerns of de-extinction projects. For example, 
whether de-extinction programs harm other forms of conservation, as the resources spent on 
de-extinction programs could result in decreased support for conservation of extant species 
(Bennett et al., 2017) and the discussion of de-extinction may “give the impression that 
extinction is reversible” and will therefore “diminish the gravity of the human annihilation of 
species” (Campagna, Guevara, & Le Boeuf, 2017, p. 48). Another criticism of the process is 
that it is ‘unnatural’ - both in terms of the technologies that are used to recreate the species, 
and in terms of the nature of the species thus created (C. Mason, 2017). All these questions 
have already been well-explored and will not be re-examined further here. Instead I will now 
turn to the issues of animal welfare arising from de-extinction projects, which in contrast have 
not yet been given much attention in the literature. 
 
3.2.2. Welfare issues 
Until recently, what has been absent in discussions of de-extinction is an exploration of the 
issues relating to the welfare of the animals created through these projects. Although mentioned 
briefly in many of the papers discussing ethical issues, animal welfare concerns are typically 
given only a few lines. These usually indicate that these issues are important but should not be 
difficult to work out, as they are the same sorts of issues that show up in other projects involving 
scientific research and species reintroduction. For example, Cohen (2014) brings up harm to 
animals as a potential source of negative utility in considerations of de-extinction projects but 
concludes “there is no reason to think de-extinction will cause a large animal welfare problem” 
(2014, p. 175). Sandler (2014) considers animal welfare concerns as a potential ethical reason 
 69 
against de-extinction projects but concludes “compared with the number of animals already 
used in research … conservation cloning does not pose a special or very large animal welfare 
problem” (2014, p. 358). Although he acknowledges that research should take care to minimise 
suffering caused, he thinks “the animal welfare concerns it raises do not significantly 
differentiate it from many other research and conservation practices involving animals” (2014, 
p. 358). Rohwer & Marris (2018) point out that “creating a mammoth is morally permissible 
… provided that suffering is minimal” (2018, p. 2, italics in original), and go on to describe 
some of the concerns with cloning, surrogacy and rearing; though again, follow Sandler in 
dismissing these as not much different from those in other similar conservation practices. 
Greely (2017) describes the potential welfare problems associated with cloning technology but 
considers that “the risks of de-extinction are not substantively different from those associated 
with gene editing” (2017, p. 34). Friese & Marris (2014) briefly describe some of the welfare 
concerns in the creation and rearing of de-extinct animals, and argue that “questions regarding 
animal care need to be understood as a crucial part of de-extinction experimentation, rather 
than downstream concerns” (2014, p. 2), however they conclude that these issues can be 
addressed through “a social science approach based upon the current realities of cloning, 
genetic engineering, back breeding, and species preservation today” (2014, p. 3).  
Only Kasperbauer (2017) has really emphasised the importance of animal welfare 
considerations in making decisions about de-extinction programs, labelling it as “the most 
critical challenge for de-extinction” (2017, p. 1). He argues that “the current state of de-
extinction technology provides good reasons to think the lives of de-extinct animals will indeed 
be full of suffering” (2017, p. 6) due to problems with cloning technology and reintroduction 
(though only the latter are applicable to de-extinction through back-breeding), and briefly 
outlines some of the ways in which these potential harms could come about. Here I will 
examine in detail exactly how and why these situations are likely to be harmful to animal 
welfare. 
Although it is true that many of the welfare issues are continuous with those affecting other 
areas of animal research and conservation, I argue that de-extinction creates special issues for 
animal welfare that need to be considered when evaluating such projects. Though the number 
of animals used in de-extinction projects is far smaller than in other human uses of animals we 
currently permit, this does not give us the justification to carry out any harmful actions within 
this range, as will be discussed at the end of Section 3.2.2.1. Welfare issues can affect the de-
extinct animals, other animals used in the process (e.g. surrogate mothers) and the wild animals 
that will be impacted through reintroduction (Cohen, 2014). In particular, there are welfare 
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issues surrounding the cloning procedures when these are used, and in the process of captive 
rearing and reintroduction, beyond those usually faced by zoos or conservation bodies doing 
this sort of work. This is in large part due to the lack of knowledge about these species and 
their requirements. 
 
3.2.2.1. Welfare issues with cloning 
In the first instance, there are issues surrounding the cloning technology used in both SCNT 
and genetic engineering. These will not be a problem for back-breeding projects, though this 
method will face a few problems of its own. So far, the use of cloning has been problematic 
for animal welfare, with cloned animals showing rapid aging, ongoing health problems and 
premature death. “Cloned animals suffer from impaired health, including placental 
abnormalities, foetal overgrowth, prolonged gestation, stillbirth, hypoxia, respiratory failure 
and circulatory problems, malfunctions in the urogenital tract, malformations in the liver and 
brain, immune dysfunction, anaemia, and bacterial and viral infections” (Gamborg, 2014, p. 
6). Fiester (2005) outlines the different ways in which cloning procedures can have negative 
impacts on animal welfare – through the suffering inherent in the cloning procedure, gestational 
problems with surrogates, ongoing health of cloned animals and the future suffering cloned 
animals might endure through research, housing etc. These procedures are associated with 
miscarriage, stillbirth, early death, genetic abnormality and chronic disease. As the success 
rates (in terms of live birth) for even the most effective programs are only 5-12%, this creates 
a lot of excess donor procedures and surrogate pregnancies. As cloned foetuses show a higher 
than average birth weight, caesarean deliveries are also often necessary. Those offspring that 
are delivered alive show huge mortality rates, due to conditions such as developmental 
abnormalities and lung, heart and liver problems. The US Humane Society has advocated for 
a ban on these procedures due to the high incidence of welfare problems. 
Take the famous Dolly, the first ever successfully cloned individual. Dolly was plagued 
with health problems, such as arthritis and lung disease, and died at six years, only around half 
the normal life span of a regular sheep of her kind (Williams, 2003). These sorts of problems 
only increase when using the technology to create and gestate extinct animals in close relatives 
rather than conspecifics, with low success rates and high levels of health problems and 
abnormalities in both the surrogates and foetuses in interspecific procedures (Sandler, 2014). 
A Pyrenean ibex cloned from the last individual, died of a lung defect within minutes of birth 
(Cohen, 2014). 
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Surrogacy can give rise to the problem of maternal-foetal incompatibility, which can be 
problematic to both the surrogate mother and the gestating foetus (Fiester, 2005). Similarly, 
there can be birthing complications when the target animal is larger or differently shaped than 
the surrogate, as would be the case with - for example - elephants carrying mammoth babies. 
Surgical delivery is the likely option in these cases, but surgery on an elephant is difficult and 
the chance of complications during surgery or recovery is high. There are also the chances of 
maternal rejection of the unusual offspring, creating potential social isolation. The lactation of 
the surrogate mother may not be appropriate for the offspring, creating nutritional and health 
problems. Shapiro (2017) points out that we need close relatives of the extinct species in order 
for the process to be successful, and these may not often be available; the less closely related 
the surrogate species, the higher the chances of problems arising. 
Back-breeding can run into similar problems. If selecting for larger or somewhat different 
individuals within the population, we again have a risk of gestational complications (though 
lower than in the surrogate cases) and maternal rejection of unusual offspring. Back-breeding 
will also usually use a very small founder population, and so creates significant risk of 
inbreeding and the associated health issues (Shapiro, 2017). 
Although these issues may be reduced with further research into the technology - looking 
for where the problems in development are occurring and repairing them - this further research 
will require the production of animals fated to suffer these physical and psychological 
problems. Some of these problems may be the same as those facing other animals created 
through these methods for research or agriculture, but some will be unique to de-extinction, 
particularly due to the requirement to use other species as surrogates. Additionally, the defence 
that these problems occur in other areas of science (the ‘accepted practice standard’) is not a 
strong one. The fact that one set of practices matches another provides no real justification if 
the first set of practices is also ethically problematic (Fiester, 2005), and the set of benefits and 
justifications for each will differ. Any project which uses the technology should thus be 
independently assessing the potential harms. These other applications are deemed acceptable 
in large part because of the perception of gains in other areas, so this response can only apply 
where there is sufficient justification of the benefits, to outweigh the potential suffering caused. 






3.2.2.2. Welfare issues with captive rearing 
As discussed, there are potentially serious welfare problems with the use of cloning 
technologies as they currently stand. However, refinement of the procedures can possibly 
reduce or remove most of these problems over time (at least those involved with cloning itself 
– issues of maternal/foetal incompatibility seem potentially more serious). Of greater concern, 
and far less obviously surmountable, are the issues surrounding the rearing and release of de-
extinct animals. Shapiro (2015) points out that “from an animal welfare perspective, the captive 
breeding stage is likely to be one of the most challenging steps of de-extinction” (2015, p. 195).  
These are in large part practical issues as to the feasibility of such practices, but as their failure 
harms the welfare of the animals under consideration, they are also strong welfare concerns. 
Again, these have largely been dismissed as the same issues that surround any breeding and 
reintroduction programs, something zoos have been addressing for many years (e.g. Beck, 
1995), but this does not mean they do not need to be addressed independently for these projects. 
Additionally, there is good reason to think that de-extinction programs are going to have a 
unique set of challenges arising from lack of knowledge and lost ecological conditions, as well 
as a highly atypical social environment. 
Breeding and rearing any animal in captivity requires a set of husbandry standards in order 
to succeed. These include detailing the recommended diet for the animal, appropriate housing 
conditions (such as temperature, shelter, access to water), social conditions, behavioural 
requirements, known health issues and how to treat them, among other information. For most 
captive animals, collection and collation of such information has taken decades, drawing on 
knowledge of the living conditions and habits of wild counterparts, or closely related species, 
and much trial-and-error on the animals in captivity – often resulting in poor health and short 
lifespans in the early members of captive populations. As an example, historically reindeer 
were notoriously difficult to keep in captivity, consistently suffering ill health and dying young. 
Eventually it was found that in the wild, their diet included a large amount of lichen, which 
provided essential nutrients (Steen, 1968). Addition of these to the captive diet fixed many of 
the problems previously encountered. Without the ability to check this in the wild population, 
this problem could not have been fixed and in the meantime would have led to ongoing 
suffering. 
If it has been this difficult to create husbandry standards for the animals we have held in 
captivity for many decades, sometimes even centuries, with access to research on their wild 
relatives, it will be much harder to do so for animals for which we have no such information. 
In some cases, we might be able to use modern relatives as a starting-point: for example, 
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quagga are likely (though not certain) to have similar requirements to zebra. In other cases, the 
species may have gone extinct recently enough that we still have access to some relevant 
information. For example, the thylacine - which has been gone less than a century and was 
frequently held in captivity prior to this - is a species for which we are likely to still have 
ecological and husbandry data. For other species, this will be much more difficult. Take the 
de-extinction flagship, the mammoth. We have no good reason to believe their diet, habits or 
environment will at all closely resemble that of modern-day elephants. They are a vastly 
different species, which lived in a vastly different environment. Paleontological evidence is 
scarce (though we can go some way with information from preserved stomach contents and 
coproliths), and given the slow production rate of large animals like these, trial-and error, even 
if considered ethically acceptable for research purposes, is impractical. In pointing out that de-
extinction would give us the ability to study and learn about extinct animals, Rohwer & Marris 
(2018) also demonstrate that there is a lot we don’t know about species like mammoths – “how 
long do they nurse? What time of year do mammoths mate? How intelligent are mammoths as 
compared to elephants?” (2018, p. 7, italics in original). Seddon et al. (2014) list some of the 
types of knowledge we need for successful rearing and reintroduction – “knowledge of former 
distributions, social structure and behavior, diet, reproduction, parental care and growth, 
interspecific interactions, and biotic and abiotic habitat requirements is required” (2014, p. 
143). Although they are somewhat confident that “valuable clues may be obtained from the 
biology and ecology of extant species that may be nearest living relatives or otherwise 
occupying a similar ecological niche” (2014, p. 143), for species that have gone extinct long 
before human observation and record-keeping, this is likely to be a much more difficult project 
than this suggests. 
Even if we are able to determine what the appropriate conditions should be, there may also 
be large problems with providing them. Take the mammoth example again. If mammoths are 
anything like their elephant relatives, they live in large social groups of mixed age and sex. 
However, in the early stages of de-extinction projects all we will have are numerous juveniles. 
These may get some of their required social contact with elephant surrogates, but elephants are 
unlikely to have the required behavioural repertoire and social ‘vocabulary’ to match their 
mammoth companions. Provision of appropriate environmental features, and required dietary 
items could also prove intractable if these are no longer available. 
 
 74 
3.2.2.3. Welfare issues with reintroduction23 
Above, I have discussed the problems of housing the de-extinct animals in captivity. Just 
raising them to an age that they are suitable for release may prove to be impossible, and this is 
a huge welfare concern – the animals are likely to be malnourished and in poor health, with 
potential psychological and behavioural deficits. But in most of these programs, the animals 
are also destined to be released back to the wild (Shapiro, 2017)24, and as such require rigorous 
behavioural conditioning for this process. Seddon et al. (2014) argue that “de-extinction is a 
conservation translocation issue” (2014, p. 140) and thus will require the same considerations 
and hold the same risks. Jørgensen (2013) summarises the IUCN guidelines for reintroduction 
– “background studies to allow identification of the species’ habitat requirements, 
identification of lessons learned from prior reintroduction projects of similar species, 
evaluation of potential sites within the former range of the species, selection of appropriately 
diverse genetic stock, and an assessment of the socioeconomic context of the project” (2013, 
p. 719). It should be immediately clear that for de-extinct species, we will not have the means 
of obtaining most of these answers, as indicated in the previous section. Harrington et al. (2013) 
provide a detailed flow-chart of welfare considerations in reintroduction projects, 
demonstrating the huge number of considerations at play and knowledge required for such 
projects to go ahead successfully. A lot of these issues will be particularly salient for de-
extinction projects, as the required data will not be available. Without this information, we 
have little chance of successful reintroductions, and this will lead to decreased welfare for 
reintroduced animals. 
There are a number of potential animal welfare issues present in all reintroduction projects. 
These include mortality, disease, post-release stress and human conflict. Almost a quarter of 
reintroductions have mortality over 50%, due mainly to predation, traffic and other human 
effects, and disease and starvation (Harrington et al., 2013). Beck (1995) found that only 11% 
of the reintroduction programs he studied were successful in creating self-sustaining wild 
populations. Our lack of knowledge about de-extinct species and their ecology means these 
numbers are likely to be even worse for de-extinction projects. Harrington et al. (2013) looked 
at ways of measuring and monitoring welfare of released animals (e.g. health, condition, 
 
23 Though the use of the term ‘reintroduction’ here and throughout the chapter implies the released animals would 
be of the same species as the extinct ones, this is not meant necessarily as an endorsement of this view, but is 
rather following the common usage in the literature. The welfare issues discussed are the same regardless of 
whether or not the releases can be classified as reintroductions. 
24 Not all de-extinction projects aim at releasing animals back to the wild (Sandler 2014), and those which simply 
aim to create animals to hold in captivity for research or exhibition will not face this set of welfare problems, 
though the others, particularly those in Section 3.2.2.2, will still apply. 
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behaviour) and the types of supportive actions that may be used to improve welfare, such as 
health screening, pre-conditioning and provision of artificial food and shelter. These again all 
require knowledge of the species in order to succeed. Harrington et al. (2013) also noted that 
captive-bred animals were more likely to fail to cope after release than wild-caught animals. 
This is a problem for de-extinction as all animals in these projects will be captive-bred. 
There are also concerns for the welfare of other wild animals that will come into contact 
with the released species, through habitat alteration, resource competition, predation or 
aggression (Seddon et al., 2014). This may be managed to some degree by careful choice of 
species for de-extinction (for example, large slow-breeding animals that can be more easily 
tracked) (Seddon et al., 2014), but lack of knowledge about the species will still make potential 
impacts hard to predict. 
Even the preparatory training procedures for release can also be detrimental to welfare, as 
has been discussed for captive breeding and release programs of extant species (Beck, 1995). 
They require training and conditioning animals to tolerate the reduced conditions of the wild – 
lack of shelter, exposure to parasites, lack of food, avoidance of predators, social interactions 
with unfamiliar conspecifics etc. All of these conditions require a reduction in welfare as 
compared to the captive environment.  Beck (1995) looks at some ways of improving post-
release success and welfare – presence of a wild-born ‘teacher’ for natural behaviours, post-
release support and monitoring, and careful study of which of the stressful pre-release 
conditions are actually required to help survival and flourishing. All of these, save post-release 
monitoring, will be extremely difficult to provide in a de-extinction context. For example, 
depending on our knowledge of the species, we are unlikely to know what sorts of wild 
conditions these animals need to be acclimatised to and will not have access to suitable model 
animals to act as ‘teachers’.  
In particular, training the necessary behavioural repertoire for a species that has never been 
observed in the wild seems a potentially insurmountable task. “It is unclear how emergent 
social behaviours would survive the de-extinction process” (K. E. Jones, 2014, p. 21). The 
ways in which these animals interact with their environment, find and extract food, find and 
make shelter, and interact with one another and other wild animals, are all unknown. Turner 
(2017) points out that most of the candidate species for de-extinction programs are large, 
charismatic vertebrates, such as mammoths or passenger pigeons, and these are precisely the 
sorts of animals for which the concerns are likely to be most pronounced, due to their 
behavioural complexity. At best, we may be able to perform ‘soft release’, in which animals 
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are monitored and cared for as they adapt to life in the wild, but this will still be a time of stress; 
and would require substantial additional resources. 
Getting the preparation wrong before releasing an animal can have disastrous consequences, 
as has been seen in countless reintroduction projects performed with animals that have wild 
counterparts to study. In fact, the high rate of failure of such projects has led to them generally 
falling out of favour as conservation initiatives. Where animals cannot be properly prepared, 
when released they will suffer and are likely to die, with no ecological benefit. This is, of 
course, a huge welfare concern. The IUCN regulations for reintroductions state “the welfare of 
animals for release is of paramount concern through all these stages” (IUCN, 1998, p. 9). 
Reintroduction programs inevitably cause suffering, even for extant and well-studied species, 
and these problems will be worse for species with less suitable habitat and about which we 
have much less information. There may be some species for which these concerns are less 
strong, such as thylacines: more recently extinct, which have plenty of suitable habitat and 
some recorded knowledge. At the very least, it will require very careful assessment of potential 
candidates, to minimise these concerns (Seddon et al., 2014).  
 
3.2.2.4. Measuring welfare 
A final concern is that we don’t have any good way of measuring what sorts of welfare 
harms are occurring in these projects. As I will describe in the next section, it is possible that 
the welfare harms described could be offset by benefits in other areas. But even if we are able 
to develop a framework that allows us to determine how much welfare harm is acceptable for 
gains in other areas, it is not at all clear that we can get a strong sense of the level of harm that 
is occurring. Making a decision about an action based on its harms and benefits requires at least 
a basic approximation of the degree of these harms and benefits, and this may be extremely 
difficult for the welfare of de-extinct species. Measurement of welfare requires using 
physiological and behavioural indicators that are usually specific to the species, and calibrated 
through testing of other individuals. Even where the indicators themselves may be similar 
across a large taxonomic range (e.g. cortisol measurements), the levels of significance (i.e. 
what measurements indicate problematic welfare) will not be. Our lack of knowledge of the 
normal behavioural and physiological parameters for these animals mean that we can make 
only very rough (and potentially anthropomorphised) judgements as to the welfare of the 
animals we are creating. As I will discuss in Chapter Six, there is the potential to use similarities 
between closely related species, but this is quite limited. There is also not a large pool of 
individuals that we can test to develop such indicators. Use of welfare indicators from other 
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species may suffice, but may also be greatly misleading if the species differ in the particular 
behaviours or physiological markers used. This may then have a large impact on the trade-off 
matrices we are considering. 
 
3.2.3. The moral status of de-extinct animals 
It is clear that there are many strong potential concerns for the welfare of the animals used 
in and created by de-extinction projects. Perhaps, though, we might think that these are not 
problematic as the animals do not fall into the right category to require our moral concern. The 
degree to which we should be concerned about the welfare of reintroduced de-extinct animals 
mirrors the discussion about de-domestication – the ‘rewilding’ of domesticated animals (see 
e.g. Gamborg, Gremmen, Christiansen, & Sandøe, 2010). There is a tension here about whether 
the animals should be considered as wild animals, or domestic animals, as these categories 
carry with them different ethical and legal implications. Domestic animals tend to be 
considered at the level of the individual animal, with welfare considerations in the forefront, 
while for wildlife the consideration is at the level of species or population (Gamborg et al., 
2010) and it is generally considered acceptable to compromise animal welfare somewhat if 
there is an overall species-level or conservation benefit. Norton (1995) argues that wild 
animals, for the most part, do not need to fall within the human moral sphere, and that in fact 
because we value their wildness, we choose not to interfere in their lives: “It is not this content 
of animal experience but the context in which we encounter it that determines the strength and 
type of our obligations” (1995, p. 106, italics in original). The level of our interference in the 
lives of animals determines our responsibilities towards them. Captive-bred exotic animals, 
neither wild nor domestic, fall somewhere between these boundaries. 
A difference between usual considerations of management of wild animals and of de-extinct 
animals is that we are not just dealing with animals as ‘moral patients’; the additional fact that 
we have created them places on us extra duties of care (Cohen, 2014), similar to the 
responsibilities we have towards pets, or zoo animals. Gamborg et al. (2010) also stress the 
difference between animals which humans have been directly involved in creating or rearing, 
for which we should assume responsibility, as opposed to those we have not: “Because humans 
are responsible for the very existence of domestic animals … and because the latter often render 
the relevant animals dependent and vulnerable in ways wild animals are not” (2010, p. 72). As 
de-extinct animals are created by us, often for our own ends, and spend at least the early part 
of their life in our care, their welfare should be our concern. 
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3.2.4. Weighing up potential benefits 
I have outlined some of the ways in which de-extinction efforts are likely to be harmful to 
the welfare of the animals involved. These are big problems, in some cases possibly 
insurmountable, and it is almost inevitable that these programs will result in animal suffering. 
Even if there are some positive experiences in the lives of the de-extinct animals, it seems likely 
that these will be far outweighed by the physical and psychological problems described above 
and most de-extinct animals would not have what would be considered ‘lives worth living’. 
However, this does not necessarily mean we should not engage in such programs at all, as there 
are other potential benefits to weigh against the welfare harms. 
Animal welfare should be a strong ethical consideration in any project that impacts it and 
most authors in the area agree that animal welfare is an important concern. Cohen (2014) claims 
that “beyond a certain level and probability of harm de-extinction may cause, we should refrain 
on moral grounds from performing it, despite sacrificing greater utility” (2014, p. 175). Sandler 
(2014) takes a milder approach, concluding that “while animal welfare concerns must be 
addressed, they do not justify abandoning deep de-extinction” (2014, p. 358). Kasperbauer 
(2017) concludes that de-extinction is “still permissible … but only if it can overcome the 
challenges I identify” (2017, p. 2), which particularly refers to the animal welfare cost and 
takes the strong view that “the ethical permissibility of de-extinction projects would be limited 
by their ability to ensure that the individuals brought back would not have lives full of 
suffering” (2017, p. 7). Rohwer & Marris (2018) similarly argue that de-extinction would be 
permissible “if and only if suffering is minimal” (2018, p. 1). But as important as welfare 
considerations are, they are not the only considerations in play. There are many potential values 
which will be positively or negatively affected, such as environmental and human values, and 
these should be considered against one another. This means that when considering the ethical 
permissibility of the de-extinction program, we must look at the potential benefits and how 
these might weigh against the welfare harms. 
This sits within a larger dialogue about under which conditions it may be acceptable to cause 
harm to animals for some other benefit. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess this 
question in any meaningful way. I will assume that the extreme positions – that it is never okay 
to cause harm to any animal unless it is to benefit that animal itself, or that there is no problem 
in harming animals in pursuit of any human gains – are the least plausible, and that there will 
be at least some conditions under which we consider such harms acceptable. We then need to 
establish what the real gains of such projects will be, as well as the level of harm that will be 
occurring (as mentioned, not necessarily an easy task), and make some attempt at weighing 
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these concerns. Norton (1995) notes that there is unlikely to be a single moral measure on 
which we can make such decisions. Instead we should be moral pluralists, with differing values 
in competition, and between which we must adjudicate – “we value many things in different 
ways, and these differing values are sometimes in conflict” (1995, p. 104). He continues that 
“we have an obligation to minimize the suffering of individual animals in some situations and 
that we have obligations to emphasize species protection in other situations. The problem is to 
explain coherently and effectively how to tell the difference between these situations” (1995, 
p. 104). Diehm (2017) points out that the ‘individualistic’ ethic used in animal welfare concerns 
will not be the only important value in conservation considerations and “the broader 
conversation about de-extinction is likely to take place on terms substantially more holistic” 
(2017, p. 26), taking into account species value as well as individual. Where there is a sufficient 
gain of some other sort, we might accept the welfare harms of these projects. 
The potential gains of de-extinction projects fall into four categories. These are: ecological 
– the improved quality of ecosystems with restoration of keystone species; aesthetic – human 
preference for the presence of such species; restitutive – that we are in some sense righting the 
wrongs we have committed in sending such species extinct; and scientific – leading to 
advancement of knowledge and technology. Several authors have analysed these potential 
benefits. Cohen (2014) and Sandler (2014) provide in depth analyses of all of these and both 
conclude that none of these provide sufficient justification for such a project. More recently, 
Rohwer & Marris (2018) assess potential benefits and conclude that human benefits are the 
most likely justification, but cannot overrule animal welfare concerns. Sandler (2014) argues 
that “deep de-extinction does not address any pressing ecological or social problems, and it 
does not make up for past harms or wrongs. As a result, there is not a very strong ethical case 
(let alone an ethical imperative) for reviving long extinct species or developing the capacity 
for doing so … taking on significant costs and risks or funnelling scare resources to pursue it 
is not justified … deep de-extinction is in many respects a luxury. It is fine to pursue it if people 
want, so long as it does not interfere with or compromise ethically important things” (2014, p. 
359). Greely (2017) describes the proposed benefits as “vague and insubstantial” (2017, p. 35) 
in comparison to other potential uses of resources to solve environmental and human health 
issues.  
Aesthetic and restitutive gains are the weakest of the proposed potential benefits (cf Lean, 
2019 for detailed discussion of these points). Aesthetic gains are based in the value we place 
on the resurrection of the species, the sense of ‘wonder’ or ‘awe’ that in itself would hold 
intrinsic value (Cohen, 2014), however these are not a type of value that can outweigh the 
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suffering caused through de-extinction programs (Kasperbauer, 2017). These may then lead to 
increased emotional and commercial investment in conservation efforts, but this would then 
only be an instrumental benefit with the primary gain still falling into the ecological category 
(see Section 3.2.4.1). Restitutive benefits take de-extinction to be in some sense a matter of 
justice – something we ‘owe’ to the species we have driven extinct. However, the underlying 
assumption that species are the kinds of things which are able to hold such claims is 
unconvincing (Rohwer & Marris, 2018) and even if we could make sense of our duties towards 
extinct species, de-extinction may not be a way of discharging them as de-extinct animals may 
not even belong to the same species as the extinct species – Shapiro (2017) describes them as 
“proxies, not copies” (2017, p. 5). If this is right, and we do not have the same species, it is 
difficult to justify that de-extinction has benefitted or provided justice to the extinct species. 
Ecological and scientific benefits are those most likely to justify de-extinction programs, and 
will be discussed in the following sections. Here I will run through these proposed benefits, 
and the objections raised against them, to assess whether they are likely to be sufficiently great 
to outweigh the potential welfare harms; concluding that it is unlikely that any will be sufficient 
as things currently stand. 
 
3.2.4.1. Ecological benefits 
The strongest justification for de-extinction is ecological: that it can help improve the 
environment through restoring ecosystems. This is what Kasperbauer (2017) refers to as the 
‘instrumental’ value of de-extinct species. It is a commonly held view in conservation biology 
that we have an obligation to sustain natural processes, and this obligation will offset some 
animal welfare harms (e.g. Norton, 1995). There are two different strands to this justification 
and the replies to it – whether we should be aiming at ecosystem restoration at all, and whether 
de-extinction is the best process to achieve this.  
On the first point, it is not obvious that ecosystem restoration is the right target for 
conservation ecology. Ecosystems are dynamic, constantly changing, and there may be no 
principled way for choosing some historic state of the ecosystem as the one we should aim at 
restoring (Davis 2000). Under this view, there is no objective standard of ‘ecosystem health’ 
that we can aim at, and all these efforts would merely be based on an arbitrary judgement of 
the ideal state of an ecosystem from a human point of view (Rohwer & Marris, 2018). Instead 
of ecosystem restoration, we might instead think of the benefits of restoring lost ecosystem 
functions and supporting biodiversity, however in most cases these are likely to be equally well 
served (at lower cost) by other interventions (Lean, 2019). 
 81 
Even if we were to accept the goal of ecosystem restoration, and were able to set an ideal 
target state, we don’t know enough about ecology to predict whether our actions in this regard 
may be successful. Cohen (2014) concludes: “Although our analysis supported the essential 
and actual possibility of de-extinction’s ecological benefit, probable changes to species’ 
environment since extinction and the resultant risks reintroduction may pause [sic] to 
ecosystemic integrity will likely make the overall ecological value of de-extinction quite 
uncertain in most cases” (2014, p. 169). Single-species de-extinctions may be ineffective in 
restoration, as ecosystems require interactive networks of species and the target species would 
thus likely “need to be brought back with a cluster of other species” (Kasperbauer, 2017, p. 5). 
Most of the species are unlikely to thrive in the wild without assistance (hence their previous 
extinctions). De-extinct species may fail to provide the intended ecological functions, instead 
merely serving as “functionally ineffectual eco-zombies” (McCauley, Hardesty-Moore, 
Halpern, & Young, 2017, p. 1004), as ecosystems can change rapidly after extinction and the 
functional niche may not remain. Robert et al. (2017) are similarly concerned about possibility 
for success, due to problems of limited genetic variability and ecological divergence of the 
species from the ecosystem.  
In terms of a conservation ‘last resort’ or safety net, de-extinction projects are likely to be 
of limited benefit, as they will not address the causes of species decline, and are probably not 
the best use of resources in this area (Sandler, 2014).  There are strong reasons to think de-
extinction projects are unlikely to succeed in restoring lost target ecosystems. At the very least, 
this justification is only as strong as the likely success of the de-extinction project in restoring 
the target ecosystem, which relies on a deep understanding of the ecology of the species, the 
availability of appropriate habitat, removal of the original causes of extinction and the role of 
the particular species within the ecosystem (Kasperbauer, 2017; Seddon et al., 2014). 
De-extinction projects may also have some benefit in raising public interest and support for 
wider conservation projects, in the same way as ‘flagship’ species (Lean, 2019). Interest in de-
extinction projects may raise funds and awareness for other conservation projects, and habitat 
protected for de-extinct species will also serve as general ecosystem preserves. However, as 
de-extinction programs are highly costly – both financially and, as I have demonstrated, in 
terms of welfare - the case would need to be strong that the degree to which these benefits 
attain (in comparison to those that come from other traditional programs) would be sufficient 




3.2.4.2. Scientific benefits 
The second strongest benefit of de-extinction programs is the benefit of the science itself – 
the value in advancing our scientific knowledge and creating new technology. Sandler (2014) 
considers this to be the primary benefit of de-extinction programs. Similarly, Rohwer & Marris 
(2018) promote anthropocentric benefits, including scientific knowledge, as the primary goods 
of de-extinction projects. These projects could push forwards scientific knowledge in terms of 
the techniques and processes used, as well as the ability to study and understand the de-extinct 
animals themselves, and the subsequent ecosystem changes (Rohwer & Marris, 2018).  These 
human benefits of knowledge accumulation are not strong ethical reasons, unless there is a case 
for some other tangible downstream impact of the knowledge gained, “therefore legitimate 
ecological, political, animal welfare, legal, or human health concerns associated with a de-
extinction (and reintroduction) must be thoroughly addressed for it to be ethically acceptable” 
(Sandler, 2014, p. 354). There is a stronger case where research and understanding could 
provide more direct benefits to humans, such as improvements in medical research – for 
instance, suggestions that research into de-extinct gastric brooding frogs could improve 
understanding of infertility in humans (Zimmer, 2013). Concrete benefits to human lives could 
be weighed against animal welfare concerns in the same way that current medical testing does, 
but would require a convincing case that the benefits are likely and of a degree to outweigh 
welfare harms. 
There are possibly other benefits for the technologies currently developed for de-extinction. 
They could be used in conservation projects for extant species, such as genetically engineering 
species to tolerate new environmental conditions caused by climate change (Kasperbauer, 
2017) or the ‘genetic rescue’ of endangered species with low genetic diversity (Rohwer & 
Marris, 2018). “The scientific knowledge and progress that will likely occur also has a great 
potential to help currently endangered and threatened species” (Rohwer & Marris, 2018, p. 8). 
As these would be improving the quality of life for currently existing animals, there would be 
an obvious benefit to individual welfare that may offset other welfare problems. However, this 
would only provide a reason to develop the techniques in these other contexts, not for de-
extinction itself. If the scientific processes are themselves valuable, they can be developed 






3.2.4.3. Creating future animals 
One more potential argument in favour of de-extinction projects of this kind is that they may 
give rise to many future animals, who will have good lives. Kasperbauer (2017) quotes Brand 
– “if you can bring bucardos back, then how many would get to live that would not have gotten 
to live?” (in Kasperbauer, 2017, p. 6). This future benefit might then compensate for the current 
suffering caused. There are two parts of this argument – the presumption that future animals 
may actually have good lives, and that if they do then this will outweigh present suffering. In 
regards to the first claim, it is not clear that the future animals will have sufficiently good lives, 
due to many of the problems described earlier for rearing and reintroducing animals. “At the 
very least, they need to present evidence that that lives of future individuals will be good 
enough to justify the suffering of the first individuals brought into existence. If none of these 
lives are worth living, then de-extinction is clearly impermissible” (Kasperbauer, 2017, p. 7).  
The second claim is a controversial one – it is not generally accepted that the potential future 
lives of others is a moral good, and certainly not one that outweighs current suffering. To 
paraphrase Narveson (1973), we want to make people happy, not make happy people. While 
we may have obligations not to bring into existence individuals who will have lives of 
suffering, we have no such mirroring obligation to bring into existence individuals who will 
have lives worth living (McMahan, 2002, p. 300). This means that the future good lives of 
other animals could never outweigh the suffering of the initial animals. “Many ethicists would 
be reluctant to accept that the possible existence of future animal lives could justify intense 
suffering for the first individuals” (Kasperbauer, 2017, p. 6). Kasperbauer (2017) concludes 
that the justification for creation of future lives could only work if the lives of the first animals 
are not full of suffering - “at the very least … the initial individuals could be guaranteed a 
certain level of wellbeing – in common parlance, a ‘life worth living’” (2017, p. 6) and this 
seems unlikely, for the reasons discussed in Section 3.2.2. 
 
3.2.5. Conclusion 
I have shown here that none of the proposed benefits of de-extinction programs appear 
sufficient to outweigh the cost in terms of animal welfare, at least not as it currently stands. 
This is without taking into account other potential costs, such as economic costs of the research, 
opportunity costs in terms of other conservation projects that may have instead been funded, 
risks of harm to existing ecosystems and human populations from release of new species and 
the potential decrease in urgency of conservation efforts if extinction is seen as reversible 
(Camacho, 2015). These additional costs give even more weight to considerations against these 
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projects. Sandler (2017) points out that the way in which we consider these trade-offs will 
depend a lot on our starting point: “is the presumption that a de-extinction effort ought to be 
permitted to go forward unless there are compelling reasons, such as those that would emerge 
from a conservation cost–benefit analysis, against doing so? Or is the presumption that a de-
extinction effort ought not to be permitted unless there are compelling reasons, such as those 
that would emerge from a conservation cost–benefit analysis, in favour of doing so?” (2017, p. 
2). Which of these starting points we take will influence how strong the reasons for or against 
need to be in order to be decisive. The strong evidence for welfare harms gives us a 
presumption against de-extinction and thus would require compelling reasons in favour in order 
to outweigh these costs – reasons which we do not currently seem to have. 
What this means is that we should at least wait to begin. These projects are, for the most 
part, not time-sensitive. The targeted animals will not become more extinct the longer we wait. 
Giving some more time would allow for improvements in the technology that may help reduce 
these welfare harms. Though the course of making these improvements might still require the 
use of animals that would be harmed, the number of animals could be smaller, and the larger-
scale de-extinction projects could then take place in future with reduced suffering.  For more 
recently extinct species, such as the thylacine, the problem is more pressing, as we may want 
to bring the species back before the ecosystem changes too much to support them. The 
likelihood of significant welfare problems, and the lack of strong justification for the projects, 
suggests that if such projects should go ahead at all, careful attention needs to be paid to the 
selection of candidate species in order to minimise the risks of suffering, and maximise 
benefits.   
‘Shallow’ extinctions such as thylacines may be far better candidates for de-extinction 
projects than ‘deeper’ extinctions, such as mammoths. For the latter, our lack of knowledge, 
and changes in ecology, are likely to lead to greater welfare problems, as well as less chance 
of successful projects. Rohwer and Marris (2018) support this conclusion: “certainly, we 
believe that the case for bringing back very recently extinct animals is much stronger. Where 
their habitats and ecological interactions are still available, their return can be justified in the 
same way as a reintroduction of a locally extinct species” (2018, p. 12). For the projects to have 
the strongest benefit, and greatest potential to outweigh welfare concerns, these should be 
species which have a high chance of successful reintroduction, and those which are likely to 
pay the largest role in restoration of damaged ecosystems. For the lowest welfare impact, these 
should be species which can be more easily bred (most likely those with extant relatives), and 
those for which our knowledge of their requirements for rearing, husbandry and reintroduction 
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are good. Only in these sorts of cases, where we have sufficient information and well-chosen 




Animal welfare is, in part, a normative concept. The field of applied animal ethics analyses 
the different ways in which we use or impact animals; considering the moral permissibility of 
particular actions and our duties towards animals in different situations. Here, I have looked at 
two different issues in animal ethics: management euthanasia in zoos and de-extinction projects 
looking to re-create extinct species. Using a subjective concept of welfare influences how we 
think of the potential harms and benefits of practices like these. Whenever our actions impact 
animal welfare, our moral deliberations should take this into account. Using these case studies, 
I have shown how welfare considerations might interact with other values in our decision-
making. I have not aimed to give definitive answers as to the permissibility (or not) of the 
practices described, but instead aimed to highlight the range of considerations we need to keep 
in mind when assessing them. One additional point raised throughout these discussions has 
been the importance of accurate measurement of welfare in order to inform our decision-
making regarding necessary trade-offs and comparisons; whether regarding the quality of life 
lost for euthanized animals compared with the gain to other animals within the institution, or 
in quantifying the degree of harm experienced by animals in de-extinction programs. Without 
accurate measurement, we risk taking the wrong paths when faced with such choices. We thus 
require accurate quantitative measures of welfare as part of our moral decision-making. It is to 















4. CHAPTER FOUR – MEASURING WELFARE 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In Chapter Two, I argued that we should understand animal welfare subjectively; as 
consisting in the subjective experience of an animal over its lifetime, then went on to examine 
how this concept could influence the way we think about some cases in applied animal ethics. 
However, as well as being a normative concept, welfare is a scientific concept. In this chapter, 
and those that follow, I will shift to looking at the measurement of this subjective experience 
of animals, and addressing some of the potential problems with making such measurements. 
For what follows, it is not essential to accept the arguments of Chapter Two. Measurement of 
subjective welfare is still important, even if one does not take it as the sole constituent of animal 
welfare. Almost all conceptions of animal welfare agree that subjective experience is a 
necessary component of welfare, and if this is the case, then its measurement will be an 
important part of animal welfare science. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, I am not here 
addressing the ‘problem of other minds’. I established there that we have good reason to think 
that animals experience conscious mental states, and that we can gain information about them. 
The other option is to assume that subjective states in animals are epiphenomenal - that is, that 
they have no effects on the animal itself or on the world. If we reject this, and instead accept 
that conscious experience has some effects, then we should also accept that - at least in principle 
- subjective welfare is detectable. This means it is accessible to measurement, though still 
insufficient to determine whether it has the required properties to be a measurable entity. In 
this chapter I will address this second concern. 
There are two different questions that arise when we are looking at the measurement of 
welfare. The first is a theoretical question – is welfare a measurable entity? And the second is 
practical – can we actually measure it in practice, and how might we do so? In this chapter I 
will address the first question, looking at whether, in principle, subjective welfare is the sort of 
thing that can be measured; that is, “what quantitative statements about well-being can we give 
sense to?” (Griffin, 1986, p. 94). The chapters that follow will then look at some of the other 
issues that come up in the practice of trying to measure welfare. In particular, when thinking 
about the measurement of welfare, one might have concerns about the commensurability of the 
different types of subjective experience and whether they can combine into a single, cohesively 
measurable state – this problem will be addressed in Chapter Seven. Here, I will examine the 
question of whether in general subjective experience (for now considered as a whole) is a 
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measurable attribute; using some basic measurement theory, I will look at what is required for 
an attribute to be considered measurable, and show how subjective experience meets these 
criteria. 
Measurement, at its most basic, is simply “the assignment of numerals to objects or events 
according to rule – any rule” (Stevens, 1959, p. 19). We already have in place a system of 
mathematics that we understand – we are able to apprehend the relationships between numbers, 
and have well-defined rules for the sorts of transformations we can perform on them, and how 
to interpret the results. When we measure something, we are mapping these mathematical 
structures onto that attribute, in the hope that we can then use the mathematical rules to better 
understand the properties of whatever it is we are measuring and how it relates to other 
instances of the same kind. In determining an attribute to be measurable, we are “showing that 
a system of empirical relations and operations is isomorphic with a certain system of numerical 
operations and relations” (Griffin, 1986, p. 95). We use basic rules or axioms to provide the 
necessary structure for ordering measures and determining the relationships between them. For 
example, “axioms of order ensure that the order imposed on objects by the assignment of 
numbers is the same order attained in actual observation or measurement” (Hosch, 2011, p. 
227) and “axioms of difference govern the measuring of intervals” (Hosch, 2011, p. 227). 
This mapping will always be somewhat imperfect, but so long as we have reason to believe 
that the empirical properties of what we are measuring are in some way mirrored by the 
mathematical properties of the assigned numerals, then we can hope to gain understanding of 
the system of interest. What is important to keep in mind is the relationship between the 
measured attribute and the measurement system applied. Sarle (1997) gives a clear example of 
the use of measurement and the relationship between the measured attribute and the assigned 
numbers: 
Suppose we have a collection of straight sticks of various sizes and we assign a number to each stick by 
measuring its length using a ruler. If the number assigned to one stick is greater than the number assigned 
to another stick, we can conclude that the first stick is longer than the second. Thus, a relationship among 
the numbers (greater than) corresponds to a relationship among the sticks (longer than). If we lay two sticks 
end-to-end in a straight line and measure their combined length, then the number we assign to the 
concatenated sticks will equal the sum of the numbers assigned to the individual sticks (within measurement 
error). Thus another relationship among the numbers (addition) corresponds to a relationship among the 
sticks (concatenation). These relationships among the sticks must be empirically verified for the 
measurements to be valid. (Sarle, 1997). 
Because these mappings are imperfect, we need to look at which particular features might 
be relevant in any case and use the mathematical transformations accordingly. This gives us 
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different scales of measurement, which are different ways of assigning the numbers to the 
measured attribute. S.S. Stevens (1951) laid out four primary kinds of scale we might use for 
measurement – nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. In Section 4.2, I will go over what each of 
these entails, and how we might apply them to subjective welfare. The important thing is that 
we match the right type of scale to the attribute or object being measured. It needs to be the 
case that the types of transformations that can be performed on the mathematical elements of 
the scale mirror those that can be performed on the measured attribute. What scale we use will 
inform which statistics we can use in analysis. 
When choosing a measurement scale, it is also important to keep in mind our goals for 
measurement. Griffin (1986) notes that measurement is flexible enough that basically any 
attribute you can imagine will be measurable on some scale or other – “What we want to know 
is not just, Is well-being measurable? There are many different scales of measurement, and it 
would be astonishing if well-being were not measurable on at least one of the less demanding 
ones” (1986, p. 75). As we will see, the simpler scales of measurement are quite permissive, 
such that anything which can be categorised could be considered measurable in this basic form. 
This means the open question of “is welfare measurable?” is not necessarily an interesting one. 
What we are really interested in is whether welfare is measurable in such a way that it will be 
useful for our purposes – whether our capabilities fulfil our needs (e.g. to enable us to compare 
and contrast; to evaluate the results of interventions). This requires an idea of what our needs 
are – how we are going to use these measurements and what we will therefore require of them. 
Do our powers of measurement match the demands of application? As I go on to look at the 
different types of scales and their potential applicability to subjective experience, I will also 
comment on how appropriate these are to the goals of animal welfare science, as described 
below. 
As discussed, animal welfare science is interested in the measurement of welfare. Most 
commonly, measurement of animal welfare will take the form of trying to determine whether 
some particular type of intervention – such as type of environment, or husbandry procedure – 
will increase or decrease the welfare of the animals that experience it25. This then often only 
requires a very basic type of measurement – all we need to determine is whether some outcome 
is higher or lower than a baseline, or some other outcome. In other cases we may have multiple 
 
25 As we are ultimately concerned with lifetime welfare (as discussed in Chapter Two), there are additional 
complexities in calculating lifetime welfare from a set of synchronic measures such as are typically used in welfare 
science. I take here an assumption that there is some such function that could do the job, though there is insufficient 
space to work out the specifics of how that might look in practice. 
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treatments which we have to compare, but we are still really just looking for a basic ranking – 
is it better for the welfare of these animals that we provide environment A, or environment B? 
In this sense, the degree to which welfare is affected is not really important, and so all we 
would need would be a basic ordinal scale, as will be discussed below (though there is still the 
additional issue of comparing interventions which may improve welfare in some respects and 
not others; this will be addressed in Chapter Seven). However, there are other cases in which 
we would require more information. It is not always enough to simply determine which of two 
(or more) environments is the best one; we will sometimes need to know by how much. 
Additionally, when making practical decisions about implementing changes to animal housing 
and husbandry, we will need to consider potential trade-offs, which will require more 
information about the degree of effect of particular treatments, and how they might compare 
to one another. This sort of decision-making requires quantitative comparisons of magnitude. 
We may also want to make welfare comparisons across different species, such as when 
deciding on best distribution of resources; this raises the problem of intersubjective 
commensurability that will be addressed in Chapter Six. The applications of measurement in 
welfare science and the types of measurement scale required for these are summarised in Table 
4.1 below, and will be discussed throughout Section 4.2. When considering the needs or goals 
of measurement of animal welfare, it seems that, though in many cases a simple ranking 
procedure will be sufficient, when trying to consider trade-offs or comparisons we will need 
some more sophisticated system of measuring degree or magnitude of subjective welfare 
effects. In the following sections, I will look at whether these types of measurement might, in 
principle, be possible for subjective welfare. 
 
Welfare application Measurement scale 
Comparing housing types Ordinal 
Looking for individual welfare changes over time Ordinal 
Comparing welfare between individuals Ordinal 
Comparing the effect of husbandry interventions Ordinal 
Aggregating individual welfare to assess groups Quantitative (Interval or Ratio) 
Calculating management trade-offs Quantitative (Interval or Ratio) 
Determining best resource distribution Quantitative (Interval or Ratio) 




4.2. Measurement scales and application to welfare 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, to measure some attribute is really just to assign numerical 
values to different values of the attribute, according to some rule. There are many different 
such rules that can be used, and here I will look at some of the more common ones, and how 
they might be applied to subjective welfare. The five primary types of scale we might use for 
measurement are nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio and absolute. Each scale has an associated 
set of permissible transformations that may be used; those which “preserve the relevant 
relationships of the measurement process” (Sarle, 1997). When choosing a type of scale on 
which an attribute might be measured, it is important to find the right match, such that the sorts 
of transformations that can be performed on the mathematical elements of the scale mirror 
those which can be performed on the measured attribute. Relating measurement to the attribute 
requires assumptions about the nature of the attribute and its properties (Sarle, 1997). In this 
section, I will outline the features of the different types of scales, and for each one, examine 
whether subjective welfare could have the required features to be measured on that scale.  
 
4.2.1. Nominal 
The first and most basic scale of measurement is the nominal scale. This is simply the 
application of labels to different categories – these can be numbers, but can also be words, or 
symbols. In a nominal scale, the mathematical relationships between the labels have no 
meaning, apart from the relationship of identity. All that matters are the number of categories 
and how many members they contain. Two items can be assigned the same label where they 
have the same value of the attribute (Sarle, 1997). This scale relies only on the relationship of 
equality – in determining whether some object is equal to another (same category) or unequal 
(different categories). The permissible transformations are one-to-one and many-to-one 
transformations (Sarle, 1997). That is, that each item within a category could be shifted to a 
new category label, preserving their distinctness, or items from multiple categories could be 
shifted into a new category, grouping them. For example, we might consider two categories of 
measurement for swans – black and white. We could label these categories ‘1’ and ‘2’, where 
the numbers represent only so far as the uniqueness of each number mirrors the distinctness of 
the groupings – the numerical properties of the labels have no bearing. We would observe our 
group of swans and assign them to either category, depending on their feather colour. Swans 
within the same category would count as equals, while those in different categories as unequal. 
We could perform a one-to-one transformation on these categories, where all members of one 
category (say, the black swans) are shifted to a new category: essentially a ‘relabelling’, where 
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‘1’ becomes ‘3’, or ‘A’. We could also perform a one-to-many transformation in which we 
create a new category of simply ‘swans’ (perhaps labelled ‘4’), and move all the members of 
‘1’ and ‘2’ to this new set. 
Subjective animal welfare could in theory be measured on a nominal scale. We could create 
different welfare categories, based on welfare scores – such as group ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ - and place 
individuals within them, depending on their measure. Any animals placed within the same 
category would be taken to have the same welfare value (equality). These categories could be 
transformed through relabelling (e.g. A = 1, B = 2, C = 3), where equality relations between 
individuals within a category still hold, or through grouping (e.g. new category D = what was 
previously in B & C) where new equality relations are created.  
This is, however, going to be of extremely limited use, as we cannot even make judgements 
as to the relative value of the categories (i.e. that category A represents higher welfare than 
category C); to do so would be to convert our measurements to an ordinal scale. Without saying 
anything about the relative empirical values of the categories (i.e. whether they represent higher 
or lower measured scores), they might still have some limited use if we state that we prefer 
membership of one category (say, A) to another (C). We could then assess whether more 
animals are in our preferred category (based on the relative membership of the two categories), 
or whether this number changes over time. In analysing a particular husbandry situation such 
as a farm, we could then have rough comparisons between different farms or the same farm 
over time. As this would be an additional judgement of normative value as opposed to the 
empirical values of the welfare scores used in measurement, this would not technically be a 
conversion to an ordinal scale. Returning to our earlier example, it would be equivalent to 
saying that we prefer to have more black swans than white, and then analysing data 
accordingly. We are not saying anything about the measurement of blackness or whiteness, but 
drawing further conclusions as to how we might prefer to use the data. However, given that in 
practice, our preferred categories will always be those of higher welfare over lower welfare, 
then this will push us to use of an ordinal scale, to which I will now turn. 
 
4.2.2. Ordinal 
The second type of measurement scale is ordinal. An ordinal scale allows us to rank objects 
in order, regarding some particular property on which an attribute is simply ranked as ‘higher’ 
or ‘lower’ than another within a list, and these are then assigned corresponding values. These 
values must reflect the ordering relationships between the members – e.g. those with higher 
levels of the attribute should be assigned higher numbers. It is important to note here that the 
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values themselves mean little – as long as they represent the ordering of the attribute, they 
could be 1,2,3 or just as easily be -14, 1.4, 3000 (Griffin, 1986). The differences between the 
values do not represent anything about the differences between the attributes. Building such an 
ordinal list simply consists of comparisons between members of a set. An example of this sort 
of scale is ‘scratch’ tests for rock hardness, in which rocks are ordered according to which other 
rocks they are able to scratch, or be scratched by.  This type of scale still cannot give us many 
useful statistical analyses, but we are able at least to determine relations of greater than or less 
than. The permissible transformations are monotone increasing transformations, in which the 
numerical (or other) labels may change, so long as they retain the ordering relation between 
items (Sarle, 1997).  
There are also several possible types of ordering we can use – Griffin (1986, pp. 96–98) 
describes strong ordering, weak ordering, partial ordering and vague ordering. Strong ordering 
is the most demanding and has the properties of reflexivity, transitivity, completeness and anti-
symmetry. Reflexivity means that all objects stand in equality relations to themselves – in this 
case, meaning that they sit in the same location in the ordering (have the same assigned value). 
Transitivity means that, for example, if A > B and B > C, then A > C. Completeness means 
that all attributes are assigned a value and can be placed somewhere on the scale – for any pair 
of objects, either they are equal or one is greater than the other. Anti-symmetry means that no 
two items can hold the same value and sit in the same place on the scale. For a weak ordering, 
we remove anti-symmetry so that now two objects can be equal. For a partial ordering we 
remove completeness, so that some objects may not have a place on the scale relative to one 
another.  
Vague ordering is a type of partial ordering, in which we lose completeness due to the 
presence of rough equalities. In rough equality, some item A might be roughly equal to B, 
which means it is neither greater than, less than or equal to B. Rough equality also removes 
transitivity – so where A is roughly equal to B and B better than C, A may not be better than 
C. Why then can’t we just treat rough equality like strict equality and assume that A = B? 
According to Griffin, the reason is that if we add something to A, to create A+ (where A+ > 
A), unlike with strict equality, we still could not claim that A+ > B, or that A+ < B or A+ = B; 
we might still just have A+ roughly equal to B. “The trouble with rough equality is that it makes 
the strict ranking statements that it infects neither definitely true nor definitely false” (Griffin, 
1986, p. 96). In these situations it will not be the case that A > B or A < B or A = B, as it is for 
most scales, and this is what gives us vague ordering. Unlike in a weak ordering, here where 
A roughly equals B, B roughly equals C, we might sometimes decide A roughly equals C and 
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sometimes not. This gives us what he calls a ‘partially transitive weak ordering’. This can occur 
either “because it is hard to discriminate the differences in value that are really there or that 
there are no fine differences really there to discriminate” (Griffin, 1986, p. 80). In practice, we 
are much more likely to face the former situation than the latter (or not even know which we 
are in), as even when we might think there is some fact of the matter as to which of two items 
is greater, we will often lack the capacity to detect small differences. 
The existence of rough equalities may not often matter much to the application of ordinal 
scales. In fact, Griffin claims that “it is uncommon for rough equality to matter to prudential 
deliberation. Where we have rough equality we treat the items, when it comes to choice, simply 
as equals … It is a mistake to conclude from the fact that rough equality crops up fairly often 
that the difference between strict and rough equality matters fairly often” (Griffin, 1986, p. 97). 
So for practical purposes, when using an ordinal scale, we can probably treat rough equals as 
strict equals and get the same results. When making decisions regarding welfare, these will 
come out roughly right for our purposes. In particular, it is rare that much will turn on decisions 
in which there is no detectable differences between alternatives – either both would be 
acceptable, or there will be some alternative use of resources that will provide a much larger 
measurable difference.  
An ordinal scale is definitely appropriate for measurement of subjective welfare. The quality 
of subjective experience can be better or worse along the welfare scale, and particular instances 
can be ranked against one another (in Chapter Six I will address the question of whether and 
how we can make comparisons between individuals). It seems fairly intuitive that we are able 
to assess, at the very least, whether some welfare situation is better or worse than some other 
(barring the issues of integrating multiple types of experience that will be addressed in Chapter 
Seven). It may be the case that in many circumstances it is difficult to differentiate between 
closely-matched cases, but this is more a practical difficulty in application than a true problem 
with the scale. Although it may be difficult at times to judge the exact ranking of particular 
states of welfare, it is not the case that such states are unrankable. We shouldn’t have much 
trouble deciding that a bear rolling around in a pool with its companions is in a better state than 
a malnourished lion pacing on concrete. It may be difficult to decide in more closely matched 
cases whether a lion hunting prey or a bear catching fish is experiencing better welfare, but this 
is more likely to be a result of measurement imprecision rather than a case of strict 
incommensurability (to which I will turn in Section 4.3). At least in principle then, subjective 
experience should be measurable on an ordinal scale. There may of course be cases in which 
making such comparisons is extremely difficult, as described for vague orderings above – we 
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might lack the measurement precision to determine differences in value, or may have the type 
of entities for which such differences do not exist. The first is simply a practical issue about 
the reach of our measurement practices. The second is potentially more difficult, and leads to 
Griffin positing rough equality, as described above, where “the roughness is not in our 
understanding but ineradicably in the values themselves” (1986, p. 81). 
Due to this possibility, Griffin (1986) thinks vague ordering is the scale most likely to be 
applicable to measurement of wellbeing. He takes rough equality as inherent to measurements 
of wellbeing. However, Griffin has taken a preference-based approach to understanding 
wellbeing, in which there may actually be no strong fact of the matter about whether some 
preference truly outweighs another. For a subjective account of welfare, we might instead say 
that there is some fact of the matter about whether or not A > B, but we just don’t have 
sufficiently precise measurements to tell. In these cases we could treat the items as roughly 
equal, in the knowledge that future measurement may allow us to be more precise and alter the 
ordering. In these cases too, as with vague ordering, we should not expect exact transitivity, as 
if we take two items (A & B) as roughly equal only because of imprecise measurement, it could 
easily be the case that some third item (C) may fall within the bounds of error for A but not for 
B and thus not be roughly equivalent to both. In cases where we have sufficiently precise 
measurements to determine the differences between closely matched items, we should be able 
to construct a weak ordering, as the items will show the properties of reflexivity, transitivity, 
and completeness. We should not expect a strong ordering, as it will be possible for some items 
to occupy the same position on the scale, and thus will not be anti-symmetric. 
Using an ordinal scale allows us to determine whether one animal’s welfare is better or 
worse than another’s, or whether an animal’s welfare has improved or decreased over time. 
This fits with the goals of much of animal welfare science, in trying to determine whether some 
particular type of intervention – such as type of environment, or husbandry procedure – will 
increase or decrease the welfare of the animals that experience it. With this scale, we are able 
to discriminate both changes across valence (shifting welfare from poor to good or vice versa) 
and within valence (e.g. shifting from more to less poor). We can determine whether some 
particular outcome is higher or lower than some comparison case or another outcome. As our 
aims should always be to shift welfare up on the scale, having an ordering such as this will 
meet many of our needs.  
Although an ordinal scale will provide us with useful information for many applications, it 
will still not be sufficient in all cases. Although trying to determine which interventions will 
improve welfare is probably the most common application, it is not the sole use of such 
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measurement. We will often be making decisions in which it is important to consider potential 
trade-offs, which then require more quantitative information about the comparative magnitudes 
of different effects. Resources for animal management are always limited and we might, for 
example, want to decide whether to increase the size of an otter exhibit to give them more space 
to play, or to add a pond to a tiger exhibit to allow them to swim. This sort of decision-making 
requires quantitative comparisons – to determine whether the welfare benefit of more space to 
the otters is greater or less than the welfare benefit of a pond for the tigers. Leaving aside for 
now the issue of cross-species comparisons (which will be addressed in Chapter Six), we are 
still left with the task of comparing magnitudes. This comparison of magnitudes will be 
required in single-individual cases as well, such as if we were deciding whether the amount of 
suffering a kangaroo might experience from undergoing a vasectomy will be offset by how 
much pleasure it might gain from the ability to then live and mate freely with female 
companions.  
Ordinal scales also do not allow for aggregation of data, such as averaging the welfare of an 
animal over many points in time, or finding the average welfare level of a group of animals 
under investigation. We may be able to rank each animal into a category (say – high, medium, 
low) and against one another, but cannot say whether, for instance, an equal number of ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ scoring individuals would produce the same average as all ‘mediums’ would, as we 
don’t know if the difference between high and medium is the same as the difference between 
high and low. This could make a difference, for example, when trying to compare different 
farming systems in which one may contain a lot of both ‘high’ and ‘low’ rankings, while 
another contains a lot of ‘mediums’ – we would have no way of deciding between them. 
Although an ordinal scale is appropriate for measuring welfare and will meet our goals in 
many cases, in other situations where we need to make trade-offs or comparisons, we will need 
to measure magnitude of welfare effects. For this we will need a quantitative scale, such as an 
interval or ratio scale. 
 
4.2.3. Interval 
We may often require more information than just knowing the relative ordering or rankings 
of a set. There can be important reasons to be interested in the size of the gaps between the 
items. A more informative type of measurement in this regard is an interval scale. Unlike an 
ordinal scale, the interval scale carries information about the size of the gaps between items in 
the ordered set – the difference between adjacent items. The differences between the assigned 
values are representative of the differences between the measured attribute – so the difference 
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between 1 and 2 is of the same magnitude as between 2 and 3. The exact scale selected, though, 
is arbitrary. An example of an interval scale is a temperature scale such as Celsius or 
Fahrenheit. Here we can see the arbitrary selection of scale – although both Celsius and 
Fahrenheit have equal intervals between their values, they differ from one another in the size 
of these intervals and in the origin point. 
Use of a quantitative scale gives us the possible rate of substitution between two values – 
we can now talk meaningfully about trade-offs between items with equivalent units. The 
permissible transformations are affine transformations, of the form t(m) = c * m + d (where m 
is the measure, t the transformed value, and c and d constants) (Sarle, 1997). This will preserve 
the relative distance between points. This can be seen in the transformation from Celsius to 
Fahrenheit: C = 1.8 * F +32. It also allows us to use more sophisticated statistical analyses to 
compare different states. One worry with use of numerical scales such as these is that the 
numerical representations may then be more specific than the information they are being used 
to represent – there may be a false precision. We thus need to be sure that the measured attribute 
is quantifiable in the right way. 
Are interval scales, then, applicable to subjective welfare? Intuitively, it seems like they are. 
It makes sense to think of subjective experience as something that varies along a linear scale – 
that it can move up and down by increments (see Chapter Seven for further discussion of how 
this would work for an integrated set of experiences). “If well-being were a simple state of 
mind that occurred in smoothly changing intensities, then we could at least hope to develop a 
powerful cardinal scale, and one that is without discontinuities or incommensurabilities” 
(Griffin, 1986, p. 75). Although Griffin disagreed that this was possible, because he took the 
nature of wellbeing to be informed desire, on the subjective welfare approach this seems 
plausible. The fact that we are able to conceive of rates of substitution, or trade-offs, in welfare, 
tells us there must be meaningful intervals between items on the scale. 
However, application of an interval scale is a much more difficult prospect than an ordinal 
scale – now we are no longer just trying to rank particular states as better or worse than others, 
but we are trying to determine by how much they are so. This requires quantification of the 
underlying subjective states – to transform subjective experience into some sort of measurable 
units, such that we could say something like, “Giving this animal diet X increases its welfare 
by three units, while diet Y only increases welfare by 1 unit.” For any individual, these units 
can be determined as increments on a scale from maximum to minimum experienced welfare, 
as discovered through measurement of indicators.  
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For practical purposes, we should be able to approximate such a carving through the types 
of quantifiable proxy measurements we use, such as physiological and behavioural variables. 
For many of these, it seems that they can be quantified and compared – blood concentrations 
of relevant hormones, frequency of particular behaviours, changes in heart rate or body 
temperature. When we measure welfare, we take data about measured indicators of welfare and 
then convert these to a welfare score. If we can assume that these proxies stand in the 
appropriate quantitative relationship to the central measure of subjective experience, then we 
will be able to give at least a rough cardinality to measurements of welfare. We need reason to 
think that the transformation of these data matches the relationship between the indicator and 
the welfare experience in order to create a useful scale. We want to avoid over-precisification 
in our final scores, based solely on the pattern of the indicator response. This does not mean 
that welfare is not quantifiable, but that we need to take care to ensure we understand the 
relationship between welfare experience and indicator response.  
This may not always be easy to determine, as the relationship between measured indicators 
and underlying welfare state may not be proportional, or linear. For instance, in order to 
determine the welfare impact of human presence on an animal, we might measure the flight 
distance. However, we cannot say that the welfare difference between two animals which flee 
at a distance of 6m and 8m have the same difference in welfare experience as between an 
animal which flees at 2m and one that allows the experimenter to touch it (0m). Even though 
the intervals are the same, we would probably want to say that the first two animals have fairly 
similar fear, while the second pair are quite different (Botreau, Bracke, et al., 2007). Or, when 
measuring pacing behaviour as indicative of frustration, we would not necessarily think that 
twice as much pacing represents twice as much frustration. We need to be sure we have the 
right indicators to represent welfare, and use of multiple indicators will help to build welfare 
scores. Mapping the response profile for an indicator over a range of interventions will also 
help with the creation of the right transformation function. Where we have multiple indicators 
that show similar relations to welfare response, we can be more confident that our measured 
variables are capturing the underlying mathematical relations of welfare response (see further 
discussion in Chapter Five on validation of indicators). 
Use of an interval scale would allow us to make important decisions in animal management, 
as described above. Knowing the intervals between items in our ordering allows calculation of 





Although interval scales can give us good quantitative information, the limiting feature of 
these scales is that they do not have a true ‘zero’ point and so we cannot say anything about 
the ratios of different values. For example, it would be meaningless to say that it is twice as hot 
on a day that measures 40°C than one that measures 20°C, because on the Fahrenheit scale the 
temperatures would read and 68° and 104°. The same numerical relationship will not hold, 
despite the same underlying relationship between the measured attribute of temperature: “the 
relationship 'twice-as' applies only to the numbers, not the attribute being measured 
(temperature)” (Sarle, 1997). As the assigned numbers are largely arbitrary, they do not allow 
for meaningful analyses like these.  
A ratio scale, by contrast, is set around a non-arbitrary origin point and thus can allow these 
transformations. On a ratio scale, the ratios between the assigned values (doubles, triples etc.) 
will then stand in for corresponding ratios between the attribute being measured. This allows 
comparisons such as ‘twice as much as’. The Kelvin temperature scale, beginning at absolute 
zero, is an example of such a scale, as are standard scales of length measurement (where the 
origin is 0cm, or no length at all). Permissible transformations are linear transformations of the 
form t(m) = c * m (where c is a constant). This represents the fact that though the origin is 
fixed, the units of measurement are still arbitrary (Sarle, 1997). An example of this 
transformation is in measurement between centimetres and inches, where length(cm) = 2.54 * 
length(in). 
If we allow that animal welfare can be quantified, it seems to lend itself to a ratio scale just 
as well as to an interval scale. That is, there appears to be a natural zero point which gives sense 
to the ratio transformations26. That zero point would simply be the point of neutral welfare – 
neither positive nor negative. This may arise because of an absence of either positive or 
negative states, or due to an equal balance between the two. We can then measure deviations 
from this set point in either the positive or negative direction – certain interventions may 
increase welfare up above the neutral point (positive welfare), while others will decrease 
welfare below the zero point (negative welfare, or suffering). A ratio scale is a good 
representation of welfare, and allows all the same applications in making comparisons and 
trade-offs as an interval scale. In Chapter 7, I will describe some of the specific measurement 
 
26 There are additional interesting questions about the zero point – such as its exact nature, and how it would be 
measured - but these are beyond the scope of this thesis to explore. 
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methods and frameworks used for animal welfare, which will further illustrate the usefulness 
of a ratio scale. 
 
4.2.5. Absolute 
The final, and most demanding type of scale is an absolute scale. Here, the properties of the 
assigned numbers are identical to the properties of the measured attribute. The only permissible 
transformations are identity transformations, which always return the same value for an item 
(Sarle, 1997). Examples of absolute measures include counting of objects and measurements 
of probability. An absolute scale is unlikely to apply to welfare, as we have no reason to think 
that there are non-arbitrary units of measurement along the welfare scale. 
 
4.3. Incommensurability 
Incommensurability between two items, or attributes, occurs when there is no way of 
placing items on the same measurement scale and thus no way of making comparisons between 
them. Think of trying to answer a question like “is this potato heavier than this banana is 
yellow?” There is no answer; the question itself is meaningless. The two values are 
incommensurable – there is just no common scale on which both items could be ranked. If 
incommensurable, “two items cannot be compared quantitatively at all; the one is neither 
greater than, nor less than, and not equal to the other” (Griffin, 1986, p. 79). Chang (2015) 
terms this incomparability - the inability to place two items on an ordinal scale, such that one 
will be greater than, less than, or equal to the other and takes incommensurability to be a weaker 
notion, of inability place two items on the same cardinal scale. Whichever specific terminology 
we use, the concern is still the same - that we might be unable to compare items.  
Although welfare itself is measurable, we might still have the problem of 
incommensurability between its items. If this were the case - such that we could not make 
comparisons between different animals, or types of welfare experience - then its measurement 
may not be of much use for the required applications. In this section I will argue that this is not 
the case; arguments I will follow up on in more detail in Chapters Six and Seven. Some of 
these questions are moral rather than scientific – as to how much moral weight we should place 
on different animals or on the states of pleasure and suffering – but the measured level of 
impact on subjective welfare will also be relevant. 
Griffin (1986) points out that an appeal to incommensurability is unconvincing in almost all 
cases – it seems that for almost any two imagined variables, there will be some point at which 
we think a large enough amount of one outranks a tiny amount of the other. If we allow this, 
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then there is at least some minimal sense of comparability. We only think there is a problem in 
cases where the values start to converge and we cannot decide how to rank them. This however 
does not mean that they are ‘unrankable’, just that we may not be able to discriminate or decide. 
The notion of ‘rough equality’, introduced in Section 4.2.2, can help with these sorts of cases. 
Here the reason two cases may be difficult to compare is because there are no real differences 
present to discriminate between. Griffin (1986) speculates that this sort of rough equality may 
actually be quite common. 
At first pass, it might seem like the problems of intersubjective comparison are examples of 
incommensurability – that we simply cannot decide whether the subjective experience of one 
animal is better or worse than another, because the fundamental differences in their subjective 
experiences may not track one another. However, it seems we have at least some minimal 
ordinal comparability – we can easily think of situations in which the poor state of one animal 
is clearly representative of lower welfare than the positive state of another, where it would 
seem crazy to insist that there is no way of judging their relative rank. The presence of a 
common ‘zero point’ of welfare experience also implies comparability of at least a basic sort 
– we can at least compare two individuals as to where they sit in relation to this point.  It may 
often be difficult to judge, but this is not the same thing. I will discuss this issue further in 
Chapter Six, and describe a way in which we may be able to make intersubjective comparisons 
of welfare. 
One type of incommensurability is trumping, which “allows comparability, but with one 
value outranking the others as strongly as possible. It takes the form: any amount of A, no 
matter how small, is more valuable than any amount of B, no matter how large.” (Griffin, 1986, 
p. 83). This means that some feature A will always outweigh some other feature B, regardless 
of its magnitude. This might be how we’d imagine the divide between positive and negative 
welfare to sit – perhaps negative welfare is just so important in its impact, that inflicting some 
degree of negative welfare will never be outweighed by some increase in positive welfare. This 
is the view of negative utilitarians – that it is only the negative welfare that counts (Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2015). This also seems unconvincing, because again we can imagine cases in which 
a tiny loss could be offset by a massive gain and it seems odd to deny that these cases would 
benefit overall welfare. In fact, Griffin (1986) points out that there is unlikely to be trumping 
in many cases at all, as there aren’t many things we wouldn’t sacrifice a tiny bit of in order to 
gain a very large amount of something else. The reason we may think that there are some things 
we wouldn’t sacrifice may instead just be an effect of our inability to comprehend the type of 
massive gain that would be required to offset some losses. 
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Another type of incommensurability is pluralism – the idea that there are irreducibly many 
values, without any sort of common scale on which to rank them. This might be the sort of 
incommensurability that would occur if we were to accept something like the tripartite 
conception of welfare, with three different but equally important values contributing to welfare. 
One of the advantages of an account of subjective welfare is we do not have to worry about the 
potential problems arising from trying to compare different types of welfare – for example, 
trying to decide how a particular level of natural behaviour compares to some amount of 
subjective wellbeing. Although these different components may not be incommensurable, there 
would certainly be difficulty in developing a framework to compare their measurements in 
such a way as to build up a meaningful picture of overall welfare – would, for instance, an 
animal with low physical welfare but high subjective welfare be better or worse off than an 
animal with low subjective welfare but a high level of natural behaviour? Trying to decide on 
the weightings of the various components could be, in practice, almost prohibitively difficult. 
But, as I have argued, we should understand welfare as actually just consisting in the single 
target of subjective experience. This means that in determining the welfare of an animal, we 
only need to consider how this one attribute varies, which should give us monism.  
It is only if we accept that individual subjective experiences are so different, or positive and 
negative welfare are so different, that they count as distinct values, will this problem arise for 
the subjective welfare account. Although Griffin argues “if the denial of reduction is just the 
denial that there is a single mental state running through all the things that we rank in terms of 
which we rank them (the denial of a crude mental state account, or of hedonism), then, it can 
be agreed by everyone, utilitarians included. In one sense, different kinds of pleasure, or 
pleasure on the one hand and pain on the other, are incomparable: namely, there is no deeper 
unitary mental state in terms of which they can be compared” (Griffin, 1986, p. 89), there seems 
no reason to think that this is true – that there is not some sort of underlying subjective quality 
of life onto which individual pleasures and pains will map (see Chapter Seven). If we assume 
that these are not different in kind between different individuals we also do not have this 
problem for the intersubjective case (see Chapter Six). So long as we are able to work out some 
sort of trade-off between these two different scales, we must still have some underlying scale 
(‘overall welfare’) to which we are referring, and this is all we need. 
Overall, there is no reason to think that we have incommensurability with measures of 
subjective welfare, either between individuals or types of mental states, and I will go on in 




One set of problems we come up against in measurement of animal welfare is issues in how 
to aggregate or combine measures into a metric of welfare. So far, I have taken welfare to be a 
fairly simple function of the total number of positive and negative subjective experiences for 
an animal over its lifetime. But welfare may not be a simple additive function of different 
positive and negative states (Sandøe, Corr, Lund, & Forkman, 2019). For example, in order to 
suffer, there may be a threshold level of intensity, duration and combination of experiences 
below which one is not too bothered, and above which one suffers. The combined effects of 
different experiences may be greater than the individual contribution of each. The presence of 
multiple aversive stimuli that can create conflict in an animal will add an additional degree of 
stress which further reduces welfare (G. Mason & Mendl, 1993). This is not a problem of 
combining affects per se, just one that means the way in which we do so may be more 
complicated than simply a linear sum (or weighted sum). Use of whole-animal measures to 
compare the relative value of different experiences, alone and in combination, will help to 
determine this (see Chapter Seven). 
There is also a ‘counting’ problem, in weighing the value of different experiences against 
their simple measure. For example, it is unlikely to be the case that an animal experiencing 1 
unit of pain over 10 days will be equivalent to one experiencing 10 units of pain over 1 day 
(Sandøe et al., 2019). This can possibly be overcome in two ways. The first is to look at the 
decision-making process of the animal itself – whether it will work equally hard to avoid one 
day of extreme pain than 10 days of mild pain, for instance. By looking at these measures we 
can build equivalences or trade-offs between different intensities and durations. The second 
way is to build this information into the scores themselves. This would include answering 
questions (beyond the scope of this thesis) about why something should count as ‘1 unit’ of 
pain, as compared to ‘10 units’; what it is about this experience that is 1/10 of the other. 
“Assessing humaneness is complex, not least because it involves comparing durations and 
intensities of suffering, and making such judgements as "is extreme breathlessness worse than 
nausea?" and "is a few hours of intense pain better or worse than several days of milder 
distress?"” (G. Mason & Littin, 2003, p. 21). It seems the value the animal places on these 
experiences, and their relative weightings with regards to trade-offs, should be part of what 
determines the scale. 
Aggregation of welfare states and measures into a single welfare metric is complicated, and 
I will return to the issue in Chapter Seven. This should not be taken to say anything about the 
measurability of welfare however. Although it may be difficult in practice to combine 
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measurements, and to determine the relative weighting and impact of different experiences, 
this is merely a problem of what we know about their relation to welfare; not in itself a reason 
to think that welfare is not a measurable attribute. As I have already shown, we have good 
reason to be confident that (at least in theory), we can measure welfare using both ordinal and 
ratio scales, depending on our requirements for application. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
For an attribute to be measurable, it must be the case that we can assign numbers according 
to a rule, such that the properties of and relations between the numbers mirror the empirical 
properties of the attribute. There are a number of common measurement scales that can be 
applied – nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio and absolute. Importantly, the scale chosen must both 
match the properties of the measured attribute and play the appropriate role for the use of the 
measurements. 
I have argued in Chapter Two for use of the subjective welfare concept, in part because it is 
measurable. In this chapter, I have shown that, at minimum, we can rank welfare states on an 
ordinal scale, which will allow us to make many of the required judgements about the 
comparative value of interventions. When making decisions regarding trade-offs, we will need 
to use a quantitative (interval or ratio) scale to compare relative magnitudes. The natural zero 
point for welfare experience (neutral welfare) means it can be measured on a ratio scale for 
these applications. There is the possibility of incommensurability between different welfare 
measures, such as between individuals, and of different types of mental states, which will be 
further explored in Chapters Six and Seven. 
Although there may be further concerns about exactly how we bring together measured 
items to create a total welfare score (an issue that will also be further addressed in Chapter 
Seven), this does not give us reason to think welfare is not measurable, but just that there is 
further work to be done in relating simple measures to the underlying state we are measuring. 
Welfare is a measurable entity, though its measurement is not straightforward. In the chapters 
that follow, I will look at some of the problems that arise in measuring subjective welfare, 










I have established that animal welfare is, at least in principle, a measurable entity. In Chapter 
Two I introduced the indicators of welfare used for measurement in welfare science - those 
behavioural and physiological measures that are used to determine whether an animal is 
experiencing good or poor welfare. It is important when using indicators such as these that they 
are valid – that is, that they actually measure the intended target state. In this chapter, I will 
discuss in more detail the different types of indicators, and what is required for validation. I 
will end by proposing a four-step process, using robustness analysis, to validate indicators of 
welfare, or any similarly ‘hidden’ scientific target. 
In animal welfare science, we aim to measure the welfare of animals under different 
conditions. This is similar to many other areas of science that are interested in the measurement 
of particular target entities – objects or states of the world. These entities are measured to look 
for their values, or to look for changes under differing conditions. The targets can be measured 
directly, or through the use of indicators. Some examples of direct measurement are measures 
of length, weight, counting (e.g. number of animals), and behavioural observations. Surrogate 
measurement occurs when for some reason we can’t or don’t want to measure the target directly 
and involves the use of surrogate measures, or indicators. Indicators correlate with the target 
of measurement, and changes in the target will be reflected by changes in the indicator. An 
example of measurement by indicator might be something like using a thermometer to measure 
temperature – we are not measuring temperature directly but instead are observing its effect on 
the expansion of a liquid. I have created three categories for targets that may not be measured 
directly, but instead through use of indicators – the target may be a construct, may be difficult 
to measure, or may be inaccessible to measurement (hidden).  
In the first case, the target state may not exist except as a construct or composite of several 
other states. Health is an example of this sort of system. It is not possible to directly measure 
‘health’ because no such entity really exists. Instead, health refers to something like the absence 
of malfunction in any one of a number of physiological systems, and measurement of the 
functioning of these systems (or some target subset thereof) will function as an indicator of the 
total state of health. Socioeconomic status is another example, where items such as household 
income, neighbourhood of residence and level of education may combine to form the total 
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state. Again, direct measurement of ‘socioeconomic status’ is not possible simply because no 
such thing exists independently of the set of items that compose it. Intelligence is another 
potential example, where intelligence might be just some sort of composite of particular types 
of reasoning skills and knowledge. Measurement of a construct is then some function of 
measurement of the constituents, weighted to produce an overall score. 
In other cases, some targets may be difficult to measure directly and it is simply cheaper or 
easier to use an indicator measure than one that is a direct measure of the target. An example 
of this is biodiversity. If biodiversity is considered as something like the number or diversity 
of species present in a particular area, it is usually not practical to conduct a thorough survey 
to determine this. Instead, for expedience, something like species abundance or diversity, or 
variety of vegetation cover may instead be used as a surrogate measure (Lindenmayer & 
Likens, 2011; Sarkar, 2002). Another example comes up in medical research. As clinical trials 
often show a significant time lag between the intervention and the outcome of interest, having 
a surrogate measure that shows up earlier can help speed up the research. Some examples are 
bone mineral content as a surrogate for incidence of fractures, and blood cholesterol levels as 
a surrogate for cardiovascular outcomes (Gøtzsche, Liberati, Torri, & Rossetti, 1996). 
Finally, we have target states that it is not possible to measure, simply because we do not 
have direct access to them – they are ‘hidden’. These are sometimes referred to as ‘latent 
variables’, particularly within psychological models, and cannot be directly observed (Markus 
& Borsboom, 2013). This can be a result of current limitations in our knowledge or technology, 
or a feature of the target state. One example of this is temperature, as mentioned earlier – we 
cannot directly access the kinetic energy of molecules, but instead can measure the resultant 
expansion or contraction of particular chemicals. Much of the work in the historical sciences, 
such as palaeontology, by necessity relies on indicators since we cannot have direct access to 
information about, say, the ecology of the stegosaurus.   
Measurement of animal welfare is of this third type – measurement of a hidden target. This 
is because we can’t directly access the mental states that make up welfare for external or 
objective measurement. In this case we have to rely entirely on indicator measures such as 
changes in behaviour or physiology. It might seem that welfare could be of the first type – a 
composite target. This is because welfare consists of the mental states of animals, which are a 
large and heterogeneous set including, for example, hunger, pain, comfort and curiosity. In 
Chapter Seven I will argue that these mental states can all be integrated into a single state of 
welfare through use of a ‘common currency’ and can be measured in its entirety. Further, even 
if we consider welfare to be a composite target, the mental states which compose it are still 
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themselves hidden targets and thus the problem of validation that I will describe will still hold. 
I will note here that this may not always be the case. With increasing understanding of the 
neuroscience underlying different mental states (Ledger & Mellor, 2018), we could make a 
case that were to accept that mental states are identical to neural states then direct measurement 
of brain activity through neuroimaging is in fact direct measurement of these mental states. If 
this were true, then welfare would no longer be considered a hidden target, but merely a 
difficult one. In this case, we could use neuroimaging as a method of validating other indicators 
of welfare (as will be described in Section 5.3 for difficult targets), that may be cheaper or 
easier to use in most contexts. As this work is still new, I will not argue further for this claim, 
but merely flag it as potentially important for future understanding of validating welfare 
indicators. For now, we can treat measurement of welfare as measurement of a hidden target, 
which presents a special problem for validation of the indicators used. 
When selecting an indicator measure to stand in for some target state, it is important that the 
indicator is an appropriate one. There are a number of features of indicators that make them 
more or less appropriate for particular measurement tasks, such as precision (how fine-grained 
the readings are), lack of bias, ease of use, sensitivity and reliability (the same result always 
given in the same circumstances). Some take reliability to be the same thing as validity, but I 
wish to keep the ideas separate here, following Markus & Borsboom (2013). Some measures 
could be valid in the sense I use, while not being reliable (e.g. if it measures with low precision). 
For this chapter, the feature I am interested in is validity - that is, our level of certainty that a 
particular indicator is accurately tracking the target state in question; that the indicator changes 
when the target changes, and does not change in the absence of a change in the target. “Validity 
refers to the extent to which the test or instrument measures what it is intended to measure” 
(Bringmann & Eronen, 2016, p. 28). Where the other features of an indicator may be tracking 
their quality, validity seems to track whether a particular measure is really an indicator at all. 
 
5.2. Causal and effect indicators 
For something to function as an indicator, it must be the case that it reliably 
correlates/covaries with the underlying state that it is standing in for, and this requires a causal 
relationship with the target state. Correlation on its own is insufficient – many different and 
unrelated factors may correlate under particular test conditions (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & 
van Heerden, 2004). Borsboom et al. (2004) argue that validity is grounded in causation – a 
test is valid when there is a causal link between the target and the indicator. Otherwise, 
measurement is just not taking place. Having a causal relationship between indicators and the 
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target also gives some other epistemic benefits (Markus & Borsboom, 2013) – it gives us 
increased reason to believe the correlation will persist under change (holding fixed relevant 
background conditions), and reason to have confidence in our predictions. 
Sidestepping as much as possible the literature on the relation between correlation and 
causation, we can generally assume that when there is a reliable correlation between two 
variables A and B, it is either because A causes B, B causes A or there is a common cause for 
both A and B: “a covariance structure model implies potential nonzero covariances among 
measured variables if (a) there is a correlational, direct, or indirect path between the measured 
variables or (b) the measured variables share a common source variable or correlated source 
variables” (MacCallum & Browne, 1993, p. 539). When we are looking for indicator measures, 
they will stand in one of these three relationships with the target state – they will either be a 
cause of the target, an effect of the target, or a mutual effect of a common cause. These three 
categories of indicators will have different features, both mathematically and pragmatically. 
Here I will focus on the first two categories, the ‘causal’ and ‘effect’ indicators27, as the 
‘common cause’ type are likely to be much less common. Animal welfare science commonly 
uses both causal and effect indicators. 
Bollen & Lennox (1991) differentiate between “indicators that influence, and those that are 
influenced by, latent variables” (1991, p. 305) – causal and effect indicators. Effect indicators 
are those that stand causally ‘downstream’ from the target state. Changes in the indicator are a 
result of changes in the target. They can be characterised by an equation such as Yi = λi1η1 + 
εi, where Y is the indicator, η is the target state, ε is the level of measurement error and λ is a 
coefficient representing the level of effect of the target on the indicator (Figure 5.1). These 
indicators are thus determined by the underlying state we want to measure. 
 
Figure 5.1: Path diagram of effect indicators (modified from Bollen & Lennox, 1991, p. 306)  
 
27 Sometimes referred to as ‘formative’ and ‘reflective’ models (Markus & Borsboom, 2013). 
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Effect indicators stand downstream from the target state; they are effects of this state. These 
measures will covary with the target state because changes in the target will cause changes in 
the measures. There are many examples of the use of effect indicators in science. In medicine, 
an effect indicator might be white blood cell count – it is an indicator of infection, since white 
blood cells increase as a result of the presence of foreign micro-organisms. In animal welfare 
science these are what I referred to in Chapter Two simply as ‘indicators’, and are often referred 
to in the animal welfare literature as ‘animal-based’ measures (e.g. Botreau, Bracke, et al., 
2007) or ‘output’ measures (e.g. Kagan et al., 2015). They are physiological and behavioural 
indicators that are used to measure changes in welfare, where it is assumed that a change in the 
indicator reflects a change in the underlying subjective experience. Examples include 
measurements of blood cortisol levels or approach and withdrawal behaviour towards a 
particular stimulus. These indicators change as welfare changes. 
By contrast, causal indicators stand causally ‘upstream’ from the target state, where changes 
in the indicator are a cause of changes in the target. Causal indicators are characterised by a 
more complex equation of the form η1 = g11χ1 +g12χ2 + … + g1nχn + ζ1, where χ is an indicator, 
η is the target state, g is a coefficient representing the level of effect of each indicator on the 
target and ζ is a variable representing error or additional causal factors (Figure 5.2). The crucial 
difference here is that the indicators are determining the target variable rather than determined 
by it. Although both types of indicators will correlate with the target state, with effect indicators 
we are observing the effects of an underlying state, while with causal indicators we are 
observing the causes of that state. 
 
Figure 5.2: Path diagram of causal indicators (modified from Bollen & Lennox, 1991, p. 306)  
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Causal indicators stand upstream from the target state; they are themselves causes of this 
state. They covary with it, as changes in the indicator will create changes in the target. Some 
authors (e.g. Markus & Borsboom, 2013) don’t wish to admit causal indicators as true measures 
at all, as they define measurement as occurring in a single causal direction. In their view, causal 
indicators predict the target rather than measure it. For my purposes, as long as there is a 
reliable correlation between the indicator and the target, with an underlying causal relationship, 
this is sufficient to serve as an indicator - even if not a true ‘measure’ in this formal sense - as 
knowledge of the value of the indicator tells us about the value of the target. An example of 
the use of causal indicators in ecology is the use of rainfall measures to estimate biodiversity, 
as the level of rainfall will affect the type and abundance of species in an area. In the case of 
animal welfare, these form what I have called ‘conditions’ for welfare (see Chapter Two), 
sometimes also known as ‘provisions’ for welfare; those things that will cause changes in the 
subjective states that compose welfare. These are also referred to in the animal welfare 
literature as ‘environment-based’ indicators (e.g. Botreau, Bracke, et al., 2007) or ‘input’ 
measures (e.g. Kagan et al., 2015). We can measure changes in the conditions for welfare in 
order to infer changes in the state of welfare. For example, some of the conditions for welfare 
will be presence of adequate food and water, freedom from disease and adequate mental 
stimulation. Direct measurement of these conditions can serve as proxies for measurement of 
welfare itself. These types of indicators are commonly used in animal welfare assessments. 
Several different measurement frameworks are used to assess the welfare of animals under 
particular husbandry conditions, such as the Welfare QualityÒ (Botreau, Veissier, & Perny, 
2009) or Five Domains (Mellor, 2016) frameworks, which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Seven. These sorts of measures are less commonly used in animal welfare science 
itself. 
The third set of indicators would be those that covary with the target state due to the presence 
of a common cause. For example, we might think that the visual presence of lightning could 
be used as an indicator for thunder, as both will correlate as a result of the common cause of 
an electrical discharge. There do not seem to be any examples of this sort of measure being 
used in animal welfare science, but it is the sort of thing that could potentially be used here, or 
in other areas that use proxy measures, such as in conservation biology. For example, using 
population levels of a particular species as a surrogate for overall biodiversity is likely to be of 
this type, as the environmental conditions that affect biodiversity will also affect the numbers 
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of the surrogate species, and thus they will covary – an example of such a common cause in 
this case could be water availability. 
There is a difference in how we validate causal and effect indicators. Bollen & Lennox 
(1991) look at some of the common ‘guidelines’ in use for the selection of and validation of 
different indicators. Importantly, the types of procedures that can validate indicators will differ 
between causal and effect indicators, particularly when considering those that rely on measure 
of correlation between different indicators. The conventional wisdom has been that indicators 
that are positively correlated with the same concept, should be positively correlated with one 
another. Additionally, there has been disagreement about what level of correlation should be 
considered ideal. They looked at these claims mathematically and found that for effect 
indicators, they should always be positively correlated (that is, a negative or zero correlation 
says they are not measuring the same thing) and will be best off when the correlation is as high 
as possible (as it is a direct reflection of the correlation between each indicator and the target). 
For example, when considering indicators of animal welfare, we would expect to find a 
correlation between the change in blood cortisol levels and stress-related behaviour as they are 
both effects of the common cause of welfare.  
By contrast, for causal indicators there is no reason to expect any correlation between 
indicators, as they work independently, and they thus will not correlate with one another. There 
is no reason to think that two common causes of a state will covary. For example, when 
considering animal welfare, there is no reason to think that the availability of food and water 
would necessarily have any relationship with access to a social group. Importantly, this means 
that while effect indicators can be, in part, validated through measures of correlation with one 
another, causal indicators can only be validated through embedding in a model which also 
contains effect indicators; a point which will be further explored in Section 5.5. 
The second claim they examined regarded whether it was necessary for validation to select 
a variety of indicators. The claim is that selection of a diversity of indicators will ‘capture 
different facets’ of the target, and thus use of these different indicators is necessary for 
complete and valid measurement of the target. They found that this will be true only for causal 
indicators. In the case of effect indicators there is no reason to require use of diverse indicators, 
as removal of particular indicators would have no significant impact on the measurement of 
the target variable. If any single effect indicator is providing a measure of the target variable, 
the magnitude of change in this indicator will be representative of the magnitude of change in 
the target, regardless of how many other effect indicators are also used. For cases where this is 
not true, it is because we have a multi-dimensional concept (a construct or composite target) 
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which can then be broken down and analysed in terms of each individual facet. Take as an 
example the composite target of health. Because this is composed of a large number of different 
components, such as cardiac functioning and immune response, no single measure will be 
sufficient to capture the entire target, and many must be used in conjunction. But in typical 
single-target cases, while having multiple effect indicators will help in reliability (as failures 
in any one indicator will not ruin the results), and each indicator should be correlated with the 
target, which ‘facets’ they each measure will not matter.  
However, this is not the case for causal indicators. When using causal indicators, it is 
important that all relevant factors are included in the model. The removal of even one causal 
factor will have a strong impact on the measurement of the variable, as they are all necessarily 
contributing to changes in the target. Consider measurement of welfare: if we were to try to 
measure welfare through causal indicators (welfare conditions), we might include things like 
stocking density, food availability and social interactions. We would then measure the level of 
all these variables to determine welfare level. However, if we left out an important contributing 
condition, such as presence of injury, our results would be inaccurate. We might look at an 
animal with lots of food and a soft place to sleep, concluding it has good welfare, but have 
failed to take into account the strong negative effect of pain. Only by including all causal 
indicators will we get an accurate measure of the target. 
The important points to come out of this are as follows: 
• Effect indicators can be, in part, validated through measures of correlation with one 
another 
• Causal indicators can only be validated through embedding in a model which also 
contains effect indicators 
• Causal indicators must all be measured to give a reliable measure of the target 
It may seem here that this all speaks against the use of causal indicators at all, which many 
authors seem to agree on (e.g. Markus & Borsboom, 2013). However, in many cases 
(particularly within animal welfare assessment), the causal indicators are easier to see than the 
effect indicators and can be used for quick large-scale assessments that effect indicators would 
be impractical for. For example, trying to do behavioural and physiological assessments on 
even a small sample of the animals on a farm is going to take far longer than looking for the 
causal husbandry variables which will impact all the animals and drawing conclusions based 
on these. 
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As causal and effect indicators stand in different relations to the target state, they are each 
going to have their own unique features and drawbacks. Each of the indicator types have 
different features and what is important is that we accurately identify which type of indicator 
is operating, in order to use it correctly. As I will detail in Section 5.5, correctly identifying 
which type of indicator we are using will be crucial for the process of validation. 
 
5.3. Validation 
The validity of a test or measure refers to whether or not it is really measuring what it 
purports to – whether the observed data are actually tracking the intended phenomenon. 
Validation of indicators is thus testing to ensure that the indicators are tracking the right target 
state – that the values and changes in indicators are correlating with changes in the target. In 
particular, we need to establish that one of the types of causal relationships discussed above 
holds between the indicator and the target. The process of validation will vary depending on 
what type of target we are talking about and in this section, I will apply some of the discussion 
of validation to the different categories of targets I introduced earlier. I will show that for 
hidden targets such as welfare, there is a particular problem for validating the indicators. 
In some cases, we may use the presence of adequate predictions as a form of validation 
(Markus & Borsboom, 2013). The idea being that, if we are able to make such predictions from 
measurements of the indicators, this gives us reason to think that we are measuring the correct 
target. The success of the predictions is best explained by the validity of the indicators. 
Similarly, Bringman & Eronen (2016) suggest that the success of theories that are built using 
the measurements will add to our confidence in the validity of the measurements. When using 
the measures, we work with the assumption that the measures are valid, and if the theory is 
successful, in terms of explanatory and predictive power, this supports the assumption. It is 
very unlikely we will have accurate predictions based on invalid measures. “What increases 
confidence in the validity of measurements is the success of the theories that are based on them, 
and what justifies the success of those theories is their explanatory and predictive power. 
Testing the latter need not involve the same types of measurements whose validity is in 
question” (Bringmann & Eronen, 2016, p. 36). There are two ways in which predictions might 
be seen as a form of validation. The first is that if, using our measurements, we are able to 
make further predictions (e.g. that given a certain measurement of physiological variable x, we 
should see behaviour y), then this gives us confidence our measures are valid. This method is 
not necessarily strong, as there can be other explanations for the success of predictions. 
Although it may form one strand of evidence (and may be part of a robustness analysis, as 
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described further on), it does not seem sufficient to stand alone for validation. The second is 
that the predictions about the measures themselves – the inputs and outputs of our causal model 
about animal welfare – are accurate; so that targeted interventions on input give the expected 
outputs. This would give us confidence in the content of the model, and is a similar process to 
that I will propose in Section 5.5. 
For ‘composite’ targets, there is not really a unique problem of validation. As the target state 
is simply an aggregate of the measured indicators, it is going to be true by definition that the 
indicators are measuring the target. There may be separate problems of deciding which features 
to include within the composite, but this not a validation issue. All that may be required is some 
modelling to determine the relative weights of the contribution of different indicators to the 
target and to decide on which aggregation function to use. For example, think of a simple case 
– the composite ‘bachelor’. Bachelorhood is not a natural property, but rather a construct of 
sex (male) and marital status (single). We do not need to validate to know whether measuring 
sex and marital status will measure the composite; it must be true. In some cases, our indicators 
may be indicators of the components of the composite, rather than themselves being 
components (e.g. using blood pressure as an indicator of cardiac function, which is a 
component of the composite ‘health’). In these cases, we would need to ensure that these were 
themselves valid indicators. Here, validation of the indicators would proceed according to one 
of the other two categories (‘hidden’ or ‘difficult’), depending on the particular example. 
For ‘difficult’ targets, validation is relatively straightforward though direct measurement of 
the target. It is necessary to establish a causal link between the target and the indicator. 
Borsboom et al. (2004) describe the process of validation as requiring the establishment of a 
reliable correlation, and providing a theoretical explanation for the causal pathway between the 
target attribute and the measurement outcomes. This involves first determining the causal 
direction (whether we have a causal or an effect indicator). This can be done through using 
theory - embedding within a theoretical framework that explains the causal connections 
between the target and the indicators (Bringmann & Eronen, 2016; Lindenmayer & Likens, 
2011) – or through testing to look for timing and direction of effect.   
The second step is establishing a reliable correlation by measuring both the target and the 
indicator under a range of conditions and (preferably) interventions, where particular 
conditions will be deliberately varied to alter the target, and the indicator will be checked to 
ensure it tracks these changes. Where interventions or manipulations are not possible, we can 
try to use ‘natural’ experiments; using the results of natural change or randomness (Markus & 
Borsboom, 2013). If we see a reliable correlation between the target and indictor under a range 
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of conditions, we have good reason to think that there is a valid causal connection. What we 
require is correlation over a range of interventions (Markus & Borsboom, 2013).  
We thus have a change in a condition (either induced experimentally or tracked naturally), 
which causes a change in the target state (which we can track through direct measurement), 
and which then also causes a change in the indicator (which we track through measurement of 
the indicator) (Figure 5.3). When we observe such correlation between measures of the target 
and measures of the indicator, we can take the indicator to be valid. The testing may be difficult 
in practice due to the nature of the target, but does not provide any conceptual difficulties. Once 
a single indicator has been validated, we can either validate further indicators by also testing 
against the target, or through correlation with other known indicators (for effect indicators). 
This process is similar for the one I will go on to describe for hidden targets, but in that case, 
the central change in the target cannot be measured for comparison and so must be validated 
another way. 
 
Figure 5.3: Validation of difficult targets 
 
Hidden targets provide a special problem for validation. In this case, we are still assuming 
there is some real-world state that we are trying to map onto. However, it is completely 
inaccessible and so we cannot use the above strategy to validate our indicators. It is impossible 
for us to get correlational data between the target and the indicator, because the target cannot 
be measured. All we can get is data about changes in the various indicators – we are missing 
the central link used in validation of difficult targets. Our tests can involve varying particular 
conditions and looking for changes in the indicators, but we as we cannot get direct measures 
of the target, we are unable to show the necessary correlations to validate these indicators 
directly (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4: Validation problem for hidden targets 
 
Although we can get some degree of validation through correlation between indicators 
(Markus & Borsboom, 2013), this still requires initial validation of at least one indicator. We 
cannot start to validate one indicator against another until we are fairly certain the first indicator 
is itself valid, otherwise we could end up quite far from our target. Here though, there is no 
starting point at which we can connect an indicator to the target. Schikore & Coko (2013) point 
out that in these cases, “a set of background assumptions is needed to describe how the 
unobservable entities bring about the experimental outcomes” (2013, p. 297). Duncan & Fraser 
similarly  argue that “compared to the simple, empirical study of processes that can be observed 
directly, developing an understanding of unobservable processes involves additional logical 
steps and assumptions” (1997, p. 23). We are making assumptions about the causal link 
between the target and indicators, but the problem arises in justifying or testing these 
assumptions without access to the target. In the following sections I will outline how robustness 
analysis can help resolve this problem and serve as a test of the assumptions. 
 
5.4. Robustness 
Robustness is a concept used in much philosophy of science, and applied in many different 
contexts. In a general sense, robustness is the property of being “invariant under a multiplicity 
of independent processes” (Soler, 2014, p. 203). Something is robust where it stays the same, 
despite changes to the conditions surrounding it. Robustness can give us increased confidence 
in our measurements and predictions. There are multiple types of robustness discussed within 
the literature, that correspond to different types of entities and processes. Here I will outline 
three, along the lines laid out by Calcott (2011). What they all have in common is that there is 
“one thing [that] remains stable, despite changes to something else that, in principle, could 
affect it” (Calcott, 2011, p. 284). 
The first type of robustness is robustness of models (also known as robust theorems, or 
derivational robustness). This is probably the type of robustness most commonly discussed in 
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the current philosophical literature. Robust theorems are those models whose derivation can be 
supported in multiple ways, using different assumptions. To rule out the possibility that the 
results of the models are simply an artefact of the idealisations made within the models, 
multiple models are constructed with different idealisations to look for some common structure 
or result. The stability of this common structure gives reason to think that it could represent 
something in the real world, as opposed to just the model. 
Robust phenomena are those phenomena which are present under a variety of different 
(actual or possible) conditions. This will usually be the result of some mechanism which will 
function across a range of interventions, as opposed to the result of contingent processes. 
Measurement robustness (also known as robust detection, triangulation, or multiple lines of 
evidence) is a form of robustness where multiple, independent means of detection are used to 
support a claim about the world. It is this type of robustness that is of interest here. In Calcott’s 
terminology, we have an ‘R-source’ which is the thing in the world which we are aiming to 
detect, multiple (independent) ‘R-variants’ which are the methods of detection and the ‘R-
target’ which is the data that these detection methods converge on. When these variants all give 
the same result (stable target) then we have good reason to think we have the right R source 
(Figure 5.5). Increasing the number of variants decreases the chance that there are 
coincidentally multiple sources providing our results. 
 
Figure 5.5: An example of robust detection (from Calcott, 2011, p. 285) 
 
In the case of animal welfare, I take it that the R-source would be the subjective welfare of 
the animal, the R-variants the indicators we are using to try and measure it, and the R-target 
the resultant conclusions drawn about changes in welfare. As I will discuss in Section 5.5, if 
multiple independent indicators give us the same conclusions, this gives us reason to believe 
that they are really tracking changes in welfare. 
Robustness analysis helps improve our confidence in particular results – distinguishing 
‘noise’ from ‘signal’ and “that which is regarded as ontologically and epistemologically 
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trustworthy and valuable from that which is unreliable, ungeneralizable, worthless, and 
fleeting” (Wimsatt, 2012, p. 63). The different conditions under which robustness can hold 
could be, for example, different sensory modalities, different experimental procedures, 
different assumptions or different models. Wimsatt (2012) sees robustness analysis as having 
four stages, and something counts as robust if it comes out as invariant on this analysis.  
• To analyse a variety of independent derivation, identification, or measurement 
processes. 
• To look for and analyse things which are invariant over or identical in the 
conclusions or results of these processes. 
• To determine the scope of the processes across which they are invariant and the 
conditions on which their invariance depends. 
• To analyse and explain any relevant failures of invariance. (Wimsatt, 2012, p. 62) 
For measurement robustness, this would look like using a variety of measurement processes 
for the same target, looking for the overlap in conclusions and determining the conditions under 
which this measurement relationship does and does not hold. 
Wimsatt (2012) justifies the use of robustness analysis by looking at the impact or errors in 
different types of reasoning. He describes the traditional scientific method, which aims to 
establish a small number of fundamental axioms and derive the rest from these. Because there 
is some small chance of error in any operation in the chain of derivation, long serial chains of 
reasoning like this will have a much higher chance of error overall. In a serial chain of 
reasoning, any one step could fail and that will cause a failed result. Small errors in each step 
multiply, so the more steps there are, the greater the chance of and impact of errors. In 
Wimsatt’s words, “fallible thinkers should avoid long serial chains of thinking” (Wimsatt, 
2007, p. 50). If we rely on only one method of measurement, any error in that method will 
infect our results.  
By contrast, a ‘parallel’ or ‘network’ setup for reasoning will help each strand reinforce the 
others, as the chance of error in each one has less chance of impacting the final conclusion and 
this will decrease further with the addition of more lines of evidence. The more steps there are, 
the more chance of success in the result: “With independent alternative ways of deriving a 
result, the result is always surer than its weakest derivation” (Wimsatt, 2012, p. 66). A similar 
result is found with the application of Condorcet’s jury theorem. This showed that “if each 
member of a jury has an equal and independent chance better than random, but worse than 
perfect, of making a correct judgment on whether a defendant is guilty (or on some other factual 
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proposition), the majority of jurors is more likely to be correct than each individual juror, and 
the probability of a correct majority judgment approaches 1 as the jury size increases” (List, 
2013, s 1.1). 
We should be more confident in more robust results because of a ‘no miracles’ explanation 
– it would be a miracle if a variety of independent tests produced the same erroneous result, so 
the explanation that they are providing an accurate result is more likely (Soler, 2014). This is 
particularly important in the sort of tests of hidden targets that are under consideration here: 
“When targets of triangulation that are not directly accessible are at stake, one needs to resort 
to often highly complex theories to establish the nature of those phenomena and events in 
multiple experimental settings” (Schickore & Coko, 2013, p. 304). If we run a preference test 
on an animal, and also measure blood cortisol levels, both showing high welfare; we would 
think it strange to conclude that they were likely to be both erring in the same direction when 
welfare was actually poor, rather than that they were producing a correct result. 
It is clearly important to have independent lines of evidence to avoid making the same errors 
across them all, but achieving true independence may not be as easy as it seems. Many new 
techniques are calibrated to existing techniques and so are not independent in this sense 
(Stegenga, 2012). If all our tests are validated simply through correlation with other valid 
measures (see Section 5.5.4), then the ‘serial chains of reasoning’ problem will recur where 
any errors in the first will ‘infect’ the others.  All tests will have similarities and differences 
along different dimensions, and it will not always be easy to delineate which are the relevant 
ones for independence (Soler, 2014). For the animal welfare case, as I will outline, we will take 
independence as requiring use of different background theories and assumptions, but it is not 
always clear what background theories are in use at a time and what features are shared. We 
must identify which are the relevant ones that need to differ (Stegenga, 2012), as I will advocate 
in Section 5.5. Additionally, we will not always be able to identify exactly which assumptions 
underlie each test, and there may be important shared assumptions which weaken 
independence.  
Coko & Shickore (2012) point out that it is difficult to get good robustness in available 
methods: “it is evident that the epistemic ideal of detection by multiple independent means in 
the Wimsattian sense is never fully realized in actual experimental practice” (2012, p. 682). In 
real science, there are usually a limited number of methods available. These are often not fully 
reliable, and not fully independent. They may also give somewhat divergent results. In 
assessing the independence of different tests, we need to look at where the possible sources of 
error may arise – in technique and in background assumptions - and vary so as to reduce overlap 
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in these. We can think of robustness as a matter of degree – a result is more robust where it is 
derived by processes that are more reliable, more independent and give greater congruence of 
results. 
Other than failures of independence, there are other ways in which robustness analysis may 
fail. Schickore & Coko (2013) point out that in practice, robustness techniques may be 
problematic to implement. “Obviously, in real (scientific) life, multiple means of determination 
are not always available. Scientists do not always have an array of different instruments and 
techniques at their disposal, which they can use to investigate an unobservable phenomenon of 
interest … Even when different kinds of instruments and techniques are available, it is likely 
that the investigators’ epistemic situation is less-than-ideal – only a couple of techniques might 
be available; the techniques might not be completely independent of one another; the different 
means of determination may be limited in their reach etc.” (2013, p. 302). This is particularly 
true in animal welfare science, where limits on resources can strongly constrain which tests are 
feasible to perform in particular settings – on-farm assessments of multiple animals, for 
instance, will not usually allow for individual blood sampling or behaviour profiling. Stegenga 
(2012) similarly points out that we might not always have access to multiple independent 
modes of gathering evidence and that even with robust evidence, the hypothesis may be false. 
It may be a case of ‘the best we can do’ rather than ideal practice; over time the sciences can 
improve through trying to overcome these problems as best they can. 
When validating indicators, robustness gives us reason to be confident in the link between 
the indicator and the target state, and that our measured results are representing real changes in 
our target. As an example, Schickore & Coko (2013) describe the derivation of Avogadro’s 
number (a number representing the number of particles within a standardised unit of a 
substance) as a means of the use of robustness analysis to determine a hidden target. There is 
no direct way of measuring this target due to the unobservable size of the constituent particles. 
Instead, thirteen different experiments were used as indirect measurements. The experiments 
required a set of background assumptions to “describe how the unobservable entities bring 
about the experimental outcomes” (Schickore & Coko, 2013, p. 297). As each experiment used 
different assumptions, they served as mutual tests of these assumptions, as well as of the target. 
The large number of independent lines of evidence pointing to the same answer despite 
different background assumptions gave stronger confidence in the results. In the next section, 




5.5. Application to the validation problem 
As described above, there is a validation problem for hidden targets such as welfare: as we 
cannot access the target, we have no means of directly establishing a correlation between the 
target and the indicators. Instead, we must make some assumptions about the relationship 
between the target and indicators, and these assumptions may not be justified. The only 
information we have access to regards the variation in causal and effect indicators, and we only 
have assumptions about their link to the target state. It is important then that we find means to 
justify these assumptions. Here I will describe a process by which assumptions can be justified 
through theoretical plausibility, and tested through the collection of multiple independent lines 
of evidence that support the assumptions made – robustness analysis. The procedure I propose 
for the validation of indicators follows a general four-step framework: 
1. Make a (plausible) starting assumption relating a causal or effect indicator to the 
target 
2. Test for correlated variation in an indicator of the other type 
3. Repeat tests for the indicator using different assumptions to give robust results 
4. Use validated indicators as starting point to test others 
Below, I will detail what is involved in each of these steps, how they fit into the process and 
how they will help with the problem of validating hidden indicators. 
 
5.5.1. Make a (plausible) starting assumption  
The first step in validating an indicator of a hidden target is to make a (plausible) starting 
assumption relating a causal or effect indicator to the target. An assumption of this type is 
necessary, as we cannot in the beginning have any knowledge about the relationships between 
the target and its indicators. Even in the ‘difficult’ case, as described earlier, we must still begin 
with a similar assumption. The difference in this case is that we are not then immediately going 
on to test this assumption as we would with the difficult targets, but are instead using the 
assumption as a base to test other hypothesised target-indicator relationships.  
The assumption made will be of the form ‘I (indicator) is causally related to T (target)’. ‘I’ 
in this case may either be a causal or an effect indicator. We can start by selecting a causal 
indicator we think is directly related to the target, such that any changes we make to the causal 
state will cause a change in the hidden target state. Or we can select an effect indicator we think 
is related, such that any changes in the target state will cause a change in the effect indicator. 
Whichever indicator we are making the assumption about, we can call the ‘set’ indicator 
(Figure 5.6). In any particular test, we will hold this assumption fixed, using it as a basis to test 
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other indicators (as described in Step 2); but overall we gain support for this assumption 
through use of different tests (as described in Step 3). 
 
 Figure 5.6: Set and test indicators 
 
An example of this type of technique can be seen in the testing of cognitive bias 
measurements. The details of cognitive bias testing will be discussed in Chapter Seven, but it 
involves looking for an optimistic or pessimistic judgement bias in animals. When trying to 
validate the link between the results of these tests and welfare, researchers attempt to induce a 
change in welfare through a change in conditions, relying on an assumption about the link 
between a particular condition (such as barren or enriched housing) and welfare (Clegg, 2018). 
The use of this assumption for testing is in line with the first step described here. 
The idea of setting an initial assumption has been occasionally mentioned in the animal 
welfare literature. For example, Duncan & Fraser (1997) state that we have to “postulate that 
these unobservable phenomena [the feelings and emotions of animals] have certain properties, 
are affected by certain influences, and in turn have certain effects that we can observe” (1997, 
p. 23). It is also often implicitly used in testing or validating indicators, such as in the example 
described above. However, the need for and use of such assumptions is rarely discussed or 
given explicit justification. In particular, the further link between this step and the robustness 
analysis described in Step 3 has not been explored.  
One important feature of this step is that we want the starting assumption to be plausible. 
This means that we must have some good reason to think the assumption is true, or at least 
justified, independently of the results of these tests. Plausibility of this type is usually achieved 
through embedding within an accepted theoretical framework: one that can give a description 
or explanation of the assumed causal relationship between the target and the indicator. If the 
theoretical framework is a well-accepted and well-supported one, we have good support for the 
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plausibility of assumptions that fit within it. This is a role for existing data and accepted theory 
in the relevant area (Markus & Borsboom, 2013). In animal welfare science, this will be 
sentience research. The relevant theoretical framework is scientific understanding of the 
neurophysiology of mental experience, as well as the mechanisms that underlie processing of 
causal indicators and expression of effect indicators (Beausoleil & Mellor, 2017), and this link 
will be discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
One method sometimes used in animal welfare science for validating indicators is through 
analogy with humans (G. Mason & Mendl, 1993). Here we find particular indicators of welfare 
changes in humans (such as heart rate increases, or changes in blood cortisol) and make the 
assumption that similar changes seen in animals represent the same sorts of welfare experience. 
This method is only as strong as the assumption of analogy between humans and animals. I 
will discuss such cross-species comparisons of welfare in Chapter Six, but this assumption is 
only likely to hold in cases where we think there is relevant similarity in the underlying 
mechanisms linking the indicator to welfare change. 
 
5.5.2. Test for correlated variation in an indicator of the other type 
After setting a starting assumption, the second step in validating hidden-target indicators is 
to test for correlated variation in an indicator of the other type. This means we measure changes 
in the ‘set’ indicator and then look for correlated variation in the indicator we are interested in 
testing – the ‘test’ indicator (as per Figure 5.6, above). As described in Section 5.3, in a standard 
‘difficult’ target case, we are able to directly test for correlation between the indicator and the 
target. In the hidden case, as this is not possible, we must instead test for correlation between 
the test indicator and an indicator we are assuming stands in another position in the causal 
pathway. If we are assuming that variation in the set indicator reflects variation in the target 
state, then correlation between the set and test indicators should directly reflect correlation 
between the target and test indicator. This gives us good reason to think that given the truth of 
our starting assumption then the test indicator is a valid indicator of the target. This may seem 
like a large caveat, if we don’t have strong reason to believe in the starting assumption. Our 
reasons for this will derive partially from the plausibility described in Step 1, and also through 
the robustness testing that will be described in Step 3. 
If the set indicator is a causal indicator and the test indicator an effect, then these tests will 
ideally take the form of deliberate manipulations on the set indicator, looking to induce 
associated variation in the test indicator, which stands causally ‘downstream’. For example, for 
tests in animal welfare we can make changes to food availability, or provision of environmental 
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features or even pharmacological interventions, using drugs known (or assumed) to cause 
changes in welfare-relevant mental states; then look for measured changes in effect indicators 
such as heart rate or behaviour. In some cases, where direct manipulation is not possible (for 
example, some ecological measures), we can approximate the same sorts of tests by collecting 
data in a variety of situations under which the set indicator varies naturally, and look for 
correlated variation in the test indicator. If the test indicator shows variation alongside the 
manipulations of the set indicator, this can be presumed to be a result of the changes in the set 
indicator (e.g. food availability) causing changes in the target (welfare), which then cause 
changes in the test indicator (heart rate) (in the next section I will discuss how we can rule out 
other potential explanations of observed correlation). 
If the set indicator is an effect indicator, the tests will be of roughly the same form, but the 
inferences taken from them will be different. We cannot simply reverse the tests, as the causal 
direction runs the other way and manipulations on the effect indicators will not necessarily 
have any corresponding changes in the causal indicators. We could not, for instance, induce a 
change in heart rate and take this to tell us anything about the environmental conditions for an 
animal. Instead, as described above, we would still carry out manipulations (or tests under 
natural variation) of the causal indicator and look for correlated changes in the effect indicator. 
However, what would change would be our interpretation of the results. Given that in this case 
the effect indicator is the set indicator, then when we see correlated variation between 
indicators this would count as validation of the causal indicator, as it is our test indicator. 
An example of this process of validating a causal indicator might be investigating whether 
type of handling correlates with welfare changes in sheep. Here, our test indicator is the causal 
indicator of handling type. In this case, we would set up tests of different types of handling 
(human vs. machine) and then as our set indicator use effect indicators such as heart rate 
changes (either previously validated, or with an assumed relationship to welfare, as per 5.5.1) 
to measure whether a change in welfare is taking place. If a correlation is found between 
handling type and changes in heart rate, this helps validate the causal indicator; telling us that 
handling type is a valid causal indicator for sheep welfare. Where we have a cause affecting a 
target, which in turn affects the indicator, this time the causal link between the target (welfare) 
and the effect indicator (heart rate) is based on an assumption, which can then be used to test 
and validate the link between the causal indicator (handling) and the target (welfare).  
As discussed in Section 5.2, it is important that these tests are done with an indicator of the 
other type than the set indicator – that is, if the set indicator is causal than the test indicator 
should be effect, and vice versa – as they stand in different positions in the causal pathway. 
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Particularly, recall that while effect indicators can be, in part, validated through measures of 
correlation with one another, causal indicators can only be validated through embedding in a 
model which also contains effect indicators. This means that testing of causal indicators can 
only ever be done using effect indicators, as in the example of sheep handling above.  
The reverse is not always true. Effect indicators can be validated through testing for 
correlation with one another. For instance, we could validate the effect indicator of heart rate 
against that of changes in ear position, by looking for correlations between the two. However, 
this will only really work when using an effect indicator which is already known to be valid 
(see Step 4 for more on this). In this stage of assumption-based testing, if both the set and the 
test indicators are effect indicators, an additional assumption will be required for testing. 
Although effect indicators will correlate, this is due to them being effects of a common cause 
(the target) rather than a direct causal link. That means that direct intervention on an effect 
indicator will not necessarily show a change in other effect indicators. Correlated variation will 
only occur through interventions on the common cause target state, which requires the use of 
causal indicators. If these causal indicators are not already validated (in which case, we are 
again at Step 4), then we are making an additional assumption about the relationship between 
causal indicator and target, that will weaken our tests. Thus, all testing at this stage should be 
of indicators of the other type to that used in the assumption. 
This can be seen through the following example. If we were looking to validate heart rate 
against ear position, we would first make an assumption about the relationship between ear 
position and welfare (as per Step 1), making this the set indicator. We would then look for 
correlated variation in heart rate, making this the test indicator. However, in order to induce 
change in these indicators, we could not simply intervene on our set indicator, ear position. We 
could manually change the position of an animal’s ears without expecting to see any correlated 
variation in other indicators of welfare (unless the animal were to become annoyed by our 
interventions). We could only expect correlated variation if we were to induce change through 
intervening on the common cause of both indicators, i.e. welfare. Any intervention on welfare 
will necessary go through one of our causal indicators – one of the conditions for welfare, such 
as provision of social companions. But by introducing this causal indicator to the testing 
process, we must either already know that this indicator is valid (which takes us to Step 4), or 
we must make an additional assumption regarding the link between social companions and 
welfare. Having two assumptions within the one test (about both the link between social 
companions and welfare, and ear position and welfare) will weaken our confidence in our 
results and in the validity of the indicators. 
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In some cases, we may not get the expected results in these tests. For instance, when setting 
a causal indicator we think would be a condition for increased welfare (such as providing 
companions for a social animal), we might then find that the indicators go the opposite way, 
perhaps telling us that they don’t enjoy this condition, despite our initial assumption that they 
would. Here we need to decide when we would abandon our initial assumption, or when we 
would reject the indicators. In these cases, we would need the robustness analysis described 
below – we can test both the assumption and the indicator under different conditions to see 
which one holds and which does not. 
 
5.5.3. Repeat tests for the indicator using different assumptions to give robust results 
As flagged earlier, there is a weakness so far with the described procedure. That is, that our 
confidence in our results is only as strong as the starting assumption we have made. This is the 
role of the third step - to increase our confidence in the results, and thus in the validity of our 
test indicator, through use of multiple tests, each using different starting assumptions. “A 
variety of sources of evidence that test an assumption in different ways will generally offer 
stronger validity evidence than a single line of evidence that tests the assumption in just one 
way” (Markus & Borsboom, 2013, p. 587). This is robustness analysis, as described in Section 
5.4. Animal welfare science often uses a similar process for validation as the one I have 
outlined so far – to subject animals to a presumed stressor, measure the corresponding effects 
and then take these to be valid indicators of stress that can then be used to test for stress under 
other circumstances (G. Mason & Mendl, 1993). However, what this process misses is the 
explicit identification of the assumption and subsequent repetition of the tests in order to test 
this initial assumption and build robust results. 
As discussed in Section 5.4, a key feature of this sort of analysis is that these lines of 
evidence are independent (or at least, as much as they can be). “If there are several independent 
ways of measuring something, this increases our confidence in the measurements” (Bringmann 
& Eronen, 2016, p. 29). There is a lot of discussion about what independence means in this 
context, but the general characterisation is one which defines independence in terms of chance 
of the same types of error occurring. That is, that the differences between the types of tests tries 
as much as possible to minimise the overlap in the same type of error, so errors are independent 
and robustness helps build our confidence in the result as described earlier.  In this case, what 
is most important is that the tests rely on independent background assumptions. Although all 
tests will share at least some assumptions, here what matters is that “any problematic or 
unconfirmed assumptions should not be shared by the different ways of access” (Eronen, 2015, 
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p. 3969). All assumptions may be problematic or unconfirmed to some degree, but it is the 
most problematic background assumptions - those which we are uncertain about - that we 
primarily need to account for. 
In the case of the procedure for validating indicators of hidden targets, assumptions will be 
problematic when they are assumptions about an unmeasurable causal relationship between the 
set indicators and a hidden target state. If we repeat the tests using different background 
assumptions, it means that the collective results do not rely on any one assumption in the way 
that a single test would: “A variety of sources of evidence that test an assumption in different 
ways will generally offer stronger validity evidence than a single line of evidence that tests the 
assumption in just one way” (Markus & Borsboom, 2013, p. 587). In the single test case, as 
described in Step 2, our confidence in the validity of the tested indicator is only as strong as 
our confidence in the truth of our starting assumption. If the assumption fails, so too do our 
results. However, when we have a set of results relying on a set of different starting 
assumptions, as described earlier, it becomes increasingly unlikely that that the observed results 
are due to some mistake or failure in these starting assumptions, and instead we have good 
reason to think they reflect a real valid causal link between the target and the test indicator. 
These assumptions should differ in that they use different set indicators, while still testing a 
single test indicator. For example, we might test an effect indicator of animal welfare first by 
using a set causal indicator of food quality, which we assume to have an effect on welfare, and 
then by using the causal indicator of access to social companions. As these two types of causes 
are different from one another, and the mechanism by which each is thought to affect the target 
state are different, we would have sufficiently independent assumptions to give robust results. 
If the tested effect indicator showed the right kind of variation in both cases, we would have 
good reason to think it is a valid indicator of welfare. 
As mentioned in Step 2, one of the problems in running these sorts of tests is ruling out 
alternative explanations for the observed correlation between set indicator and test indicator. 
Testing ‘difficult’ targets just involves inducing a change in the condition and comparing 
resultant measures of the target and the indicator for correlations. The process is transparent, 
in that we can see that changes in the indicator are a result of changes in the target state. This 
is not true for hidden targets, where the process is opaque and although we can vary particular 
conditions and look for changes in the indicators, we are unable to validate these directly to the 
target as we cannot get direct measures of the target.  
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The problem is that the results of our tests on hidden targets (covariation between changes 
in the conditions and changes in the indicator) could be a result of one of three different 
scenarios:  
• The change in condition is directly causing a change in the indicator rather than 
doing so indirectly through changes in the target. That is, the indicator, rather than 
serving as a measure of the hidden target, is instead serving as a measure of the 
condition itself (Figure 5.7). This may be because the target in this case does not 
really exist, or because the indicator is just not related to it. 
 
Figure 5.7: Case 1- Indicator measuring condition directly 
 
• The indicator is actually measuring some other target that is affected by the 
condition. Here we have the condition causing changes in some other target, that the 
indicator is then tracking (Figure 5.8). Again, this may be because the intended target 
is absent, or simply because the indicator is the wrong one for the target in this case.  
 
Figure 5.8: Case 2 - Indicator measuring an alternative target 
 
• The indicator is tracking the intended target, and observed changes in the indicator 
are a result of changes in the target under varied conditions (Figure 5.9). This is the 
case we are hoping stands when validating indicators. 
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Figure 5.9: Case 3 - Indicator measuring the intended target 
 
What is important is that we have a method of distinguishing between these possible 
scenarios. This is where robustness analysis can assist. In the first instance, this requires use of 
accepted theory to create a likely model of the relationship between a set of conditions and the 
target, and the target and some indicators. We can then use different conditions to strengthen 
our testing and create more robust results. 
Take the first scenario – that the indicator is measuring the intended condition. This becomes 
much less likely if we repeat the testing under changes in some other condition that we have 
reason to think impacts on the target. It may be the case that condition A directly affects the 
indicator, but if we then bring in condition B, which is quite different from condition A, it 
becomes less likely that observed changes in the indicator still reflect both these conditions 
directly rather than reflecting the effect of the conditions on the hidden target. Figure 5.10 
shows this line of reasoning employed by Miller (cited in Fraser, 2009), who argued that the 
most parsimonious explanation for the links between several different causal and effect 
indicators will often be use of an intervening variable, rather than multiple independent 
stimulus-response links. The more lines of evidence we add, in terms of different conditions, 
the less likely the direct relationship is the explanation. This also links back to the earlier 
discussion of predictions as a form of validation – under the first model we could not make 
predictions about changes in the effect indicators, except through changes in the listed causal 
indicators. In the second model, we could introduce some new causal factor we think would 
influence thirst (such as an increase in ambient temperature) and expect to see changes in the 
effect indicators. Where such change is observed, we have further reason to believe this 
explanation.  
 
Figure 5.10: Use of an intervening variable to simplify explanation of links between indicators (from 
Fraser, 2009, p. 114) 
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In the second scenario, a similar approach also works. We run tests under a range of 
conditions and look for changes in the indicator. If changes in the different conditions all result 
in changes in the indicator, we have good reason to think that they are working through some 
intermediate state rather than directly on the indicator. But even then we still might not have 
reason to think that the intermediate state is our intended target. Perhaps there are other 
potential states that could serve this role just as well. We cannot immediately distinguish 
between the second and the third cases. It is true that there is not necessarily going to be any 
set of tests that will definitively differentiate between these scenarios. However, there are two 
ways we may strengthen our belief that we are measuring our intended target.  
The first is through targeted testing – putting in place tests which are specifically designed 
to rule between the effects of the intended target and some other hypothesised state that could 
be doing the work (Schupbach, 2016; Soler, 2014). Schupbach (2016) even defines 
independence of tests in these terms - “each newly cited detection in such cases [of] RA 
[robustness analysis] differs from previous means of detection if it is capable of ruling out 
another class of competing potential explanations of the result left standing by these previous 
means” (Schupbach, 2016, p. 13). This will not give us the result that that intended target is the 
definite cause of our results, but can rule out the most probable alternatives. For example, say 
we observe a change in availability of favoured foods correlating with a change in indicators 
of preference behaviour. We could have two alternative explanations – that the change is 
occurring through a change in welfare experience, or that it is instead mediated through some 
other non-conscious reflex mechanism. If we had a way of intervening that would affect 
experience but not non-conscious processing (e.g. use of mood-altering drugs), then this would 
give us reason to prefer the former explanation. 
The second way of strengthening is the use of theory. If we can tell a plausible causal story 
about the mechanisms through which changes in the conditions affect the target state and go 
on to affect the indicator, and this causal story fits well with our best established theories in the 
area – especially if it can be independently tested - then we have reason to prefer this 
interpretation over others. Think again of the example above. We could use our current best 
theories about the relationship between subjective experience and behavioural motivation (e.g. 
Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019) to lend support to the welfare interpretation. This gives us a way 
of deciding on the third explanation over the second. If the relationship between the indicator 
and the target holds under a range of conditions, then we can be confident in our assumptions 
and accept the indicator as valid. 
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5.5.4. Use validated indicators as starting point to test others 
Once we have used the three steps above to validate an indicator, we can repeat for as many 
indicators as we wish to. However, we can also make the process simpler by using the validated 
indicators to test others (“concurrent validity” - Botreau, Bracke, et al., 2007). The validated 
indicator would then take the place of the set indicator used in the starting assumption. We can 
use validated causal indicators as starting points to test effect indicators, and validated effect 
indicators to test casual indicators. Correlation between a validated indicator and a test 
indicator tells us they are likely to be mapping onto the same target state, and thus that the test 
indicator is also valid. Additionally, because of the correlation between effect indicators, as 
discussed above, we can also use effect indicators to test one another. Although this will still 
require assumptions for causal indicators (or use of validated causal indicators), correlation 
with other validated effect indicators is a strong additional line of evidential support. 
As an example, Panksepp (2005) suggests that we could use results from human tests to 
validate behavioural indicators of welfare in other animals. The suggestion is that we could 
take neurochemical agents known through self-report to cause changes in emotional states in 
humans (e.g. increasing or decreasing joy or sadness). Taking the assumptions that self-report 
is a reliable enough guide to human experience, and that neurochemical agents are likely to act 
the same way in other similar brains (i.e. containing similar relevant neural pathways), we can 
take these causal indicators as valid and then use manipulations in these to test for correlated 
changes in the effect indicators, such as playful behaviour or vocalisations. Where correlated 
changes are seen, we have good reason to think that these indicators are valid for the changes 
in welfare. 
Because this method does not rely on starting assumptions, but on established validated 
indicators, it therefore doesn’t require the third step of multiple testing for robustness. Our 
confidence in the validated indicator gives us confidence in the results of the tests. However, 
in many cases it will still be valuable to run multiple tests. Although the initial testing process 
may give us confidence in the validity of our tested indicators, it does not give us certainty, 
particularly as the sensitivity and scope of the indicator response may vary. And any mistakes 
in that process would be amplified if these are then used as the basis for testing others – recall 
Wimsatt’s ‘chain of reasoning’. Running multiple independent tests, using different 
assumptions or other (independently) validated indicators, gives us increased confidence that 
there are no such mistakes causing an impact on our results, and thus is still a useful step in 
testing. Our higher level of confidence in previously validated indicators, as compared to 
confidence in assumptions about the set indicators might be reflected in the need for fewer 
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lines of testing than we would need initially, but it would usually be advisable to have more 
than one. 
 
5.6. An example of the process 
The framework I’ve developed here gives us a method for validating welfare indicators. 
Although something like this method, or components of it, are often used in animal welfare 
science, the process has not yet been made explicit. An example of the use of a method like 
this can be found in Briefer et al. (2015) in their work in developing indicators to measure both 
the valence (positive/negative) and strength of welfare in goats, in which they used multiple 
tests to increase confidence in the results. Here I’ll detail how this study fits into my framework, 
showing its application and benefit. 
1. Make a (plausible) starting assumption relating a causal or effect indicator to the 
target 
The initial assumptions related causal indicators to goat welfare. Goats were placed under 
differing conditions that were assumed to have positive or negative effects on welfare – access 
to food or social groups versus being unable to access food and experiencing social isolation. 
These assumptions – that, for example, access to food improves welfare, and seeing but being 
unable to access it causes reduced welfare – seem fairly plausible and are based on expert 
knowledge of the animals. 
2. Test for correlated variation in an indicator of the other type 
While varying the causal indicators, the goats were then assessed for changes in various 
potential effect indicators such as ear position, type of vocalization and change in heart rate. 
This is a case of a causal (set) indicator affecting the target, which in turn affects the effect 
(test) indicator. Those effects that varied reliably with the changes in conditions were supported 
as valid indicators.  
3. Repeat tests for the indicator using different assumptions to give robust results 
This experiment used two different set indicators for testing – food availability and social 
contact - each with its own independent assumption relating these to welfare. This meant that 
even if one assumption was erroneous, it was unlikely that both would be. It is far less likely 
that the observed effect indicators were indicating some other factor; in the framework, welfare 
is the most likely link between the food and social conditions. 
4. Use validated indicators as starting point to test others 
Although not used in this experiment, the indicators that were tested and validated here 
could form the basis of future testing of both causal and other effect indicators. 
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5.7. Conclusion   
If we take animal welfare to consist in the subjective mental states of animals, we have a 
measurement problem as these states cannot be measured directly; instead we must use indirect 
indicator measurements such as behaviour or physiology. The measurement indicators used 
must be valid ones – that is, it must be the case that the indicators are measuring the intended 
target rather than some other target (or nothing at all). This requires a causal relationship 
between the target and the indicators. This causal relationship can go in either direction – the 
indicators can either be causes or effects of the target state. These two types of indicators need 
to be tested against one another for validation. Here I have proposed a four-step approach for 
validating these indicators, which requires making some assumptions about the causal links 
between the target and the indicators, and testing these assumptions using multiple independent 
lines of evidence to increase our confidence in them via robustness analysis. Indicators showing 
a reliable correlation throughout testing can then be taken to be valid measures of the target 
state. This framework could also apply in other cases of measurement of ‘hidden’ target 
variables, in particular other properties of animal minds, such as consciousness or cognitive 
abilities.  
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6. CHAPTER SIX – INTERSUBJECTIVE 
WELFARE COMPARISONS 
 
6.1. Introduction  
As already discussed, animal welfare science is the scientific study of the welfare of animals. 
Scientists use different indicators, such as changes in behaviour or of physiological variables 
such as heartrate, to measure the changes in welfare under different conditions. I have argued 
that we should understand welfare as consisting in the subjective experience of animals – their 
positive and negative mental states. The private nature of this subjective experience raises 
particular issues for measurement. In Chapter Five I looked at how we can validate indicators 
of welfare, as a hidden target state. Here I will examine another such issue: whether we can 
justify making intersubjective comparisons of welfare – that is, comparing the welfare of 
different individuals. 
When measuring the welfare of any individual animal, we are quantifying its welfare – in 
some sense defining the ‘units’ of welfare for that individual. We use indicators to gain 
information about the states of subjective welfare – both their valence (whether they are 
positive or negative) and their intensity (how strongly the animal feels them). We can also 
gather information about how the indicators reflect welfare (i.e. to what degree the indicators 
change when welfare changes), how strongly welfare changes under different conditions, and 
the boundaries of maximum and minimum welfare for that individual, both in terms of under 
what conditions this will occur and how strongly the indicators will reflect this. 
We are able to measure subjective states of an individual with (hopefully) some degree of 
accuracy. We can certainly provide an ordinal listing of states of welfare, in which we rank 
some as higher than, lower than, or the same as, others. For example, if looking at whether 
sheep prefer handling by humans or machines during shearing, we could measure indicators 
like their behavioural responses to each situation (such as approach/avoidance), ear positions 
and changes in heart rate to determine which situation provides better welfare. Based on these 
indicators, we could then rank the conditions accordingly. Additionally, we may think that we 
can even, to some degree, quantify the magnitude of differences in welfare through the 
magnitude of difference in the measured indicators. If, for example, we see twice as much 
cortisol in blood sampling, we might infer that that animal is twice as stressed, though these 
sorts of inferences must be taken with caution. We can create a rough ordering of sets of 
conditions for an individual, from those that create the best welfare down to those that create 
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the worst and understand how the measured indicators reflect these states. Though this is 
somewhat straightforward for any individual animal, it becomes much more complex if we 
want to compare this information between different animals. We may run into the problem of 
incommensurability, as discussed in Section 4.3. In this chapter, I will look at this problem of 
intersubjective comparison, and describe one way to overcome it. In Section 6.2, I will describe 
the different types of situations under which we might want to make comparisons and the types 
of comparisons they require. In Section 6.3 I will use a worked example to outline the problem 
of intersubjective comparison in more detail. I will then go on to provide my solution to this 
problem in Section 6.4, looking too at some potential problems, and finally in Section 6.5 look 
at how the solution applies to the different types of comparisons we might want and what we 
can do in cases where it will not apply. 
 
6.2. Types of animal welfare comparison 
There are three primary areas in which we might want to make intersubjective comparisons 
of animal welfare. The first is in making management decisions for the life of any particular 
animal; in weighing the trade-offs that might be required for making their lives go well overall. 
There are often times when we might want to inflict a negative experience in order to enable a 
positive experience, and need to compare their intensity to ensure the trade-off is justified. For 
example, whether we should put a young animal through a painful medical procedure in order 
to prevent health problems in later life, or cause frustration through denial of a favourite food 
type that could cause future obesity. These comparisons will be intrasubjective, and will 
require comparative information about the degree of harm and benefit of these different actions 
for a single individual.  
The second area is in using animals for experimental welfare science. In animal welfare 
science, the welfare of animals is studied under different conditions. This requires taking 
groups of animals and placing them under conditions such as different feeding regimes, 
environmental parameters or social groupings. Measurement of behavioural and physiological 
indicators is then used to draw conclusions about the effects of these conditions on the welfare 
of the animals. Importantly here, the tests are performed on small groups of animals, with 
results that are assumed to be relevant to other members of the species. Often, the different 
experimental conditions will be performed on different groups, and the results from each group 
compared. Here we have two ways in which intersubjective comparisons are necessary – in 
making comparisons between experimental groups and in extrapolating results to other 
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members of the species; both of which will typically occur within species. These comparisons 
will usually be intersubjective, but intra-species. 
Finally, there are comparisons made for institutional (or individual) decision-making about 
the distribution of resources between animals in order to achieve the best overall outcomes. In 
most situations, there are limitations to resources, such as money and husbandry time, and these 
sorts of decisions about distribution under scarcity will require making trade-offs between 
provision of benefits to different individuals or groups of animals; with some animals 
necessarily being privileged over others. For example, consider a zoo manager trying to decide 
whether to use part of the zoo’s budget to provide a lion with underfloor heating in its den, or 
a group of lungfish with new exhibit furniture Decisions of this type require intersubjective 
comparison of the potential harms and benefits the different animals may experience, and 
comparisons will frequently be inter-species. 
All three of these applications require meaningful comparisons of welfare in order to make 
the requisite inferences and decisions. If such comparisons cannot be made, this will impact 
many areas of welfare science and animal husbandry. However, making such comparisons does 
seem problematic. It is not immediately obvious that we could be justified in thinking that 
different animals have experiences of welfare that are comparable in this way. In the next 
section, I will explore why this is the case.  
 
6.3. The comparison problem  
In order to make comparisons of welfare between different individuals, we must have a 
common scale onto which we can map their ‘units’ of welfare. That is, to be able to say 
something about how many measured units of welfare for one animal are equivalent to a 
number of units of welfare for another. Think of temperature measurement – although we have 
different temperature scales (Fahrenheit and Celsius) we are easily able to convert units in one 
into units of the other. If there is no such common underlying scale for welfare, or we cannot 
gain the required information to do the necessary conversions, then we will not be able to make 
intersubjective comparisons of welfare.  
On the surface, it seems we have good reason to be sceptical of this possibility. It is entirely 
plausible that different individuals could experience vastly different levels of welfare, and that 
they do not reflect these differences in measurable indicators. We see versions of this in real-
world situations – it seems, for example, that people can vary quite a lot with respect to pain 
thresholds and the degree to which they express pain reactions, and this can make it very 
difficult to compare pain experience between individuals. It may be the case that some animals 
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have reduced affect – that their highs are not particularly high nor their lows particularly low. 
The intensity of all their experiences may be small. Some animals, by contrast, might be 
capable of reaching far higher heights and far deeper lows – their intensity is just greater 
overall. If it is possible (which it seems to be) that such individuals could exist without showing 
different indicator responses, then as the underlying subjective states are private and 
inaccessible, we might never know whether or when they occur, and this undermines our ability 
to trust such comparisons. Making intersubjective comparisons of welfare will then require 
further justification. This problem has been widely discussed in the literature on human 
welfare, and the approaches taken there will be discussed in detail in Section 6.4.1. Here I will 
make the problem clearer through use of an example, and discuss the types of comparison the 
problem may apply to, before turning to my proposed solution. 
 
6.3.1. An example 
The problem of intersubjective comparison can be illustrated with this example. I used to 
work with two otters – Sneezy and Paddy. Imagine that each are given some yabbies, and their 
behavioural and physiological responses measured – say, the amount of vocalisation, and 
changes in heart rate. We see that Paddy shows a higher level of response on all measured 
indicators than Sneezy does. What conclusions can we draw from this? There are a few options: 
• Paddy enjoys receiving yabbies more than Sneezy does and her indicators reflect 
this 
• Paddy and Sneezy enjoy receiving yabbies the same amount, but Paddy is more 
inclined to ‘display’ her pleasure in measured indicators than Sneezy is 
• Paddy enjoys receiving yabbies less than Sneezy does, but her reactions are much 
higher 
There is also a possibility that Paddy actually dislikes the yabbies, and her indicators are 
instead demonstrating the strength of this dislike rather than enjoyment. Here, I will introduce 
the distinction between valence and intensity. Indicators such as heart rate and level of 
vocalisation may tell us how strong the reaction is (intensity), while there are other indicators, 
such as behaviour and type of vocalisation, that tell us whether the reaction is positive or 
negative (valence). Here, I will take it as fixed that the otters have the same indicators of 
valence – that is, that they will show the same signs of positive and negative experience. This 
is plausible, due to their shared evolutionary history and development. Here then, we are only 
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interested in whether the measured levels of response intensity correspond to the same intensity 
of experience. 
The problem is, that there does not seem to be any evidence here that gives us reason to 
prefer any of these alternatives over the others. There are multiple conclusions, all equally 
consistent with the observations and there is not any reason to consider one of the possibilities 
more likely than the others. This is not just hypothetical – within-species differences in 
individual behavioural and physiological responses to positive and negative stimuli are 
common (e.g. Boccia, Laudenslager, & Reite, 1995; Izzo, Bashaw, & Campbell, 2011; 
Manteca & Deag, 1994), and it is difficult in these cases to determine whether or not results 
imply a welfare difference. 
We cannot escape the problem using tests for the strength of preferences, as they will hold 
the same problem as other indicators. We could look to see whether Paddy will work harder 
for her yabbies than Sneezy would, but the results we see only give us comparative information 
for each individual – how much they value yabbies vs. work – and can’t be used to make 
intersubjective comparisons without assumptions such as that they both find work equally 
unpleasant. Sneezy may work less hard, but that won’t tell us whether he values yabbies less, 
or dislikes work more. He may merely be lazy, and less motivated in general to try and receive 
his favourite things, despite enjoying them just as much. Again, the information we have gives 
us no reason to prefer one of these options to the others, and there does not seem to be any 
further information we could gather that could give us such reason. Similarly, repeating the 
tests with a larger sample size would not give us further insight. Even if we had a test in which 
we saw 100 otters showing a higher response and 100 showing a lower response, we would 
still not have the required information in place to determine whether the higher responses were 
a result of greater enjoyment of yabbies, or of differences in reactivity. 
The problem arises because we have two dimensions along which the animals can vary from 
one another. The first is in the degree or intensity of their subjective response to stimuli: 
something like their ‘capacity’ for pleasure or suffering. This includes both the level of their 
maximum and minimum welfare (scope) – how high their highs and how low their lows – as 
well as their usual response to stimuli – whether it might be overall more positive or negative 
than others. The second dimension is the relationship between the level of subjective response 
and the change in the measured indicators. Some animals may be highly reactive, showing 
large changes in their measured indicators to only small increases or decreases in their 
subjective experience. Others may be more circumspect, showing only small external 
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responses to large subjective changes. We have no way of testing for this possibility, and no a 
priori reason to rule it out. 
Another example that might be familiar to many is that of the emotional reactions shown by 
young children. Toddlers are famous for having meltdowns over what we would consider to 
be very small problems, such as the shape of their sandwiches. When a toddler throws a 
tantrum, what we don’t know is whether they are genuinely that deeply upset about the issue 
(i.e. as upset as we would have to be in order to show such a response), or whether they are 
just being particularly histrionic. Which of these interpretations we take will determine how 
we should react to the tantrums – should we show genuine concern for a deeply emotionally 
wounded child, or ignore an excessive display? Without further information to help us decide, 
either option is equally likely. 
The overall problem is that under an observed difference in overall response, we don’t know 
which of these factors – difference in level of welfare intensity, or in indicator response - is 
responsible for this, or indeed if both are varying simultaneously. Without such information, 
we cannot make comparisons.  
 
6.3.2. Types of intersubjective comparisons 
There are different types of intersubjective comparisons that can be made, and although the 
general problem as described above will affect all of them, the degree to which it will become 
a problem for a situation will differ depending on the type of comparison required. The types 
of comparisons link to the types of measurement scale discussed in Chapter Four. 
The three types of intersubjective comparisons are valence comparisons, level comparisons 
and unit comparisons (List, 2003). Valence comparisons are the most basic, and simply require 
an assessment of welfare as positive or negative with reference to some intersubjectively 
relevant zero point - "i's utility in state x is greater than/equal to/less than a utility level of zero" 
(List, 2003, p. 5). The zero point represents a ‘neutral’ point of welfare, and if we can assign 
the same zero point to each individual, then we have a shared basis from which comparison 
can be made. Different individuals can be compared with regards to where they stand relative 
to this zero point. We can then make claims such as: both individuals are experiencing positive 
welfare, or one individual is positive and the other negative. 
The problem of intersubjective comparisons does not hold for valence comparisons. For any 
individual animal, we are able to use indicators to make judgements about the valence of its 
welfare - whether it is experiencing positive or negative welfare. This is done in reference to a 
neutral ‘zero’ line, at which welfare is neither positive nor negative. The exact characterisation 
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of the zero line, and how to identify or measure it, are complex and interesting questions, but 
will not be explored here. Here I will take what I hope is a somewhat intuitive characterisation 
of the zero line as the subjective absence of both the characteristic positive and negative mental 
states (or an equal balance of both), that can be observed through the absence of indicators for 
either of these. Intersubjective comparisons of this type are made possible by the fact that this 
zero line is the same conceptual point for all individuals. What it means to be experiencing 
neither positive nor negative welfare is the same for all individuals – it does not make sense to 
think of one animal as having a more intense neutral experience than another. So, if we can 
identify when any individual is in a positive or negative welfare state, we can make 
comparisons of that to other animals – animal A is experiencing positive welfare while animal 
B is negative. This allows some basic level comparisons, in that we can assume that all animals 
experiencing positive welfare are at a higher level than those experiencing neutral or negative 
welfare. 
Level comparisons are more general judgements that the welfare of one individual is higher 
or lower than that of another individual; of the form: "Person i's utility in state x is at least as 
great as person j's utility in state y" (List, 2003, p. 1); or more formally: Ui(x) ³ Uj(y). This is 
a ranking of welfare states of different individuals from highest to lowest – similar to an ordinal 
scale of measurement. This type of comparison gives us no information about the valence of 
or degree of difference between the two levels.  
The problem of intersubjective comparisons does not hold for valence comparisons. For any 
individual animal, we are able to use indicators to make judgements about the valence of its 
welfare - whether it is experiencing positive or negative welfare. This is done in reference to a 
neutral ‘zero’ line, at which welfare is neither positive nor negative. The exact characterisation 
of the zero line, and how to identify or measure it, are complex and interesting questions, but 
will not be explored here. Here I will take what I hope is a somewhat intuitive characterisation 
of the zero line as the subjective absence of both the characteristic positive and negative mental 
states (or an equal balance of both), that can be observed through the absence of indicators for 
either of these. Intersubjective comparisons of this type are made possible by the fact that this 
zero line is the same conceptual point for all individuals. What it means to be experiencing 
neither positive nor negative welfare is the same for all individuals – it does not make sense to 
think of one animal as having a more intense neutral experience than another. So, if we can 
identify when any individual is in a positive or negative welfare state, we can make 
comparisons of that to other animals – animal A is experiencing positive welfare while animal 
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B is negative. This allows some basic level comparisons, in that we can assume that all animals 
experiencing positive welfare are at a higher level than those experiencing neutral or negative 
welfare. 
Unit comparisons are the most detailed, being judgements about the amount by which the 
welfare of one individual is higher or lower than that of another, as well as the relative 
difference of welfare change that will occur when individuals change conditions. These are of 
the form: "If we switch from state x to state y, the ratio of person i's utility gain/loss to person 
j's utility gain/loss is l" (List, 2003, p. 1); or more formally: Ui(x) - Ui(y) / Uj(x) - Uj(y) = l. 
Here we can compare the number of units of welfare experienced by different individuals in 
different situations, not just changes up or down, as in the quantitative (interval and ratio) 
scales. If it can be made, this type of comparison gives us more information about the 
magnitude of welfare differences, and is much more useful in many decision-making contexts. 
Comparisons of this type will require that measurements of welfare can be made to at least an 
approximate quantification of units; as mentioned in Section 6.1, this seems to be plausible 
through quantification of indicators. 
The three applications of animal welfare comparisons described will generally require unit 
comparisons, though level comparisons might sometimes be sufficient. In making management 
decisions trading off current and future welfare, we will need to know the magnitude of the 
negative and positive experiences in order to compare. For use of animals in welfare science, 
we will at least need to know if some intervention has made a group of animals better or worse 
off than another, and often by how much. For management decisions about resource 
distribution, we want to know how much benefit we will be providing our different animals 
through provision of resources, in order to determine the optimal distribution. 
Both level and unit comparisons, however, do seem to fall to the problem of intersubjective 
comparisons. In both cases, all we have is information about the conditions the animals are 
experiencing, and the indicators they are showing, but for the reasons laid out earlier, we cannot 
simply assume that animals are responding similarly to the conditions, nor that their indicators 
reflect similar levels of subjective experience. We may have slightly more justification in using 
level comparisons, at least in cases where the difference in condition or response is quite vast, 
but even these will rely on some similarity assumptions, which I will address shortly. The 




6.4. Solving the comparison problem 
Some writers have argued that intersubjective comparisons of welfare are meaningless and 
cannot be made (see examples in List, 2003). This is the strong claim that the subjective 
experiences of different individuals are of a different type, and are thus incommensurable – 
there is no common scale by which we could make comparisons (see Section 4.3). 
Intersubjective comparisons of welfare do not seem to be of this type. It makes sense to think 
that subjective experience is the same kind of thing between individuals, though its particular 
features and dimensions may vary. There is a first-person experience for any sentient animal, 
and it is in this experience that welfare is grounded. We do not think that the experience of 
individuals is of such a vastly different type that there is no common ground by which to 
understand it. At least, this should be the case between similar or closely related animals. We 
might have a different intuition when considering the minds of vastly different species. I will 
not argue for this claim here, but it seems intuitively plausible that we do not have an ineffably 
different state grounding experience for different individuals. The comparisons are not 
meaningless; however, they may not be possible. 
Here I will take it as accepted that subjective experience is the same kind of thing between 
individuals; one may still want to push on this claim, but if experience is of a different type, 
then there will be no possibility of comparisons at all (see Chapter Seven for more on the 
similarities between different types of similarities). If subjective experience is of a single type, 
there will then be a common scale on which we can measure welfare. Instead of trying to 
compare weights and lengths, the process is more akin to trying to compare lengths measured 
in different units (i.e. centimetres and inches). However, when we are trying to compare 
measurements made in centimetres and inches, we have access to the required information for 
converting one to the other. The problem of intersubjective welfare comparison is that we 
might not be able to access the equivalent ‘conversion formula’. We may have the 
measurements of welfare of one animal and those of another animal; both of which quantify 
welfare in relation to the scale for that animal. Due to the private nature of subjective 
experience, what we do not know, and possibly can not know, is how to convert units between 
the scales of each individual and compare them on a common scale, as we cannot differentiate 
between changes in measured indicators as a result of changes in welfare intensity or due to 





6.4.1. Solutions for the human case 
The problem of making interpersonal comparisons of welfare is not a new one, and this 
problem has been widely discussed in the literature on human wellbeing (see e.g. Elster & 
Roemer, 1991), though often only with a preference-satisfaction view of welfare in mind. 
However, this discussion has not been expanded to include welfare comparisons made of 
nonhuman animal species, or between different species. It seems that however bad the problem 
is in the human case, it is going to be even worse in the animal case. Firstly, we just don’t have 
as much information about the minds of animals to work with. In the human case, we can use 
our knowledge of our own experience and the reported experience of others to make some 
justified assumptions about similarities and differences between individuals. With animals, as 
all our information about mental states is coming through indirect measurement of indicators, 
we cannot be anywhere near as certain. Additionally, we will often want to make comparisons 
between members of different species, and this will make the problem even worse, as the 
differences between individuals will be even larger.  
There are three main classes of solution proposed in the human case – use of an ‘imaginative 
empathy’ introspective approach to imagine which of two welfare positions is likely to be 
greater than the other (Binmore, 2009; Harsanyi, 1955), a ‘behaviourist’ solution positing a 
connection between a measurable indicator and subjective experience (List, 2003), and lastly 
to simply move away altogether from the measurement of subjective welfare and to either 
measure something else we consider to be important in the questions of distribution under 
which these comparisons are usually required (such as resource availability), or use a different 
ethical or distributive principle in decision-making (Fleurbaey & Hammond, 2004). I will 
examine these here and argue that even if they are potentially useful in the human case (which, 
for most, is doubtful) they fail to meet the requirements for justifying intersubjective welfare 
comparisons in animals. 
The first potential solution is to use ‘imaginative empathy’. This involves an ‘introspective’ 
or ‘imagining’ approach to comparisons, in which an observer assesses the situations of the 
individuals under comparison and makes an introspective intuitive judgement about their 
comparative welfare; typically based on imagining themselves in both positions, with each 
individual’s behaviour and desires. This can be of two types – a judgement of state (x is better 
off than y) or of preference (I would rather be x than y). This approach has some deep issues, 
particularly with reliability. Although we might gain information about the observer’s 
judgement, why should we think that this tracks the fact of the matter about the comparative 
welfare of the individuals? In the human case, this method is given some (attempted) 
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justification through our understanding of what it is like to be a person under different 
conditions, with an assumption of similarity between individuals. This relies on our capability 
of truly imagining ourselves in the place of another, separate from our own desires and 
psychological biases, and judging between situations.  This seems difficult for other humans, 
and probably impossible when it comes to other species. On what basis could I really make a 
meaningful judgement about whether a lungfish swimming in a tank is better off than a lion 
resting on the grass? Both are so far from my own experience, that my judgement is certain to 
reflect mostly my own preferences and biases. It also presupposes that there is some degree of 
similarity between the experiences of the individuals by which we could make the judgement, 
and this is partially what is at question. If I don’t have information about the intensity of a 
particular animal’s experience, how can I imagine myself in its position at all? In cases where 
there are disagreements between observers, there seems no further facts that can be appealed 
to in order to resolve the dispute, if this is all our comparisons are supposed to rest on. 
The second option is to use a ‘behaviourist’ framework to “posit a fixed connection between 
certain empirically observable proxies and utility” (List, 2003, p. 1). That is, we use some 
external indicators of welfare as proxies for the subjective experience, and compare their levels 
or units instead. In the human case, this relies on using behavioural cues as proxies for internal 
states. For instance, we might use facial expressions as an indicator of happiness and compare 
the facial expressions of different individuals as a proxy for comparing their welfare. The 
problems with this approach should be immediately obvious, given what has already been said 
about the lack of justification for unreflectively using proxies in this way. This relies on an 
assumption that there is the same ‘mapping’ relation from subjective experience to indicator 
for all individuals; and the lack of justification of this assumption is precisely the problem we 
are dealing with. While this approach is the most promising, and is similar to the solution I will 
propose, it cannot be taken without further justification for believing in the reliability of the 
connection so posited. 
The third option is to avoid the need to make welfare comparisons entirely, through either 
measuring and comparing something else or through using a different ethical or distributive 
principle for decision-making. A common response to the comparison problem is to use another 
measure to stand in for welfare. Not a direct measurement proxy, as in the previous suggestion, 
but some other proxy variable that could be considered valuable and could substitute for 
welfare. In this case, we are not really trying to make intersubjective comparisons of welfare 
at all, as there is no strong claim being made about the link between change in the proxy and 
change in welfare, but instead are comparing some other state or resource that we might 
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consider important in considerations of distribution (which is the context under which many 
comparisons are made). Examples might be availability of particular resources. In the human 
case this is often money; in animal cases it might be more basic resources, such as food or 
shelter. Other examples might be access to or realisation of some more basic ‘objective goods’ 
– for humans these are things like accomplishment, knowledge, friendship, autonomy; for 
animals they could perhaps include freedom, comfort, social relationships. Again, we are not 
here necessarily trying to compare welfare between individuals, but instead looking at 
comparisons of other goods that we might think are important, and can be more easily 
objectively measured and compared. As such then, this is not really a solution to the problem 
of intersubjective comparisons, but simply a workaround. It may be useful in some contexts, 
but not if there are situations in which we really want to measure and compare subjective 
welfare. As we don’t know the relationship between these conditions and subjective experience 
(the very heart of the problem we are trying to solve), it may not help us much. I can measure 
whether Paddy and Sneezy have the same number of yabbies, but this is not telling me whether 
or not they have the same welfare, which was what we were originally looking to discover. 
Finally, we have the option to bring in some other ethical or distributive principle to allow 
decision-making without comparisons. This differs from the previous point in that rather than 
trying to make intersubjective comparisons of something other than welfare, we instead try to 
find ways to get by without making comparisons at all. The type of comparisons required 
depends on the ethical or distributive principle we are operating under, and if we are able to 
find a principle that does not require comparisons to be made at all, we no longer have a reason 
to be concerned with the fact that we are unable to make such comparisons. Only if we are 
strong utilitarians will we assume that all our distributive decisions should involve absolute 
maximisation of overall subjective welfare.  A utilitarian framework won’t work in these cases, 
as it requires the use of unit comparisons which cannot be justified. Some potential alternatives 
are a maximin rule, sufficient threshold, Pareto and equal consideration of interests (Fleurbaey, 
2016). Here, I will outline the first three, and detail why they would not work in the animal 
case. In Section 6.5 I will discuss the final option, which I think is the best contender for an 
alternative solution in cases where the one I will propose does not apply. 
The maximin rule operates to ensure the worst off improves their situation. In this case this 
would mean that the resources should go to help whichever animal currently has the lowest 
level of welfare. This won’t usually work in the cases we are interested in, as it still requires a 
level comparison to determine which animals are worst off to start with, something we won’t 
have unless one or the other starts out below the zero line. Perhaps a modification of the 
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maximin rule, which applies to distribution of goods rather than distribution of welfare, could 
work here – the resources would go to the animal which has fewer overall. This would be a 
combination of the above ‘proxy’ solution with an alternative distributive principle. Although 
this would allow us to make decisions, there is a risk that it is not getting at what we might 
want in using our resources for welfare improvement. 
Under a ‘sufficient threshold’ view (Nussbaum, 2000), we take each individual to have the 
right to access a sufficient threshold level of those components deemed necessary for a good 
life. This is similar to the proxies view as described above, in that we are looking at the 
components of welfare rather than the subjective state itself, but in this case, rather than 
quantifying the components as a proxy measurement for underlying welfare state, we are 
ensuring that each animal has access to some minimum threshold requirement. Like the valence 
requirement, this will only work in cases where we are making decisions between animals 
which do and do not already have their threshold level met. If both species are already over 
their threshold, then we have no way of choosing between them for further positive welfare, 
and if both are under their threshold then we have no way of prioritising which to raise first. 
We might think of using some additional principle like satisficing – rather than trying to make 
the theoretically best decision, we are instead trying to make an acceptable decision and so 
long as neither animal is below some minimum threshold then we feel like the decision was 
ok. But this doesn’t help us much in deciding between alternatives. 
For human cases, the most prominent contender for an alternative ethical principle is Pareto, 
which is commonly invoked in work on the interpersonal comparison problem in humans 
(Fleurbaey, 2016). Under the Pareto principle, we should only take actions that benefit all, or 
benefit some and leave others no worse off. This then requires only intrasubjective level 
comparisons, to assess whether individuals are being made better off, but does not require any 
assessment between individuals. This is an intuitively appealing principle and seems like it 
would lead to good decision-making – every individual always ends up with higher welfare. 
However, given limitations on resources, it will be almost impossible to apply in most 
situations, and certainly not all. There are going to be cases where resource scarcity and 
competing interests make it impossible to improve the welfare of all individuals, and at times 
it may be the case that we have to accept a decrease in welfare of one individual or group to 
create a larger increase in welfare for another group. This principle may recommend that 
instead we would not act at all, so no improvements would be made, but no-one would be 
worse off; but this seems counterintuitive in cases where we could give a large benefit for only 
a small cost. Even a modification such as first implementing all improvements for animals with 
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negative welfare before assisting animals who already have positive welfare will not gain 
much, as there is still no way to prioritise between improvements within a valence class. 
One proposed modification is that an action is considered acceptable if the ‘gainers’ could 
in theory compensate the ‘losers’ and still end up better off. Again, this does not require 
interpersonal comparisons, as it only need be the case that after the transfer, the winning group 
is still above their previous standing, according to their own ordering, and that the same is true 
for the losing group, also according to their own ordering. This solution works well in cases 
where there can be a quantifiable resource that could potentially be transferred to outweigh 
losses, but it seems there are likely to be cases where this won’t apply (particularly for animals) 
– there may be no way of quantifying the value of the loss of one’s health, for example; or 
dealing with any non-divisible resource (though economists might deny that there is anything 
in human life that can’t be captured in this way). It also does not seem that we could use a 
similar process for determining which group would fare better in cases where there is no loss 
to outweigh, but where we are trying to decide on which group should receive a benefit (i.e. 
which would benefit more from it). We could compare how far up their own ordering each 
would go if given the resource and choose the larger benefit, but this requires some sort of 
interpersonal comparison if we are to assume that ‘two steps up’ one individual’s ordering is 
to outweigh ‘one step up’ in another’s. Unlike the previous case where all that is required is 
that the resource transfer would be sufficient to create a net gain in both cases, regardless of 
magnitude, the comparative magnitude of gain seems important in benefit-only cases. The 
solution seems particularly problematic in animal cases – even within a species, it is not clear 
what sort of hypothetical resource transfer we could imagine to balance the scales, and this is 
even more true across species. There is no obvious answer to how we could calculate whether 
there has been a net gain or loss in a decision involving different species. Perhaps we could use 
the value of the resources used initially – e.g. whether some of the money used to buy lion 
heating could instead buy lungfish logs – and compare whether in that case both groups would 
still benefit. However, this won’t help in cases where the resources may be less quantifiable 
and still won’t help us in the benefit-only cases described above. 
It also doesn’t allow for decisions between different potential allocations if all meet the 
Pareto standard – there may be some actions which leave many much better off, and some that 
leave them only slightly better off, but these differences cannot be assessed under this 
framework. We may, say, want to make a decision about which group to benefit (like whether 
we are to renovate and improve the lion exhibit or the lungfish exhibit) and want to know which 
group would have the higher welfare gain from this. Without a way of quantifying interpersonal 
 148 
comparisons, it seems difficult to make such decisions in a non-arbitrary fashion. I outlined in 
Section 6.2 the decisions we are likely to need to make in animal welfare cases, and it seems 
that this solution is unlikely to be useful in many, if any, of them. As neither this, nor any of 
the other solutions discussed wholly suffice to justify making intersubjective comparisons of 
animal welfare, I will now describe a potential solution that does. 
 
6.4.2. Making similarity assumptions 
The problem of intersubjective welfare comparisons is that we are unable to make 
comparisons between the measures of welfare of different individuals, as the data 
underdetermines what the results might mean. There are two dimensions along which animals 
might vary – in their degree of welfare experience and in the relationship between their 
experience and the changes in indicators – and which we choose can affect how we interpret 
our results. Variation in observed reactions can be explained by variation along either of these 
dimensions, with no obvious and unproblematic way to choose between them, and thus no way 
to draw conclusions. Making comparisons of welfare based on the results of measurement such 
as described in the otter case, requires that we make some assumptions about the similarities 
between individuals. Here I will detail these assumptions and what may justify their use. It is 
important to keep in mind here, that comparisons are made for a reason, and we only need to 
be confident enough in our comparisons to serve the reason at hand; we usually do not require 
some stronger metaphysical certainty (though it might be nice!). Our level of confidence in the 
assumptions thus only needs to match what is required for the application. 
There are two assumptions that we can make, based on the two dimensions of variation: 
1. Similarity in degree 
2. Similarity in response 
By making either one of these assumptions, we are in essence holding fixed one of the 
dimensions and assuming that observed variation is explained through variation in the other. 
This then allows us to make the comparisons we require. 
The first assumption is that the animals have the capacity to experience a similar degree of 
welfare. That is, that the animals are similar in respect to their level of welfare intensity - the 
amount of pleasure or suffering they can and do experience under different conditions. This 
assumes that the individuals have roughly equivalent minimum and maximum welfare 
intensities – the height of their highs and the depth of their lows - as well as similar degrees of 
change in between.  
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Making this assumption, we can go on to make comparisons using a zero-one method. The 
zero-one method is one under which we assign a score of 0 to the minimum level of welfare 
and 1 to the maximum level28 for any individual. Here we assume that the maximum and 
minimum welfare levels are equivalent between individuals; this is what we are taking for 
granted under Assumption 1. This provides set points for conversion of individual results onto 
a common scale. For each individual, we can build up a welfare profile in which we can 
measure their level of response under a range of different circumstances to identify where they 
experience their maximum and minimum welfare levels (0 and 1), and the degree of indicator 
response they display at these extremes. This would involve exposing them to a range of 
conditions, both positive and negative, and recording their responses across a range of 
indicators, under these conditions. We could then identify their maximum and minimum 
response levels, and under what conditions these occur, which would then be used to create a 
scale for the individual, showing different conditions and indicator responses as proportions of 
their total, occurring along the 0-1 line. Regardless of the differences between the conditions 
and indicator responses for individuals, we can still express responses for each as a proportion 
of the maximum. We can then use our assumption about the common value of the 0-1 points 
to construct a common scale on which comparisons can be carried out. As will be discussed in 
Section 6.5, normalising the range in this way may also have a moral justification, in terms of 
fairness. 
For example, think back to our otters, Paddy and Sneezy. We can begin by measuring their 
individual response profiles. We measure Paddy’s heart rate and vocalisation under different 
conditions and find that her responses range from a minimum of 15 under her most unpleasant 
condition to a maximum of 350 in her favourite (presuming here for the sake of simplicity that 
all the measured indicators showed the same response profile; further on I will discuss the case 
in which this is not true). We then do the same for Sneezy and find a range of 2 - 180. If we 
were to just compare these as absolute responses, it would look like Paddy’s highs were much 
higher than Sneezy’s. However, if we are assuming that both their maximums and minimums 
represent an equivalent underlying welfare state, we can scale them accordingly. A score of 
350 for Paddy represents the same level of experienced welfare as 180 for Sneezy. So while 
Paddy might show a response of 200 to yabbies, while Sneezy shows 100 – which on the 
surface makes it seem like Paddy likes them twice as much - when we scale to the 0-1 scale, 
 
28 When considering positive and negative welfare we might set these slightly differently – say 1 for best, 0 for 
neutral and -1 for worst, but the principle remains the same. 
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we find that both are around 0.6 of their maximum response, which would tell us they like them 
roughly equally (Figure 6.1). Paddy is in general more prone to a larger indicator response 
under all conditions, and so we see that Sneezy’s lower absolute response is actually as high 
for him as Paddy’s is for her, and can thus infer that he is actually enjoying the yabbies just as 
much. By making the assumption about similarity in degree of welfare (1), we can then use 
tests under different conditions to measure for differences in the indicator response profiles (2). 
We hold fixed the degree of welfare intensity and explain observed variation through 
differences in the response profiles. 
 
Figure 6.1: Comparison of welfare responses under Assumption 1 
 
As described here, it may seem that use of this 0-1 rule requires a linear reaction function. 
That is, that we think that the level of welfare change between a 10% and 20% response level 
is the same as that between 70% and 80%. This, of course, may not be the case. It could be that 
animals are far more responsive at the lower or higher end of the scales (we might show a far 
more extreme response to intense pain than mild pain, for example), and that the response 
functions look something more like curves than lines. It is not the case that for the use of this 
assumption to work, that we require a linear response function. It is the case, however, that we 
require the shape of the individual welfare curves to all be roughly the same, so that when we 
map them onto the 0-1 scale, we are still able to make comparisons based on how far along the 
curve different responses are. This then raises the further issue of how we might determine 
individual response curves, to be sure we are justified in thinking they are similar between 
individuals. The details of this are beyond the scope of this work, but general testing mapping 
the degree of response along different conditions should give some idea of the shape of the 
response functions. 
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If we make the second assumption, we are assuming that the animals are similar with respect 
to the level of indicator response shown under the same state of experienced welfare, such as 
similar heart rate change for mild arousal. This is similar to the behaviourist solution for the 
human case, as described in Section 6.4.1. If we take this assumption, we can simply use 
behavioural and physiological data to determine the intensity of their subjective experience 
under different conditions (and map out the maximum and minimum overall levels). For 
example, take again the case of our otters. We map out their range of responses under different 
conditions, and find Paddy varies from 15 - 350 and Sneezy from 2 – 180. But this time, instead 
of scaling these responses to the same range of underlying welfare levels, we take them as 
directly representative of what is happening experientially, in the same way for each otter. 
Paddy’s higher reaction levels suggests she is capable of experiencing more pleasure than 
Sneezy under a range of circumstances. Her ‘highs’ are higher, while his ‘lows’ are lower. 
Comparing their reactions again on receiving the yabbies, with Paddy showing a score of 200 
to Sneezy’s 100, we now take Paddy’s more extreme reactions to mean that she is indeed 
experiencing more pleasure – twice as much - in receiving the yabbies (Figure 6.2). By making 
the assumption about similarity in indicator response (2), we are able to run tests to measure 
the differences in degree of welfare intensity experienced by individuals. We hold fixed the 
relationship between welfare experience and indicator response and explain observed variation 
through differences in the underlying experience of welfare. 
 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of welfare responses under Assumption 2 
 
6.4.3. Justifying similarity assumptions  
I have shown that by making either one of the similarity assumptions – similarity in degree 
of welfare experience or in profile of indicator response - we are then able to perform further 
tests and make inferences about variation along the other dimension, using this to make 
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meaningful intersubjective welfare comparisons. But this is only useful insofar as we are 
justified in making such assumptions. Here I will show how reasons of analogy and shared 
evolutionary history work to justify making these assumptions. The justifications provided will 
support either assumption with varying strength, depending on contextual details such as the 
particular indicators used, or the relatedness of the animals. In many cases, animals which are 
similar in the relevant regards (such as members of the same species) are likely to show similar 
response profiles, indicating that both assumptions will hold together. In cases such as our 
otters, where we observe difference in response, we can look either for which assumption holds 
the stronger justification, or use additional methods to decide between the assumptions. These 
will be detailed in the next section (6.4.4). 
Reasoning by analogy holds that where animals are similar in terms of their underlying 
structures and mechanisms, they should also be similar in terms of the experiences and 
responses produced. Many animals have such similarities in their anatomy and physiology; the 
structures and mechanisms that give rise to both subjective experience and indicator responses. 
In terms of welfare intensity, similarities in brain structure and function would give us reason 
to think there is similarity in the subjective experience. The structure of the brain, and the way 
in which it functions, will determine the psychology of the individual, and these will vary 
depending on the inherited ‘instructions’ for development as well as the influence of the 
developmental environment. We then have good reason to think that individuals that are similar 
with regards to the relevant inheritance and developmental environments, will have similar 
types of psychology, with similar scope and boundaries. Insofar as subjective experience is a 
function of brain activity, and where there are neural correlates of experience, similarity in 
brain structure and function should then give us similarity in experience. This is much more 
likely to hold within species than across species. 
Where neural structures directly mediate indicator responses, similarity in neural systems 
will also give us reason to think there will be similarity in these responses. Often, though, 
indicator response will also involve other physiological pathways and in these cases, we would 
also require similarities in the relevant response-producing mechanisms – such as the hormonal 
and neuronal outputs of the brain, and their impacts on bodily systems – to give us reason to 
think there is similarity in the responses produced. 
The level to which we can trust the similarity assumptions on this basis will then depend on 
the level to which there is relevant underlying anatomical and physiological similarity. For 
example, the neural mechanisms for generating affect appear to be similar across most 
mammals (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009). The level of similarity will in turn depend on the 
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degree of variation and plasticity within developmental processes, and further study on the 
precise mechanisms involved will help determine where the assumptions might hold. Effects 
of developmental environment, such as hormonal changes during foetal and infant 
development, and conditioning of particular behavioural responses throughout life, are also 
likely to play a strong role in determining both scope of experience and level of responsiveness, 
and so this type of similarity must also be considered. It may turn out that the assumptions only 
hold among related individuals that also share relevantly similar upbringing. Current and future 
research into the neural correlates of experience, and the development and function of both the 
mechanisms creating subjective experience and those linking experience to behavioural and 
physiological indicators, will shed further light onto which cases this justification will hold. In 
cases where these structures and processes are homologous, arising from the same evolutionary 
events, we would have even greater reason to think our assumptions justified on this basis. 
The next justification is that of evolutionary history. Animals which have shared 
evolutionary history, as well as sharing the structures and function of their brains and bodies, 
also have shared selection pressures. If we take subjective experience, and the behavioural and 
physiological responses it produces, as being the products of selective processes (e.g. Ginsburg 
& Jablonka, 2019; Godfrey-Smith, 2017), then it makes sense that shared selection pressures 
will have led to similar experience and responses. Animals with shared evolutionary history 
(most particularly those of the same species) will have brains adapted to the same biological 
challenges, and it makes sense to infer that they will share similar psychology, with the same 
scope for welfare experience.  The minds and the indicators of different individuals that 
evolved under the same conditions, are likely to be similar in scope and function. Physiological 
and behavioural responses to subjective welfare changes are going to depend in large part on 
evolutionary history. For behavioural responses this will include what was beneficial to 
communicate with others – for example, prey species are notoriously non-vocal when in pain 
as they do not wish to alert predators to their weakened status. For physiological responses this 
is likely to include those responses appropriate to ready the body to meet whatever particular 
challenges it is about to face, such as increased heart rate for fight or flight. These evolutionary 
pressures will be shared among members of the same species, and thus it is likely that the 
degree of response will be similar also. For example, when considering our two otters, we know 
they share a common ancestor and the same historical selection pressures that led to the 
development of their species-specific brain structure and function, as well as those which led 
to their propensity to vocalise under different circumstances. Their shared evolutionary history 
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gives us good reason to think they might be similar in their subjective experience under 
different conditions, and/or their set of indicator responses. 
Finally, we have considerations of parsimony. This is using an inference to the best 
explanation; one that can describe our results within our best frameworks of understanding. 
This would include not positing differences without evidence of their existence – although it 
may be possible that different individuals vary widely in experience and response, if there is 
no positive evidence of this fact, then it does not seem likely that this is the case. As per 
Harsanyi (1955) - “If two objects or human beings show similar behaviour in all their relevant 
aspects open to observation, the assumption of some unobservable hidden difference between 
them must be regarded as a completely gratuitous hypothesis and one contrary to sound 
scientific method” (Harsanyi, 1955, p. 279). Overall, it seems far more likely that individuals 
with these similarities in anatomy, physiology and evolutionary/developmental history will 
have broadly similar minds than vastly different ones. Without evidence to the contrary, it 
seems more parsimonious to assume similarity in these cases. If the minds are sufficiently 
similar, then we are justified in making our assumptions and the comparisons which rely on 
them. As previously mentioned, we do not need to have an identical level of response; a broad 
similarity in the scope of subjective response is sufficient to justify comparison of measures in 
cases where this holds, as it will give us a close enough result for our needs. For most practical 
purposes, certainty is not required; just a reasonable assumption that we are getting close to the 
fact of the matter about comparative welfare experience. 
There are several lines of evidence that can be taken to justify the similarity assumptions 
I’ve outlined. If the animals are sufficiently similar, then we are justified in making our 
assumptions and the comparisons which rely on them. As previously mentioned, we do not 
need to have identical level of response; a broad similarity in the scope of subjective response 
is sufficient to justify comparison of measures in cases where this holds, as it will give us a 
close enough result for our needs. For most practical purposes, certainty is not required; just a 
reasonable assumption that we are getting close to the fact of the matter about comparative 
welfare experience. In the next section, I will address some possible concerns with the 
similarity assumptions, before moving in the final part of the chapter to look back at the type 
of welfare comparisons we are likely to want to make and how the solution - use of similarity 





6.4.4. Potential problems with similarity assumptions 
There are two potential problems with making the similarity assumptions as described. The 
first is that these assumptions might be too fragile, only holding in a small range of cases. The 
second is that we need a method of determining which of the two assumptions we should make 
in any given case, if we know we cannot make them both together. 
In the first instance, the upshot to the justifications provided for the similarity assumptions 
is that they will only hold for animals which share the relevant similarities of physiology or 
evolutionary history – typically those of the same species, or perhaps closely related species. 
This might also require those with similar developmental histories, which may mean for 
example sub-groups within species of age, sex or rearing type (wild vs captive). There are 
known effects of individual personality and temperament - as well as genetics and early 
experiences - on emotional responses to stimuli, and thus welfare (Boissy et al., 2007). This 
may make the assumptions too fragile, as some very small differences in anatomy, physiology 
or development could give rise to some quite large changes at the affective or response level. 
If this is true, then in order for our similarity assumptions to be justified, we would need to 
have quite a fine-grained level of underlying similarity in order to justify using either of our 
assumptions, and this would further narrow the range of cases for which we could use them.  
What is key here, is that we need to understand what the relevant similarities are. We need 
to know how particular anatomical structures and biological processes give rise to both the 
subjective experience of welfare, and the indicators that we use to measure it. This requires 
further research into these structures and mechanisms. Only by understanding these processes, 
and how robust they are across different structures and different environments, will we 
understand which groups of animals possess the relevant similarities to make welfare 
comparisons – whether these are species groups or possibly further divided by classes such as 
sex, age group or type of developmental environment. This of course is quite a demanding 
research requirement, requiring a detailed causal model of the relations between the inputs, 
welfare changes and output indicators for a huge variety of taxa and the subgroups within. 
However, beginning with representatives of different higher-level taxa (e.g. felids, amphibians) 
and looking for the differences and similarities between them may help delineate where 
relevant similarities lie and how much further detailed work is required. Understanding the 
extent of similarity in structure, function and selection pressures across different groups will 
help us see how far we might extend this solution. For example, if we found that the mechanism 
linking welfare experience to changes in heart rate was one which arose fairly early in 
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evolution, shared across all vertebrates, then we could use this indicator to make comparisons 
between animals within this entire group.  
One thing we might think is that the second assumption – that of similar response - is more 
fragile than the first, of similar scope of welfare. That is, we are more likely to find differences 
in response as we move towards less similar animals, than we are to find differences in scope 
of welfare experience. This is likely to be true if the mechanisms which cause response are less 
robust than those which cause experience; if they are affected to a greater extent by contextual 
factors and processes, such as developmental environment. There are many examples of these 
differences – urination and defecation in a new environment is a scent-marking behaviour in 
mice but a sign of fear in rats, and bulls show decreased corticosteroid response after tethering, 
while pigs show increased response (G. Mason & Mendl, 1993). It is plausible that in general, 
indicator mechanisms are more variable than those causing experience, as there is likely to be 
more homology in brain structures and processes than in the diverse range of indicators (see 
e.g. work by Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009 on the deep brain structures responsible for 
generating pleasure). If this is true, then in cases where we are unsure as to which assumption 
we should make, as discussed below, this will give us some reason to favour the first. 
In the cases where the relevant similarities hold, whatever they might end up being, we are 
able to make the required assumptions and so can perform intersubjective comparisons of 
welfare. For now, I’ll take it as safe only in the cases of the same or closely related species. 
This, however, leaves out a large class of comparisons we might like to make – particularly 
those between species. We do not have good reason to think that these similarities hold between 
quite dissimilar species; for example, it is not likely that the scope of welfare intensity for a 
lion is anything like that for a lungfish. Additionally, the types of indicators tend to be quite 
species-specific (especially behavioural indicators), and we should be quite circumspect in 
inferring similarity between species. In the final section, I’ll look at what this might mean for 
the types of welfare comparisons we will want to make, as described in the beginning of the 
chapter. 
The other important question we are left with is which of the two assumptions we should 
make in any given case, given that the same justifications hold for both. To begin with, we can 
test whether we can make both assumptions together, as in many cases this will be possible. 
We test this by mapping the overall response profile for our animals: finding their maximum 
and minimum response levels and the variation across different conditions. A full mapping of 
response profile would not necessarily be required for each individual animal – preliminary 
work mapping out response profiles for a representative group (such as species, age class, sex 
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etc.) could be used and if enough similarity seen, assumed to hold for the whole group. In cases 
where we see animals with a similar profile of indicator responses over different welfare 
conditions, we can make both assumptions together – that the animals have both a similar scope 
of welfare experience and a similar degree of response. This is a much more parsimonious 
explanation than the alternative - that both these factors are varying in opposite directions to 
give rise to the seeming similarity. The second scenario is far less likely, given that it requires 
correlated change in both systems, and there is no reason to think that even if both systems did 
vary to this degree between individuals, they would both do so in tandem. Without a plausible 
explanation as to why there would be such a hidden difference, we should think that the same 
responses under the same conditions reflect similarity in the underlying subjective experience, 
and that our two assumptions hold.  
The best explanation of observed similarities between the behavioural and other responses 
of individuals is similarity in underlying mental states. It is far less likely (though not 
impossible) that these are the result of vastly different mechanisms working on different 
underlying states, so we should accept the more plausible hypothesis that there is a relevant 
similarity in underlying subjective states that can ground use of intersubjective comparisons. 
However, in cases as described above, where the animals were shown to have differing 
response profiles (with the example of Paddy ranging from 15-350 and Sneezy from 2-180), it 
must be the case that they differ along at least one of the given dimensions of welfare 
experience or level of response. And, as we saw, which assumption we make will lead us to a 
different result – making the first assumption tells us that the otters are enjoying their treat 
equally, while the second tells us that Paddy is experiencing almost twice as much pleasure 
from it as Sneezy. It matters a lot in these cases which assumption we choose, so how do we 
decide between them? 
The answer to this is going to depend primarily on context. It will rely on the particular 
indicators we are using, and the proposed mechanism for linking these indicators to welfare. 
For indicators such as behaviour, which have a more flexible developmental pathway, we 
would be more inclined to assume that observed differences are a result of different response 
levels, where scope of welfare experience is held fixed (Assumption 1). For more deeply 
physiologically controlled indicators such as heart rate, we would be more likely to assume 
that different responses reflect different levels of experience, where response profiles are likely 
to be similar (Assumption 2). It will also depend on the mechanisms for creating subjective 
experience and how these operate within an individual, and across different types of 
development. The more robust these mechanisms, the more likely we are to think Assumption 
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1 holds. Once we are able to better identify the cognitive mechanisms responsible for giving 
rise to subjective experience, we can also look for how these are distributed across different 
species. Certain distributions will make it more likely that these were present in the common 
ancestors (as a more parsimonious explanation than multiple independent evolutionary events) 
and therefore we could use these to justify making comparisons between individuals within the 
given clade. There is interesting future work to be done here, linking the conditions for 
evolution of subjective experience and particular indicator responses, to what they can tell us 
about welfare of individuals and comparisons within and between species. The more we know 
about the conditions under which subjective experience arose, the mechanisms which create it, 
and how welfare experience links to changes in the measurable indicators, the better we will 
become at determining when and how the assumptions will hold. 
Another way of deciding between the assumptions is to look for convergence between 
different types of indicators. By testing the response profile for an individual across a range of 
indicators, we can get a better idea as to whether observed variance is likely to be a result of 
variance in underlying welfare state or in indicator response. We would start by measuring 
welfare for an individual across different conditions and across time, using a range of 
indicators, which work through different mechanisms. This would give us a response profile 
for each of the indicator types for that individual. We could then compare these between 
individuals to look for where the inter-individual variation lies. If the different indicators give 
us similar results (e.g. one individual shows higher overall response across a range of indicator 
types), then this gives us reason to think that this is reflective of differences in underlying 
welfare intensity (Assumption 2). The alternative, that the individuals have differing 
responsiveness that operates equally across the range of indicators, despite their independent 
mechanisms, is far less likely. If instead we see different results across indicator types, this 
gives us reason to think that it is the indicator response profiles that are varying, and it is more 
likely that Assumption 1 holds and welfare intensity is similar.  
One potentially promising line of evidence could be that from neuroimaging. If we are able 
to validate particular types of neural activity as representative of different intensities or types 
of subjective experience, then this could be taken as a reliable indicator of welfare state. This 
would require us to validate the images across a range of individuals to determine that there is 
a strong link between observed response and subjective experience, but if this is found then we 
could be confident that this data tells us something about variation in welfare state. We can 
plausibly assume that measurements of brain activity are more direct measures of the processes 
that cause subjective experience (granting that there are still currently assumptions in play in 
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producing and interpreting images), rather than of their downstream effects, so we would not 
expect to see differences in response profile for the same underlying experience. This means 
that unlike other indicators, these measures would not be subject to the same uncertainty 
regarding the source of variation – different measured levels of brain activity would be directly 
indicative of different underlying intensity of experience. There has been some promising work 
on this in humans, where both subjective report of intensity of experience, and behavioural 
responses, correlate with intensity of brain activity (Coghill, McHaffie, & Yen, 2003). Further 
work in this area could validate this link and perhaps give us a reliable direct measure of welfare 
experience that could be used to make comparisons.  
 
6.5. Applying the solution to different comparison types 
As described in Section 6.2, there are three types of comparisons we might want to make – 
individual management decisions, use of experimental animals and resource distribution 
decisions. Here I will examine how the solution applies in these different cases, given the scope 
and limitations of the similarity assumptions, and how we might go about making comparisons 
in cases that aren’t covered by this method. 
Management decisions for individuals require consideration of trade-offs between harms 
and pleasures – we might inflict current harms or prevent particular pleasures in order to 
decrease future harms or increase future pleasures; or we might just need to decide between 
sets of current conditions with different potential positives and negatives. This requires the use 
of intrasubjective welfare comparisons. These do not seem to be a different type of comparison 
in their own right, but rather a special case of intersubjective comparison, in which we consider 
the two ‘subjects’ to be two possible outcomes for the one individual, or different time-slices 
of the same individual. These seem like the least problematic type of comparison to make, as 
the similarity assumptions are most likely to hold in cases where we are talking about the same 
individual. Even if we think that individuals may change dramatically over time, we can use 
the inter-individual comparisons described in the next paragraph to make the necessary 
inferences about particular age groups, treating them as we would separate individuals. 
In animal welfare science, measurements made on one group of animals will need to be 
compared to those made on different groups of experimental animals, as well as extrapolated 
to other members of the species. Both of these require that the similarity assumptions discussed 
in the previous section hold. In these cases, it seems highly likely that they do. Experiments of 
this type are almost always performed within a species, which gives us the justifications from 
analogy and shared evolutionary history. Further, they are often segregated for subgroups such 
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as age/sex classes to see if there are differences, which adds further strength to the similarity 
assumptions within these classes. Given our justifications for applying the similarity 
assumptions in these cases, we have good reason to be confident in the comparison of 
experimental groups in welfare studies, and the extrapolation of these results to other members 
of the species. 
The final application of intersubjective welfare comparisons is not so simple. This is 
institutional (or individual) decision-making about the distribution of resources between 
animals in order to achieve the best outcome. In cases where a single type of animal is held, 
this shouldn’t be an issue, as we can use the similarity assumptions to make comparisons and 
apply a basic utilitarian calculus. For example, on a dairy farm, we can use the similarity 
assumptions to make relevant comparisons to assess whether we would have greater overall 
welfare benefit through the provision of soft bedding for calving or higher quality food to 
pregnant cows, based on comparisons of the welfare increase under each condition and the 
number of animals likely to be affected. But many such decisions will involve multiple species, 
such as governmental investment in agriculture, interventions on wildlife, and in zoo 
management and husbandry. Think again of our zoo manager trying to decide between 
underfloor heating for a lion or aquarium furniture for a group of lungfish. Here we have two 
such disparate species that it is unlikely that the similarity assumptions will apply. It is perfectly 
plausible that lungfish and lions have completely different scopes for intensity of welfare; so 
that the heights and depths of lion experience may just be of a different scale to that of lungfish. 
It is also extremely improbable that there will be overlap in the types of indicators used to 
measure welfare in each species, let alone that they will be subject to the same processes linking 
subjective welfare to indicator outcomes. All we have is information about the benefit to the 
individuals – we know the lion will benefit from its heating and the lungfish from their 
furniture, but we cannot compare either their levels of welfare, or the degree of benefit each 
might receive.  
There does not seem to be any objective standard to which we can appeal in order to convert 
units of lion welfare into units of lungfish welfare, and so we cannot make meaningful 
comparisons. But we still want to have some means of comparing the welfare gain to the lion 
from its underfloor heating to the gain of the lungfish of having new logs to explore and shelter 
in. As it stands, the only comparison we can make will be that of valence. As the zero-line of 
neutral welfare experience is the same for all individuals, we can at least rank lion and lungfish 
welfare according to whether it occurs above or below this zero line. For example, it could be 
that that the lungfish are currently experiencing negative welfare through the stress of being 
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exposed without exhibit furniture, and the lion positive welfare, being happy enough already 
but simply made happier with extra heating.  Here we could make a simple valence comparison 
and say that the lion has better welfare, without needing to know anything about magnitude. 
However, this will not work in cases where both are above or below the zero line as we then 
cannot compare how far above or below they sit and so the solution is only of limited use. 
One possible solution is to use some other capability as a proxy for welfare capacity – 
something like cognitive complexity. The idea here being that cognitive complexity might 
underlie the capacity to experience certain ranges of subjective welfare, so we could take a 
proportional increase in welfare for a more cognitively complex species to be greater than that 
for a less complex species. This sort of option would be particularly appealing to those who 
might think that cognitive complexity is a strong influence on the type and intensity of 
experiential states; in this chapter – indeed most of the thesis – I have been working with the 
assumption that (at least in the animal case) experiential states are somewhat simple and 
separate from cognition except insofar as it concerns which stimuli are likely to produce which 
experiences. This is not an issue there is space to explore here. Evidence to the contrary would 
not change much of what I have had to say throughout, except in making the case more 
complicated. In this instance, a strong link between cognition and affect would give us more 
reason to try and pursue this line of capacity-based proxies.  
Cognitive complexity as a proxy is a commonly used division to separate out human welfare 
from that of other animals (McMahan, 2002). It is also becoming increasingly common in 
calculations of animal suffering under different production regimes, e.g. for use in Effective 
Altruism initiatives29. Different proxies have been considered here, including brain size, 
number of neurons, and connective complexity. There is perhaps some intuitive pull to the idea 
that size or complexity of the brain may relate to the potential breadth and depth of subjective 
experience. We might want to think that perhaps the pain of a cat just cannot reach the same 
intensity as that of a human. 
The problem with this solution is that it relies on an assumption about the relationship 
between cognitive complexity and welfare, for which there does not seem to be a method of 
validation without running into the problems already described in this chapter. We do not have 
direct access to information about the welfare capacity of different organisms, thus we cannot 
simply check whether cognitive complexity correlates with welfare potential. We would 
instead need to make assumptions about these links, and these assumptions would then need to 
 
29 e.g. http://sandhoefner.github.io/animal_suffering_calculator 
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be made explicit, and justification provided for them. As it stands, we don’t currently have 
strong reason to think that cognitive complexity correlates with welfare capacity (Browning, 
2019b). Future work in understanding the mechanisms for production of sentient experience 
may provide answers leading to valid proxies, but this is not yet the case. What would be 
required would be an overall theory of cognitive function and affect, that could be tested 
independently of these problems. 
Instead, in these situations in which we do not think the similarity assumptions hold, we 
may take the third solution described earlier for the human case and look at alternative methods 
of decision-making that do not involve direct comparisons between welfare. As described in 
Section 6.4.1, use of an alternative proxy is unlikely to help in the animal case. Neither are the 
alternative ethical frameworks of maximin, Pareto, or sufficient threshold. The most promising 
alternative is probably an equal consideration of interests view, where the interests of each 
individual are given the same weighting, regardless of absolute strength (Fleurbaey, 2016). 
This would fit in with a Kantian-style ethics in which each individual holds the same moral 
status (Sebo, 2018)30. This would ensure that a lungfish gets its best possible welfare and a lion 
gets its, despite potential differences in intensity between them. This is not because we have 
strong reason to think that the maximum welfare of a lungfish and that of a lion are of a similar 
level, but because we assign the same value (a moral value, rather than a measurable empirical 
welfare value) to the welfare of each. That is, we could say that allowing a lungfish to achieve 
its maximum welfare level is of equal moral importance as allowing a lion to achieve its, even 
if it turns out that the lion actually experiences three times the welfare intensity at its maximum 
than the lungfish do. In the absence of any decisive information about the relative welfare of 
the different species, this seems like perhaps the most sensible principle to apply.  
Once we apply such a principle, we can then use something like the zero-one rule and assign 
the 0-1 scores to the maximum and minimum welfare levels of each animal, based on the 
relative importance of these states rather than their comparative value. Using these, we can 
then make our decisions through assessing different actions based on how far up their own 
scale each species might move – for instance, we might prefer the lungfish furniture if we have 
a 20% increase for each of the 10 animals, where the lion only has a 30% increase for the single 
individual. Instead of comparing improvements on a single objective scale of absolute ‘welfare 
units’, we would instead compare how much difference they make relative to the individuals 
 
30 There is also the possibility of exploring different degrees of moral status, though this is likely to rely on the 
types of considerations discussed throughout the chapter – if a lungfish and a lion have a different moral status, it 
is most likely to be a result of their different welfare capacity (which we’ve established we can’t determine). 
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under consideration and rate them this way. This situation, while not empirically ideal, seems 
to capture much of what is important when making such decisions, such as giving equal weight 
to the interests of different individuals. 
In the absence of the possibility of making determinate comparisons, an equal consideration 
view is perhaps the best we can do. Whatever principles we use for ethical decision-making in 
these cases of uncertainty about comparative welfare, they are likely to be specific to context 
and background values. Despite how one decides to make decisions in these cases, what is 
most important to highlight is that we shouldn’t attempt to make direct comparisons of welfare, 
as this is highly unlikely to lead to reliable results of the type we want. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
When measuring animal welfare, there is a problem in making comparisons between 
individuals, as doing so relies on background assumptions about similarity that require 
justification. In the case of animals of the same species, we have reasons of parsimony arising 
from analogy and shared evolutionary history that can justify the use of these assumptions. In 
the case of comparisons across species, we cannot justify such assumptions and instead need 
to use different ethical or distributive principles to make the decisions in which we may 
otherwise have wanted to use comparisons. 
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN – INTEGRATING 
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE INTO WELFARE 
 
7.1. Introduction – the problem 
Animal welfare is often described as a single state, ranging on a continuum from good to 
poor. As I argued in Chapter Two, welfare should be understood as consisting in the subjective 
experience of animals - the way that they experience their own lives as going well or badly. 
Within the rest of the thesis, as I’ve discussed the measurement of subjective welfare, I have 
taken it as a single integrated entity that can be measured and compared. However, this is not 
obviously the case. The subjective mental states, or affects, that an animal can experience, both 
positive and negative, are hugely varied. Negative experiences include pain, fear, hunger, 
boredom, breathlessness, thirst, discomfort and nausea. Positive experiences include satiety, 
comfort, curiosity and companionship. These are sets of extremely heterogeneous states. From 
our own experience, we know that they are subjectively different, creating sensations of 
different types and with differing levels of impact. They are brought on by different internal 
and environmental causes, lead to different physiological and behavioural outputs, and are the 
results of differing brain pathways. This creates issues for how we understand the 
commensurability of these different affects, as discussed in Section 4.3 – how we can compare 
them, or integrate them into a single measure.  
This problem has been noted in the literature on animal welfare science, particularly in 
attempts to create frameworks for measuring welfare that rely on sets of different conditions: 
“there is also a problem of comparing qualitatively different experiences associated with 
different treatments … until we have a common metric for unpleasantness, such comparisons 
are speculative at best” (Beausoleil & Mellor, 2015, p. 42). If we want to solve this problem, 
we must find some sort of underlying ‘common currency’ onto which we can convert different 
affects and with which we can determine the relative weightings in their contribution to overall 
welfare. The alternative is to consider welfare not as a real integrated state, but instead as 
construct: something like health, made up of multiple different components that, though 
individually real, do not together form any naturally existing state. In this case there would be 
no empirical facts to which we could appeal in making overall welfare assessments or 
calculations of trade-offs between affects and we would instead have to rely on pragmatic or 
other considerations in constructing weightings. Though these will still enable us to perform 
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many of the tasks we wish to in welfare measurement, this could weaken our confidence in the 
applicability of the resultant scores (see Section 7.4).  
There is no doubt, of course, that we can individually measure different affects. We are able 
to measure both the causal and effect indicators (as described in Chapter Five) for a number of 
different affects. These can then be quantified either in terms of the absolute value of the 
particular indicators measured, or in terms of relative response on a scale of minimum to 
maximum. For example, if we are measuring hunger, we might do so by looking at how hard 
an animal would work for access to food. Comparing the measure at any one time to the 
possible minimum and maximum scores (representing complete satiety and extreme starvation 
respectively), we could then come up with a score representing the current state of hunger along 
that scale. This can be done using various indicators for a variety of affects such as pain, fear, 
curiosity etc. At the moment, there are many more well-validated indicators for negative states 
than positive ones, but current work is changing this and the range of measurable states is 
increasing. 
However, having these simple measurements for each different affect is not useful in this 
context if there is no way of ‘converting’ the units between the different states to make 
comparisons or to combine them into a single measure. What we need is some way of 
quantifying the affects onto the conversion scale, and it is here the difficulty lies. This requires 
a common currency with which we can make comparisons. In this chapter, I will start by 
describing the problem in more detail, before moving on to provide reasons why we should be 
confident that there is such a common currency, and outlining how in practice we might go 
about assigning the relevant weightings to different affects through using different types of 
welfare assessments or through construction based on pragmatic concerns. 
There are two primary reasons it is important that we have a common currency for 
comparing and combining the different affects that make up welfare. These are: to make overall 
welfare assessments of animals, and in making decisions regarding trade-offs in animal 
management. Assessing the overall welfare of animals is the target of many animal welfare 
measures and assessment frameworks. We want to know whether an animal is faring well or 
badly, not just with regards to some specific affect or another, but in a more general sense. We 
want our animals to be experiencing total positive, rather than negative, welfare. Making 
overall quality of life assessments allows us to make comparisons between how well animals 
are doing under different types of management (e.g. Littin, Fisher, Beausoleil, & Sharp, 2014 
on comparing the humaneness of different pest-control techniques). It also allows us to make 
end-of-life decisions, based on the current and expected future welfare status of an animal. To 
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make these overall assessments we need some way of taking measures of the separate affects 
an animal is experiencing and combining them into a single total measure. In the best-case 
scenario, we want to do so by converting each experience into some sort of common currency, 
and weight each accordingly in combination; the alternative is the use of constructed 
weightings as will be discussed in Section 7.4. 
In addition, when managing animals, we frequently need to make trade-offs. We might need 
to inflict some sort of pain or discomfort now, in the form of a medical procedure, to prevent 
some future suffering, or to allow for future positive experiences and wonder whether the 
positives can compensate the negatives. For example, we might want to decide whether it is 
worthwhile to catch up a male animal (causing stress) and castrate it (causing pain) in order to 
allow it to live in the future with a group of females (providing positive social interactions). Or 
we might need to decide on the best use of resources in order to maximise welfare. This may 
take the form of comparing different interventions to increase positive states: e.g. whether it is 
better for us to use resources to provide heating for an animal (increasing thermal comfort) or 
to provide a more varied diet (increasing consumption pleasure). It may also take the form of 
comparing interventions aimed at decreasing negative states (e.g. frustration) to those aimed at 
increasing positive states (e.g. providing favoured foods). To make these decisions, we require 
information about the relative strengths of different experiences, and how strongly they affect 
overall welfare. 
Although there are two different applications described here, they reduce to the same 
problem. The first requires us to take a number of different affects and integrate them, somehow 
summing their differing contributions into a single measure representing overall welfare. The 
second requires us to take two or more different experiences and compare them to determine 
which may have the greater impact on welfare. But although the questions may arise in 
different contexts - as discussed above - the solution will be the same. That is, both will require 
us to find a common currency for welfare, and determine the relative weightings of different 
experiences, in order to either compare or combine them.  
Where there could be a distinct problem is in making comparisons within and between 
valences (that is, positive and negative states). The first is that of combining the different 
experiences within a single valence (either positive or negative) into a total unidirectional 
score. For instance, can I bring together my experiences of comfort, pleasure and satiety into a 
single measure of positive experience, such as happiness? This would require both the ability 
to quantify each of these different affects, and to weight them relative to one another in total 
calculation. The second issue is that of comparing the different valences – the sum total of 
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positive experiences to that of negative experiences. That is, is there a particular amount of 
positive experience which could be considered to be equivalent to or compensatory for an 
amount of negative experience? It seems plausible to think that I would not like to experience, 
say, 10 units of suffering, even if it were to gain me 10 units of pleasure. One potential response 
to this is to just argue that one unit in either direction is the same, but that it is a lot easier to 
get a negative unit than a positive one – that negative experiences affect our welfare to a greater 
degree than positive ones do. Another potential answer is to say that negative experiences 
should have a greater weighting – that it would take, say, two units of positive to outweigh one 
unit of negative: “it takes a lot of pleasure or happiness to outrank a fairly small amount of pain 
or misery” (Griffin, 1986, p. 84). When we are trying to compare negative and positive welfare, 
we might just need to give a greater weighting to negative welfare as “a fairly small amount of 
misery will turn out to make life worse to a greater degree than a fairly large amount of 
happiness makes it better” (Griffin, 1986, p. 84). 
In some sense, this is the same problem, in that it requires quantification of and weighting 
of different types of experience onto a single metric. However, in another sense it is a much 
deeper problem, as the positive and negative states are far more heterogeneous, and whatever 
underlying state they may combine to form, may not be of the same kind. We could in fact 
have two different common currencies in play here, and it may be much more difficult to find 
a way to weight them against one another. Indeed, Mellor’s work on measuring animal welfare 
(e.g. Mellor, 2016) separates the two issues of comparing within and between valence, 
attempting the first through creating single measures for overall negative and positive welfare, 
but leaving the second by refusing to attempt to combine the two into a single unified score. 
However, he also discusses the concept of overall ‘quality of life’, which relies on the relative 
balance of positive and negative experiences, implying there is some meaningful way of 
comparing these, even referring to the “integrated subjective outcome” (2016, p. 15) of 
experiences, that represents the total welfare status. This suggests he is more concerned with 
the epistemic than the metaphysical problem I will describe below. Again, I will argue in 
Section 7.3 that these questions (comparisons with and between valence) are also reducible to 
the same issue – finding the common currency with which to weight the different experiences, 
and that this will hold both for with-valence and across-valence comparisons. 
Solving the problem of comparing or combining welfare measures involves answering two 
different questions. The first is a metaphysical question about the existence of some underlying 
welfare state that allows us to create a common currency for measurement and comparison. 
The second is an epistemic question about if and how we could in practice convert our 
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measurements of different affects into this common currency to make comparisons or 
determine overall welfare state. These questions are separable, and the answer to one does not 
rely on the answer to the other. We may establish the existence of a common currency but be 
unable to gather the information required to convert and compare different affects using it. Or 
we may not find reason to think there is a common currency, but still feel that nonetheless we 
can have reliable and useful methods for comparing and combining different affects that are 
sufficient for our purposes (see Section 7.4). In the following sections I will describe each of 
these questions in more detail, arguing that we have good reasons to think there is such a 
common currency, and going on to describe some possible ways we might approach the 
question of measurement through combined use of two different types of welfare assessment, 
finishing with a brief outline of how we might proceed if we do not accept the presence of a 
common currency. 
 
7.2. The metaphysical question – existence of a common currency 
The first question is the metaphysical question relating to the existence of the common 
currency. That is, whether or not there is actually some single underlying state onto which we 
can map all the different affects, that would provide a basis for believing we can compare or 
combine them. If there is no such state, then they are incommensurable, and we would not be 
able to compare them (see discussion in Chapter Four). If we want to talk about welfare as a 
single entity as opposed to a heterogeneous collection of affects, there needs to be some 
underlying state that composes welfare and onto which we can map these various affects. This 
will form the common currency we would then use for measurement and comparison. This 
does not necessarily require a deep metaphysical commitment to a particular type of entity, as 
we can still do a lot by instead taking this underlying state of welfare as a construct and therein 
using constructed weightings for comparison (see Section 7.4). However, if we do have a 
meaningful underlying state that can form our common currency, this adds substantial strength 
to the work we do in measurement of welfare.  
There are several reasons to think that such a common currency might exist – common 
usage/intuition, introspection, trade-offs and decision-making, and functional and structural 
similarities between affects. Note here that these reasons for thinking that there is an underlying 
state by which we can measure and compare different affects, work equally both within and 
between valences. Our common usage and intuition seem to allow us to make assessments 
combining positive and negative experiences, and trade-offs occur frequently between positive 
 169 
and negative experiences. This means that, if there is a common currency, it is likely to be one 
that allows us to make both types of comparisons. 
 
7.2.1. Common usage, intuition and introspection 
The first line of evidence comes from common usage. The concept of welfare, as an overall 
integrated experience, is commonly used by both animal welfare experts and within the general 
population. We frequently refer to concepts like ‘welfare status’ or ‘quality of life’ when 
talking about ourselves or other animals. We can easily make sense of the idea of an individual 
having a state of welfare that is an integrated experience of a variety of affects; and often 
welfare is taken to mean something like the overall happiness of an animal. This concept is 
also used regularly within the animal welfare literature, for example: “animals’ negative and 
positive mental experience, the overall balance of which underlies their welfare status or 
quality of life” (Littlewood & Mellor, 2016, p. 2) and the description of welfare as “the 
integrated balance of all sensory inputs to the animal’s brain that are cognitively processed and 
experienced as emotions or feelings” (Beausoleil & Mellor, 2011, p. 456). This is the most 
common understanding of welfare found within this literature, with quotes such as these 
demonstrating the easy acceptance of this concept. This is of course no strong argument, but 
the fact that we can and do comfortably use the concept of welfare in this sense of integrated 
experience, should give us some increased confidence that there is such a state. 
Indeed, intuitively it seems that there is some such overall welfare state, made up of different 
experiences, that we can and do understand and discuss. We can look at an animal and its 
condition and talk about whether it has overall positive or negative welfare, and where it might 
roughly sit on that continuum. For example, we might see a sheep standing in a field and 
observe its nearby social companions, lack of access to shade in the hot sun, plenty of grazing 
grass, and conclude it probably has acceptable, but not great, welfare. 
Common usage and intuition may not be a great guide to the way the world actually is, as 
folk concepts do not always map onto real entities in the world. In particular, the above 
considerations would not rule out the possibility of welfare as a composite or construct, as 
opposed to a real integrated state. However, this intuition is reinforced through our experience 
of introspecting on our own state. I consider myself right now and the combination of states I 
am experiencing – mild hunger, physical comfort in my office chair, slight head pain from a 
lingering cold, anticipation of my upcoming lunch, some intellectual discomfort from trying to 
write this chapter, among other states. These are all different experiences - causing distinct 
sensations, and with differing impact on my overall wellbeing - not just additions on some 
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single continuum. But still there does seem to be some sense in which I am incorporating all 
these affects into some greater overall experience I could call my welfare, at least at a given 
moment in time. On reflection I judge my overall state as positive – I have several positive 
affects, only a few (mild) negative ones, and I feel like on balance, the positive are outweighing 
the negative. In an extremely informal way, I have combined the various types and degrees of 
the different affects into a single judgement on my welfare. However, it is more than just a 
judgement, it is an experience – overall, I feel good. There is some experience I am having that 
is more than the individual affects themselves, but instead is some sort of total state they are 
contributing to – what I might want to call my welfare. My subjective experience is one of 
integration of these varied affects. The same could be said for my diachronic assessment of my 
lifetime wellbeing so far – I can assess and integrate the different experiences I have had, both 
positive and negative, to estimate what I think my current welfare is in this regard. 
This is, of course, also no proof of anything. My own introspective intuition that I have 
some sort of total welfare experience doesn’t say much about how the world actually is. 
Introspection is often not the most reliable guide to the contents of our own minds, and so 
introspection cannot determine whether it is really the case that my experience is integrated in 
the way I feel it to be. It tells me even less about whether this may be the case for others when 
I can’t access the contents of their minds, particularly nonhuman animals, whose minds are 
likely to be quite different from my own. We may be additionally concerned that similar 
considerations to those described above could also be applied to our usage of the term ‘health’, 
even while accepting that this is a construct. However, this provides at least some limited 
evidence that such an integrated state of welfare is possible and that there is some common 
currency mediating the different affective experiences. Along with the other considerations 
outlined below, it gives us initial reason to think that it might exist and that we might therefore 
be able to measure it, reason that is strengthened by these further lines of evidence.  
 
7.2.2. Trade-offs and decision-making 
We also think we can make trade-offs between different experiences, and do so frequently. 
For instance, we don’t feed a lot of high-calorie food to captive animals, because we judge that 
their current sensory pleasure in receiving a preferred food is outweighed by the future negative 
experiences caused by ill health, such as nausea, discomfort and limited mobility. We will 
perform stressful catch-ups and painful veterinary procedures in order to decrease some sorts 
of future ill-effects on health or behaviour. In making these decisions, we are doing some sort 
of rough comparative calculation as to the relative strengths of these experiences and their 
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impact on overall welfare. Although these trade-offs are often very imprecise and context-
specific, the fact that we are able to make them at all gives us reason to think there must be 
some sort of common currency we are comparing.  
Animals will also make trade-offs like this for themselves, such as whether it is worth facing 
a fear of a novel object to obtain food or experience some amount of pain or discomfort to gain 
access to and explore a new area. They must constantly make decisions for action between 
competing motivations – for instance, a lizard which is currently hungry, thirsty and cold must 
decide whether to first eat, drink or find shelter. These are usually not conscious, rational 
deliberations in the same sense that we ourselves may make such decisions, but neither are they 
strictly instinctive behavioural patterns; they are flexible and responsive to different inputs and 
animal personalities. This sort of decision-making requires a common currency on which to 
weigh the differing motivations. Without it, an animal could not function in an environment of 
constant competing motivations. “The animal must therefore have a ‘common (value) 
currency’ for consistently evaluating types of world and body states in spite of their inevitable 
variations and for preferring one type of state over another type according to its value, which 
is context dependent” (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019, p. 374). The ability of animals to make 
decisions and trade-offs like these is strong reason to think there is some central metric they 
are using and by which we can compare different affects (as will be discussed in Section 7.2.3, 
probably something like ‘pleasure’).  
In the next section, I will discuss the common evolutionary role for positive and negative 
affect. Importantly, it is likely that the integration of positive and negative affective states 
allows for animals to choose actions when faced with competing motivations, by assessing 
perceptual information and assigning hedonic value to different options (Gygax, 2017). This 
cannot be done directly through comparisons of different motivations (e.g. eating and drinking) 
without some further common currency, which is evaluated by some “structure, which is 
connected to both motivational systems” (Spruijt et al., 2001, p. 150). This additional structure 
compares the potential reward of different actions and will motivate the behaviour with the 
highest reward. This process is, of course, imperfect. There will not always be a single best 
action which obviously produces the highest reward, and at times this will create confusion or 
internal conflict. However, for the most part, animals are able to navigate complex situations 
and make appropriate choices. The ability of animals to make sophisticated decisions for action 
under the influence of various competing affective states, and decide on acceptable trade-offs, 
is strong reason to think there is a common currency by which they are assessing the strength 
of competing motivations. 
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7.2.3. Similarities between affects and the nature of the common currency 
Even if we have good reason to think there is some common currency that makes the 
different affects commensurable, we might not think that we will be able to determine what 
exactly this is. In Section 7.3, I will argue that we don’t always need to know the nature of the 
currency to allow us to perform the calculations we need. However, if we were able to 
determine the currency, this would give us a definitive positive answer to our metaphysical 
question, as well as provide guidance for the epistemic question, to give us methods for 
measurement; a much stronger position than the constructed weightings I will discuss in 
Section 7.4. Looking for this currency, we should look at what the different affects possibly 
have in common. If there is some way to measure all positive affects on a single scale, this 
must be because they have some common feature, either in terms of their intrinsic features, or 
a relational property such as a cause or effect onto some other state. The very fact that we are 
able to group ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ experiences together means they must have at least some 
common property that allows us to do so. 
This line of support is strengthened through thinking about the evolutionary role for positive 
and negative affect. It is a common view that subjective experience evolved to enhance survival 
and reproduction action in animals (e.g. Cabanac, 1992; Dawkins, 1998; Fraser & Duncan, 
1998; Mellor, 2012; Ng, 1995; Panksepp, 2005; Spruijt et al., 2001). Examples of this thinking 
are common in the animal welfare literature – for example: “pain and other negative affects 
evolved to guard us from danger, and equally important are the positive affects that evolved to 
attract us to things that will probably improve our lives” (Phillips, 2008, p. 291); “emotions 
refer to processes, which are likely to have evolved from basic mechanisms that gave the 
animals the ability to avoid harm/punishment or to seek valuable resources/reward” (Boissy et 
al., 2007, p. 377). As I will describe, under this view negative and positive affects serve to 
enhance learning and motivate behaviour; and as discussed in the previous section, their 
integration can then help decide between competing actions.   
In this model of the evolution of affect, negative experiences arise from those conditions 
which adversely affect survival and reproduction (such as injury, thirst and disease) – so-called 
‘needs’ situations (Fraser & Duncan, 1998) - and provide motivation to take appropriate action 
to reduce or remove these stimuli. These affects stimulate actions to correct whatever 
homeostatic imbalance they represent – breathlessness increases respiratory effort to increase 
oxygen supply, hunger stimulates eating to maintain nutrient balance, and pain stimulates 
withdrawal to minimise injury. These feelings increase in intensity - and motivation increases 
in urgency - as the situation becomes more critical to survival, and subside when the needs are 
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met. Higher intensity negative affects create a greater urgency to engage in the required 
behaviour. Positive experiences occur in those conditions that enhance survival and 
reproduction (such as mating or exploration) – ‘opportunity situations’ (Fraser & Duncan, 
1998) - and encourage seeking out and participating in them. These experiences serve as 
proximate motivational mechanisms to promote behaviours serving more ultimate evolutionary 
ends. Positive and negative affects thus share a common motivational role, in that they all serve 
as motivators for action. 
Recent work by Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019) argues for a similar model of the role of 
affect in motivation and goal-directed behaviour: “Felt values (pleasure and displeasure, 
although not all values need to be felt) guide the organism’s behaviour and its ever-changing 
internal states and actions so that a homeostatic, fitness-promoting state is achieved” (Ginsburg 
& Jablonka, 2019, p. 101). Here, affect serves the evolutionary role of allowing organisms to 
ascribe value to various stimuli and actions, which influences learning and motivation through 
the process of reinforcement learning. Positive and negative experiences act as ‘attractor’ and 
‘repulsor’ states which reward homeostasis promotion and punish its reduction (Ginsburg & 
Jablonka, 2019, p. 280). They describe a learning system containing a common ‘reinforcement’ 
unit that “assigns values to percepts and actions according to the deviation of the system from 
a state of homeostasis” (2019, p. 364). This reinforcement unit functions to categorise and 
integrate a variety of different stimuli in order to promote motivation and goal-directed 
behaviour. The presence of a central reinforcement unit such as this would provide a common 
role for different positive and negative affects in learning and motivation. 
Similarities between the function and structure of different affects also gives us reason to 
think that they may not be as different as they appear and may indeed be reducible to a common 
currency. As described above, there seems to be a common evolutionary origin of positive and 
negative affect, and a common role in learning and motivation. Several authors have produced 
models in which different affects can be represented on a common schema. Both Burgdorf & 
Panksepp (2006) and Mendl et al. (2010) model emotional states in a two-dimensional space 
of arousal and valence (Figure 7.1). In these models, the four quadrants represent different 
effects on fitness (1a) and the types of emotional states that accompany these 
reward/punishment systems (1b). For example, a high-arousal, high-valence state would be 
related to reward-seeking and pleasure systems such as happiness and excitement, resulting 
from fitness rewards such as mating, or feeding. Low-arousal, low-valence states would relate 
to the absence of positive opportunities and be expressed as depression, or boredom. These 
models give us a way of understanding and comparing all emotional experiences along these 
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dimensions. This unified representational framework could underlie the common currency for 
measurement. 
            
a.                                                               b. 
Figure 7.1: Modelling positive and negative affect. a. Relation of fitness to affective states (from 
Burgdorf & Panksepp, 2006, p. 175). b. Mapping core affect space (from Mendl et al., 2010, p. 2896) 
 
Different affects may thus share the same roles, and also underlying neurophysiology. 
Cabanac (1971, 1979, 1992) argues for pleasure as the ‘common currency’, with the maxim 
pleasant = useful (i.e. the perceived stimulus is useful to the organism), with displeasure 
relating to danger. He describes this as “internal signals modifying the conscious sensations 
aroused from peripheral receptors” (1971, p. 1107), such that the perceptual input is given a 
positive or negative ‘gloss’ by other processes, contingent on the current and past state of the 
animal. It is this ‘gloss’ that serves as the commonality between valenced experiences and 
provides motivation to action. “The tradeoffs between various motivations would thus be 
accomplished by simple maximization of pleasure . . . the displeasure of frustrating one 
motivation being accepted for the sake of a larger pleasure obtained in satisfying another one” 
(Cabanac, 1992, pp. 173–174). Spruijt et al. (2001) similarly argue that the common currency 
is pleasure, or satisfaction: “pleasure represented by, e.g. opioids and dopamine — or related 
receptor activated signals — is the currency of the brain” (Spruijt et al., 2001, p. 154). They 
also bring together the concepts of reward and aversion in terms of calculation between actual 
and expected state after an action – these are then just relative concepts acting through the same 
mechanism. More recently, the same line has been taken up by Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019): 
“pleasures and displeasures can be seen as such overall and general currencies of value, which 
can evaluate any percept or action” (2019, p. 374). A common currency like pleasure is flexible 
and allows complex evaluation and integration of different affects. With further evidence that 
 175 
pleasure, or something similar, was in fact the common currency combining different affects 
into a single welfare state, we would have an answer to our metaphysical question.  
More recent work provides the mechanisms by which this may occur, through similarities 
in underlying neurophysiology. Spruijt et al. (2001) claim that the ‘central bank’ that converts 
this currency of pleasure are the brain structures (such as the mesolimbic systems) which 
represent all these inputs. Berridge & Kringelbach (2013) claim that though different pleasures 
(such as food, or sex), feel subjectively quite different, they actually rely on similar underlying 
neural systems. They argue that “this overlapping pattern opens the possibility that the same 
hedonic generating circuit, embedded in larger mesocorticolimbic systems, could give a 
pleasurable gloss to all such rewards even when the final experience of each seems otherwise 
unique.” (2013, p. 296) – the ‘pleasurable gloss’ being the commonality allowing 
commensurability. This is the same function described by Cabanac, with the addition of a 
potential mechanism. Although the perceptual pathways for each stimulus will be different, 
there appears to potentially be a single ‘liking’ system in the brain, mediated by opioid activity, 
that operates over a range of stimuli to create the sense of pleasure that accompanies them. 
These physiological similarities provide strong evidence for the existence of a common 
currency – most likely pleasure, or something similar - underlying all affective states. Further 
research into subjective experience, and its role and mechanisms, could help strengthen this 
case further. This still leaves open the possibility it would not do so – if it were instead to give 
us reason to doubt the underlying commonalities between affects, we would need to fall back 
on the constructed weightings I will discuss in Section 7.4. 
 
7.3. The epistemic question – determining weightings 
There are thus good reasons, even if not definitive, to think that there is some common 
currency, such as pleasure, onto which we are able to map different affects and through which 
they combine to create an overall experience of welfare. The second question to address is an 
epistemic question – whether or not, even if we accept the presence of a common currency, in 
practice it will be possible for us to know the weightings for the different components of 
welfare. It might turn out to be true that there is some meaningful single welfare scale, but that 
we are not actually able to measure the different components with enough precision to compare 
or combine them as we need to; and, perhaps even more likely, that we will not be able to 
determine the different weights we should allocate to the components to score their impact on 
overall welfare status. This is the position taken, for example, by David Mellor and colleagues 
(Mellor, pers. comm., Mellor & Beausoleil, 2015), who argue that we do not have the capacity 
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to know the relativities of these different affects either within or across valences, but that we 
can nonetheless do useful work in animal welfare and management. Here I will take a more 
optimistic approach and outline some methods by which we may be able to get some way 
towards determining what we want to know; in particular, through using a combination of 
different types of welfare assessment. In Section 7.4 I will also look at what we might be able 
to do in practice, even if we rejected the metaphysical claim about the existence of a common 
currency. 
As I will describe in more detail in the following sections, there are two primary methods 
of assessing animal welfare – through whole-animal measures (or ‘whole animal profiling’ 
(Beausoleil & Mellor, 2011)) and through multi-criteria assessments (or ‘systematic analytical 
evaluation’ (Beausoleil & Mellor, 2011)). The former takes single measures to give an overall 
assessment of the welfare state of an animal, integrating multiple lines of information about an 
animal’s behaviour and demeanour to give an overall rating for that animal’s welfare status. 
The presence of such measures of overall welfare add further strength to the case for 
considering welfare to be an integrated state. However, it is limited in that it is unable to 
identify the specific conditions that are impacting welfare. By contrast, the latter uses measures 
of a number of indicators – usually causal indicators of the conditions an animal lives in – to 
bring together a complete picture of the potential welfare impacts of different situations. This 
can then be used to identify where welfare compromise may occur, to provide specific 
recommendations on which areas should be changed to improve welfare. The method is limited 
in that we need to know the weightings of the various welfare components in order to arrive at 
an accurate assessment. As I will discuss in Section 7.3.3, use of both of these assessments 
types together gives us the most useful way to find how to compare and combine different 
affects. Specific welfare impacts and their indicators can be measured through multi-criteria 
assessments, while their impact on overall welfare can be deduced using whole-animal 
measures. 
 
7.3.1. Whole-animal measures 
In many cases, we may not need to know the weightings of different welfare components at 
all. Whole-animal measures consist of a single indicator, used to represent the total quality of 
life for the animal. These include Qualitative Behavioural Assessment, cognitive bias tests and 
neuroimaging. These measures do not require us to know the relative weightings of the 
different affects, as we are taking a ‘downstream’ animal-based measure that gives us 
information arising from the integration that has already taken place within the mind of the 
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animal. For cases where we only want to know the overall welfare status of an animal - such 
as when comparing different housing systems - this will be sufficient. For cases where we want 
to make decisions regarding trade-offs etc., we will need further information about relative 
weightings, and this will be addressed in Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3. 
 
7.3.1.1. Qualitative behavioural assessment 
One commonly used whole-animal measure is Qualitative Behavioural Assessment (QBA) 
(Wemelsfelder, Hunter, Mendl, & Lawrence, 2001). Here, trained observers make assessments 
about the overall welfare status of an animal based on what they see of its behaviour, body 
language, vocalisations etc. QBA is carried out by having a set of observers assess the overall 
body language of an animal against either a set of fixed terms or through generating their own 
descriptive terms. They score the animal for each of these characteristics (e.g. nervous, alert, 
curious, excited) by marking a point on a line between the ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’ for 
these traits (e.g. Figure 7.2). These scores can be applied either for individual animals or groups 
of animals, depending on the aim. These scores are then converted to numerical scores (0-100) 
by the researchers and analysed for general patterns. 
 
Figure 7.2: Application of QBA (from Fleming et al., 2016, p. 1570) 
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QBA uses the assessment of an observer to interpret the overall behaviour or demeanour of 
an animal – “in effect, the observers become the research instrument” (Beausoleil & Mellor, 
2011, p. 457). It is an “integrative welfare assessment tool” (Wemelsfelder et al., 2001, p. 209), 
in which the observer is unconsciously integrating many pieces of information from the 
behaviour and body language of the animal. This approach is also integrative in that it is 
assessing the ‘output’ from the animal after it has already internally integrated its various 
experiences. The aim is to assess not so much the behaviours themselves, but the ‘style’ of the 
behaviour, as representative of the animal’s overall condition (Wemelsfelder, 1997). Rather 
than looking at a single aspect of an animal, it is a whole-body approach that reflects how an 
animal is interacting with its environment. Such a measure should capture both the physical 
and psychological state of the animal.  
This method has been shown to have high inter-observer reliability (Wemelsfelder et al., 
2001) with similar scores produced across observers. Observers require only a little training 
and do not need to be experienced with the species in order to provide reliable assessments 
(Fleming et al., 2016). Importantly, it has been validated against other scientific measures of 
animal welfare, correlating with other relevant physiological and behavioural indicators 
(Wemelsfelder, 2007), illustrating that it is not merely subjective judgement but observation of 
real features of the animal. It is a quick and versatile measure that can be used in situations 
where it might be difficult to collect more detailed data (Fleming et al., 2016). It appears to be 
sensitive to subtle differences between animals, or over time (Fleming et al., 2016). 
The primary drawback of QBA is that it may not be applicable over very many species. So 
far it has primarily been used for large mammals (and recently, chickens (Muri, Stubsjøen, 
Vasdal, Moe, & Granquist, 2019)). Given its reliance on human estimates of behaviour and 
body language, it may not be of much use for species very unlike ourselves or those we are not 
so familiar with, such as fish and insects (though Wemelsfelder (2007) thinks this is possible, 
just a matter of acquiring familiarity with and skill in assessing these more phylogenetically 
distant species). 
 
7.3.1.2. Cognitive bias 
Another emerging area of research in whole-animal measurement is cognitive bias testing. 
Cognitive bias is one promising measure which seems to account for overall animal welfare; 
cumulative welfare state, or a sum or averaging of positive and negative experiences up to that 
time (Mendl et al., 2010). In cognitive bias tests, animals are trained to expect a reward under 
one stimulus and a punishment under another. For example, if a light activates in the right-
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hand corner of the room, they will receive food, and if it activates in the left-hand corner of the 
room they will receive an aversive stimulus (e.g. a loud noise or strong puff of air to the face). 
They are then presented with an ambiguous signal, such as a light somewhere in the middle of 
the room, to see how they react – whether they behave as though they are about to receive the 
reward (optimistic), or the punishment (pessimistic). By using signals with different levels of 
ambiguity (i.e. progressively closer to one side or other), we can map the differing levels of 
optimism and pessimism and infer degree of welfare. Individuals who have experienced 
primarily positive states, i.e. those who are likely to have lived in an environment providing 
fitness-enhancing rewards, will be likely to view ambiguous signals optimistically, as potential 
rewards. Conversely, individuals who have experienced primarily negative states (low reward 
opportunity environments) will be more likely to view ambiguous signals pessimistically, as 
potential threats (Mendl et al., 2010). State of welfare “may thus act as a heuristic device 
influencing cognitive processes and facilitating appropriate decision-making behaviour” 
(Mendl et al., 2010, p. 2900). This leads to a cognitive judgement bias varying with overall 
welfare experience. This has been established in human subjects, and is now the subject of a 
lot of work on animals, including mammals (Mendl et al., 2009), birds (Deakin, Browne, 
Hodge, Paul, & Mendl, 2016), fish (Laubu, Louâpre, & Dechaume-Moncharmont, 2019) and 
even honeybees (Bateson, Desire, Gartside, & Wright, 2011) across a range of situations. 
Validation of these measures must also take into account effects of personality on baseline 
levels of optimism and reactivity (similar to what was discussed in Chapter Six), but this can 
be accommodated with careful testing and appropriate sample sizes. This work is relatively 




One other potentially valuable future measure could be neuroimaging. Work identifying the 
regions of the brain responsible for generating positive and negative affect (Berridge & 
Kringelbach, 2013) could be used to identify the valence and intensity of affective reactions to 
stimuli, and possibly in assessing overall levels of pleasure or displeasure at a specific time. 
This work is still in the very early stages - mostly in humans – however, as discussed in Chapter 
Six, there have been some promising results where both subjective report of intensity of 
experience and behavioural responses correlate with intensity of brain activity (Coghill et al., 
2003). Recently, Poirier et al. (2019) have argued that measures of biomarkers for the 
hippocampus (a part of the brain responsible for learning, memory and emotional regulation) 
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may give us information about the cumulative affective experience, or overall welfare status, 
of animals. Hippocampal volume, amount of local grey matter and neurogenesis (development 
of new neurons) have all found to positively correlate with other measures of welfare, such as 
subjective self-report in humans, and mood in animals (Poirier et al., 2019). This method has 
the advantage of measuring overall quality of life, and will not be sensitive to small changes 
induced through the process of restraint and measurement. If this type of measure can be 
properly developed and validated, it may be the strongest measure we could have, as it is 
accessing intensity of mental states more directly than any other measure. 
 
7.3.2. Multi-criteria assessments 
As demonstrated, whole-animal measures are highly effective for making overall welfare 
assessments, without the need to determine the weightings of different affects. The primary 
limitation of these measures is that they cannot tell us anything about which aspects of welfare 
are good or poor - and which conditions in the environment are responsible for creating good 
or poor welfare - and therefore cannot provide guidance as to what changes to make. Often, 
when assessing an animal, we do not want to know just how well or badly it is faring overall, 
so much as we want to be able to identify the primary positive and negative impacts to welfare, 
and how we can improve them. Whole-animal measures cannot tell us much about how to 
proceed in these situations, or in cases of trade-offs between affects, or choices of resource 
distribution.  In these cases, we will prefer to use a more comprehensive multi-criteria 
assessment. These assessments take a variety of measures of the different conditions an animal 
is experiencing, and bring these together to form a total overall picture of welfare. Unlike the 
whole-animal measures described in the previous section, these assessments will require an 
answer to the epistemic question, needing at least a rough idea of the weightings of the different 
components in order to create an accurate picture of overall welfare. This problem will be 
addressed in Section 7.3.3. 
Botreau et al. (2007) describe the multiple purposes for which such multi-criteria measures 
might be required – to advise farmers on how to improve welfare, to check compliance with 
legislative requirements, to implement welfare certification schemes and to compare systems 
to refine legislation. They argue that all these goals require combining different measures to 
form an overall assessment – either a relative or an absolute one. Frameworks of causal 
indictors31 like this are often used because they are more easily measured on a large (whole-
 
31 See discussion on types of indicators in Chapter Five. 
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farm) scale, and are highly repeatable (Bartussek, 1999). In general terms, for any multi-criteria 
assessment framework, the method will be to survey the various potential factors which can 
impact welfare in either a positive or negative direction (causal indicators). These factors will 
need to be quantified (to at least some degree, even if just ordinally such as ‘low’, ‘medium’, 
‘high’) and then weighted in terms of their likely relative impact on overall welfare. This sort 
of method has the benefits of allowing us to try and make judgements in cases where more 
detailed information might not be available (or where it might be too time-consuming or costly 
to obtain), but is also very vulnerable to failures in implementation. In particular, it will not 
create an accurate score if some components have been left out or overlooked, or if the 
subjective assessments of those implementing it are not accurate. As described in Chapter Five, 
in any system using a set of causal indicators to assess a target state, the measurement will only 
be accurate if the set contains all and only those factors which actually impact the target. If we 
leave out a factor which is actually impacting welfare, or if we mistakenly include a factor 
which is actually neutral, our assessments may be quite wide of the mark. In this section, I will 
describe some of the multi-criteria assessment frameworks commonly used in animal welfare 
assessments, and their benefits and limitations, before moving on in Section 7.3.3 to outline 
how we might assign weightings to the different components. There are four primary multi-
criteria frameworks used to assess animal welfare – the Five Domains, Animal Needs Index, 
Welfare QualityÒ, and SOWEL and related models. Here I will briefly describe the first three, 
and why I think they will fail to suffice for the purposes of determining weightings of different 
conditions or affects, before turning in more detail to the SOWEL-type models, which I think 
are most promising in this context. 
 
7.3.2.1. The non-contenders 
First, I will briefly discuss three multi-criteria frameworks that are commonly used in animal 
welfare assessment – Five Domains, Animal Needs Index and Welfare QualityÒ - and why 
they will not work for the purposes required here. The first framework is the Five Domains 
model (Mellor & Beausoleil, 2015), which is particularly commonly used in assessments for 
zoos and companion animals. In this model, the animal is scored for welfare impact over five 
different domains – four ‘physical’ domains which reflect the life conditions that affect welfare 
(nutrition, housing, health and behaviour), and the fifth ‘mental state’ domain which is what 
welfare is taken to consist in. This fifth domain counts both positive and negative mental states 
relating to provisions and lacks in the other four domains (e.g. lack of food causing hunger, or 
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lack of foraging opportunities causing frustration). All conditions are therefore represented 
with their relevant mental states, or affects, in mind. The underlying conceptual tools here are 
promising, but the model will not succeed in helping to determine weightings, as the impacts 
are only scored qualitatively, on an A-E scale, which only allows for ordinal rankings of states. 
No attempt is made to give a qualitative score, or to attempt to quantify the weightings of 
different components of the framework. This was deliberately built into the model to prevent 
over-precisification where the data does not support it: “numerical grading was explicitly 
rejected to avoid facile, non-reflective averaging of ‘scores’ as a substitute for considered 
judgment and to avoid implying, unrealistically, that much greater precision is achievable than 
is possible with such qualitative assessments” (Mellor, 2017, p. 10). Although the four scores 
are combined into a single score for the fifth (mental state) domain, this is done informally and 
based primarily on the knowledge and intuition of the assessor/s. Rather than functioning as a 
measurement tool, the model is instead aimed as a ‘focussing’ device, to gain a greater 
understanding of the welfare of an animal, and the conditions impacting it. 
The Animal Needs Index (Bartussek, 1999) is a collection of proxy measures used to score 
and compare the conditions provided at a farm level, to ensure farms meet minimum provision 
standards for certification or labelling schemes, and to identify which areas should be 
improved. It scores indicators for five husbandry conditions that are considered to affect 
welfare – mobility, social contact, flooring, climate and stockman’s care. Although these are 
taken as representing the most important welfare needs of the animals, they are not intended as 
a comprehensive set of measures. Additionally, measures at the farm level necessarily 
aggregate the welfare of individuals, and thus cannot tell us about individual welfare, which is 
typically the target of ethical concern (Houe et al., 2011). Although this ANI framework is 
linked to welfare assessment, as it is not a direct measure of welfare, it will not help in this 
case.  
Another example of a multi-criteria assessment is the Welfare QualityÒ framework 
(Botreau, Bonde, et al., 2007), commonly used for farm animals. The model takes 12 welfare 
criteria, across four principles – feeding, housing, health and behaviour. Each of the criteria is 
then assigned several indicators, which are mostly effect rather than causal indicators, such as 
body condition score or incidence of aggressive behaviour. Multiple measures are taken for 
each criterion, which are aggregated into the criteria, followed by another aggregation into the 
welfare principles and finally bringing it all into an overall assessment of the quality of the 
facility, with regard to the welfare of its animals (Botreau et al., 2009). This is a more complete 
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framework than the Animal Needs Index, and produces cardinal scores, unlike the Five 
Domains model. However, the 12 criteria were taken from discussions with consumer-citizens 
as well as scientists and so do not necessarily represent welfare from the animal point of view. 
The aggregation weightings are also quite opaque, and seem to be based on expert opinion 
rather than measured effect on the animals (de Graaf et al., 2018). For this reason, this is still 
unlikely to be a useful model for determining actual weightings of welfare impact; and instead 
we should prefer the similar but more rigorously designed SOWEL-type models, as will be 
discussed below. 
 
7.3.2.2. SOWEL-type models 
The most comprehensive frameworks for measuring welfare and determining weightings of 
the different components are the SOWEL-type models. The SOWEL model was developed by 
Bracke et al. (2002 a; 2002 b) for assessing the welfare of breeding sows. The same framework 
has been used to create similar models for assessing welfare of chickens (the FOWEL model - 
de Mol et al., 2006) and cows (the COWEL model - Ursinus & Schepers, 2009).  
These models are built by first selecting a number of needs (11 for the SOWEL model) 
which represent the different behavioural systems that are taken to contribute to subjective 
welfare – such as feed intake, thermoregulation and exploration. For each need, various 
attributes are identified (37 total in the SOWEL model), which are measurable conditions that 
contribute to that need (e.g. ‘exposure to cold’ for thermoregulation, or ‘novel events per week’ 
for exploration). Each attribute is given a discrete score between 0-1 depending on the quality 
of the measure (e.g. for number of eating places, the categories might be: sufficient, limited, 
and restricted, receiving scores of 1, ½ and 0). These cardinal scores allow for integration of 
all attributes into a single welfare score. 
Finally, the attributes are given weightings. Unlike the opaque expert-assigned weightings 
used in Welfare QualityÒ, these are based on information available in the scientific literature. 
This evidence can be basic comments by researchers on animal behaviour, such as how 
strongly they think the animals want the resource, or can be more data-driven, such as the 
results of studies on animal preferences and willingness to work, or behavioural activity 
budgets. These weightings are not just assigned to the whole attribute, but different values 
within an attribute so that, for example, extreme pain may have a much larger ‘pull’ on total 
welfare score than mild pain. This allows for variation in the two types of weightings – 
weightings between conditions and weightings between different levels of a condition 
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(Norwood & Lusk, 2011). Weightings between conditions represent the relative strength of, 
say, food availability versus thermal discomfort on overall welfare. Weightings between levels 
represent the relative impact of mild versus strong discomfort on overall welfare. Once the 
weightings are set, a total score is then calculated as the weighted sum of the attribute scores. 
This model is not perfect. One problem is in the scoring of the attributes. The attributes are 
scored ordinally (e.g. worst, mid, best) but the scores are then treated cardinally (0, ½, 1). This 
means that the relationship between the different levels of score is treated linearly (e.g. that the 
difference between sufficient eating places and limited is the same as between limited and 
restricted), with no justification for this actually being the case. Given that the categories are 
arbitrarily chosen, this may not often be true. Another issue is in the assignment of weightings 
– what counted as relevant data for these could vary from weighted preferences, to qualitative 
comments by scientists in their papers. There is no single objective and repeatable method used 
throughout to assign weightings, and so these will vary in accuracy and validity. However, 
these are issues with inputs, rather than with the framework of the model itself. The strength 
of these models is the transparency, and the ability to update and alter these scores and 
weightings as new data emerges. Although the current inputs into the model are not ideal, the 
underlying framework of the model is such that this could be easily improved and strengthened.   
For this reason, the SOWEL-type models are currently the best available tool for accurately 
measuring welfare and determining weightings of different components. Their primary benefit, 
a feature which was deliberately built in, is in allowing for changes to be made as new 
information becomes available: “the decision support system is designed to be adaptable, that 
is, new insights can be incorporated when these become available” (Bracke, Metz, et al., 2002, 
p. 1835). The data in the model is directly linked to a table of the referenced data (e.g. 
comments in scientific papers) to allow for transparency, as well as making it updatable. If 
future studies show that something should be added or subtracted from the range of identified 
needs or attributes, or that the weightings should be altered, this can be easily accommodated. 
As this type of new information - and subsequent model changes - are highly likely to arise, 
this framework is strong in its ability to adapt accordingly. The framework can also be taken 
and applied to any species, with modifications needed only to the input data regarding species-
specific needs and indicators. Use of this basic framework, with an eye to improving the quality 
of the inputs, will get us ever closer to an accurate welfare measure. In the next section, I will 




7.3.3. Determining weightings 
As demonstrated, there are a number of different frameworks that can be used to describe 
and assess welfare according to the variety of contributing conditions, the most comprehensive 
and flexible of which are the SOWEL-type models. As per the discussion in Chapter Five, we 
can take these frameworks to be valid measurements of welfare given the appropriate testing 
and justification for background assumptions. The primary problem with frameworks such as 
these is getting an answer to our epistemic question and determining the weighting of different 
components (Botreau, Bracke, et al., 2007). In these assessments we will want to know the 
weightings of different components of welfare, particularly when we need to make trade-offs 
between different areas of welfare impact and want to know which are acceptable for their 
impact on total welfare. In order to decide whether we are justified in inflicting a certain amount 
of pain or discomfort for some future benefit, or in deciding whether to invest resources in one 
benefit or another, we need to have at least a rough idea of the relative magnitudes of the costs 
and benefits under consideration.  
Weightings are most often set by the opinions or intuitions of various practitioners or 
‘experts’: “inevitably, the design of a practical assessment tool for animal welfare at farm level 
must primarily be the result of negotiation” (Bartussek, 1999, p. 186). The different 
backgrounds and expertise of these assessors will change the weightings assigned (Otten et al., 
2017).  For example, in another framework - the Animal Needs Index - the authors considered 
free movement as an essential prerequisite for other types of welfare experience, and so 
weighted this more highly (Bartussek, 1999). Mellor & Stafford (2008) describe a procedure 
used by McMillan for determining an animal’s overall quality of life (welfare status). This is 
to: list all the feelings an animal is experiencing, weight these (by biological/survival value or 
urgency), alter the weightings for the particularities of the individual animal and finally 
construct a scale to assign weights to the adjusted feelings. They rightly criticise this approach 
as, with current methods, there is no objective way to set the values at each step – it may allow 
for ordinal, but not cardinal, scoring. This method does not take into account the effect on the 
animal, and to what degree each of these conditions actually do impact welfare. Instead, these 
subjective judgements will contain some value judgements about what counts in animal welfare 
– ethical as well as scientific judgements (Veissier et al., 2011). 
Determination of weightings needs instead to be objective: in some sense, they need to be 
empirically constrained, to figure out what impact different experiences have on welfare, from 
the point of view of the animal rather than the researcher. There are multiple ways we can 
arrive at objective weightings for welfare components. We can do this either through testing 
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on the various whole-animal measures, or through preference tests. For the first, we would start 
by measuring the overall welfare of an animal at one point. We would then make an 
intervention we were interested in testing the effect of, say by changing food quality or amount 
of available shelter. Finally, we would measure overall welfare again, to observe the difference 
in the scores. This difference will help us determine the impact of this condition on overall 
welfare. Repeating this for many conditions would start to give us their relative weightings for 
the animal measured, and repeating over different animals can help find general species or 
group trends in overall weightings. We could also vary multiple conditions together to look for 
interaction effects between the impacts of different conditions. This information could then be 
used for making decisions about management trade-offs, or for integrating multiple weighted 
measures into a single welfare score. Even if rough, these weightings should still be sufficient 
for most applications.  
In the second case, preference testing is another animal-based measure that can be used for 
determining the contribution of different affects to overall welfare. Using preference tests, 
animals can tell us which resources they prefer, and how hard they will work to get them 
(Dawkins, 1983). This information can then be used to scale the different components against 
one another, based on how the animal itself views such trade-offs. For example, we could look 
at whether an animal prefers x amount of resource A over y amount of resource B, or how hard 
an animal will work for A vs B. Either of these will give us a good idea of how much relative 
value the animal places on these resources, and the affects they create. Avoidance tests could 
give similar information for negative experiences. Preference tests also give the animal the 
ability to trade off positive and negative experiences, such as experiencing something noisy 
while accessing food, and thus allow us to determine relative weightings across valence as 
well.  
One caveat here is that preference testing is not a perfect window into the affective state of 
an animal, as discussed in Chapter Two. Although very often, what an animal wants - and what 
they will work towards - will be those things that they find pleasurable and rewarding, this is 
not always the case, as the ‘liking’ (reward) and ‘wanting’ (motivation) systems have different 
neural substrates, and can operate independently of one another (Berridge, 1996). There can 
also be strong effects of history and individual temperament, and we cannot be sure that 
animals will maintain the same weightings over time as they age, or environmental conditions 
change. Validation through other measures of affect could help with this. 
By recording the changes in whole-animal measures under specific changes in conditions, 
or by measuring something like relative strength of preference, we can gather information as 
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to the relative weightings of different affects on the welfare experience of the animal. This can 
then allow us to build up larger multi-criterion frameworks using these ratings to build an 
overall picture of animal welfare and its components. Using both of these types of assessment 
together allows us to get a picture of the overall welfare state of an animal, while still having 
sufficient detail about living conditions to allow us to determine where change is required. It 
also allows us to validate the measures against one another to make sure we have not missed 
anything on either side. This is possible because there is an overall integrated state of welfare, 
with a common currency onto which we can map the different affects that compose it; 
otherwise the relationship between whole-animal measures and multi-criteria frameworks 
would not hold. Even without knowing the exact nature of the common currency, this process 
allows us to determine the weightings of the different affects and thus make necessary welfare 
assessments and decisions. 
 
7.4. A pragmatic proposal 
I have flagged throughout this chapter that we might remain unconvinced about the 
metaphysical claim, regarding the existence of a common currency by which we can combine 
or weight different affects. However, even in this case, we would still want to make 
management decisions regarding welfare and resource allocation. Here, as mentioned, we 
might think instead of welfare as being a multi-component construct more like health. Here the 
different components may individually exist, but do not form an integrated state. Instead, they 
are brought together because of our categorisations, and interests. In this case, it would not be 
surprising that there is no metaphysical entity forming the common currency, or a single correct 
answer about the interactions between affects, and their weightings. Instead, we may have 
multiple accounts, each of which lays out a different way of combining affects into a single 
score, based on different background assumptions, normative commitments, and individual 
preferences. In this case, the problem of determining weightings is no longer an empirical one 
– there is no single privileged set of weightings that we are trying to discover. Instead, we are 
looking for a solution which best fits our purposes.  
When considering why we want a method for integrating welfare components, we have the 
two reasons discussed in Section 7.1 – to make assessments of overall animal welfare, and to 
make considerations of trade-offs between different components of animal welfare. Most often, 
what we want is a way of determining how we should use our resources to maximise increases 
in welfare. To this end, we may consider using something like robustness reasoning (see 
Chapter Five). In these cases, we could compare the decisions recommended by multiple 
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different aggregation procedures and prefer those that are recommended by many or most 
different processes. Alternately, if simply considering whether a single proposed intervention 
is an appropriate use of allocated resources, we could examine whether it results in an increase 
in welfare across most or all of our different aggregation procedures. In cases where it does, 
we would proceed, and where it does not, we may instead look for an alternative. Something 
like the SOWEL model previously discussed could be extremely useful in these applications, 
as it allows for variation of input weightings, and could be used to test results across a range 
of acceptable parameters. In this way, even without the strong metaphysical commitment to a 
common currency and an integrated state of welfare as a real entity, we would still be able to 
make relevant decisions regarding animal husbandry and management. 
This of course still leaves us with the issue of deciding on which set of aggregation 
procedures we consider reasonable. There are an infinite number of ways of weighting the 
different components of welfare and their contribution to the overall score, and so robustness 
reasoning of the type described above will not be of much use if we were to take all of these 
under consideration. Instead, we need to decide on a reasonable subset of those procedures. I 
will not here advocate for any definitive way of deciding on what would count as reasonable 
for these purposes, but I will raise a few relevant considerations.  
Firstly, we would want to discount any procedure that places too much, or too little, weight 
on each component. If we are considering any particular condition or affect as a component of 
welfare, it is because we think it makes a significant contribution to welfare, and so we don’t 
want excessively low weightings. Similarly, it does not seem right that any single affect will 
be primarily determinate for welfare, and so aggregation procedures with excessively high 
weightings should also be discounted.  
This ties in to the second consideration, which is that our weighting procedures should be 
intuitively plausible. We have some sense from our own experience of which types of affects 
have greater and lesser impacts on our own feelings of wellbeing. Similarly, from our 
observations of other people and animals we have an idea of what influences them the most. 
An aggregation procedure that weighted transient boredom much higher than chronic pain, for 
example, would not be convincing. Intuitive plausibility must obviously be taken carefully. As 
discussed in Section 7.3.3, weightings set by expert opinion run the risk of being overly 
anthropomorphised, and missing those things which matter to the animals under consideration. 
However, when supplemented with appropriate knowledge about the animals, this can help us 
narrow down the set of appropriate procedures. 
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The primary drawback of treating welfare as a construct and using these procedures is that, 
compared to the case in which we believe we are measuring welfare using a real common 
currency, we would have weakened confidence in the applicability of our results. Our 
aggregation procedures would be based on human intuitions about plausibility, and the process 
of arriving at these intuitions is opaque (think of the Welfare QualityÒ framework). Where we 
are basing our sets of reasonable aggregation procedures on these considerations, we might fail 
to capture those things that matter more to the animals.  
The comparison here is again with health. Health is a construct of this type, and we are 
frequently able to make sense of trade-offs between different components – say, taking a 
medication to improve symptoms of a disease, that at the same time will impact kidney 
function. However, there are two reasons why this case is not exactly analogous to animal 
welfare. The first is that we are making decisions for humans, and so our intuitions about how 
to weight acceptable trade-offs are much more likely to hit the mark than for animal species, 
particularly those quite distantly related and dissimilar to us. The second is that even in the 
human health cases, we might think that we are actually often appealing to some other common 
currency; weighting components of health in relation to our preferences for different types of 
disease or incapacity, or relating to our overall lifespan or quality of life. If this is true, then we 
still need common-currency thinking. This is not to say that the results of the procedures 
described above will not get us some way to achieving the ends we desire in welfare 




Scientific measurement of subjective animal welfare is fraught with a number of problems, 
one of which is how we can make sense of integrating or comparing different positive and 
negative mental states. Despite the heterogeneity of these different affects, I have argued that 
we have good reason to think that these can be integrated into an overall welfare experience. 
Further, we can measure this overall experience using whole-animal measures, and use changes 
in these measures - along with preference testing - to see how animals make their own trade-
offs to determine relative weightings of different experiences. This will thus allow us to make 
effective management decisions. Even if we remain unconvinced about the presence of a real 
common currency, we can still use robustness reasoning on different aggregation procedures 
to identify the best decisions under these circumstances.  
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8. CHAPTER EIGHT – CONCLUSION AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Most people agree that animal welfare is important. It is bad for animals to suffer, and good 
for them to have happy lives, and where possible we should act to prevent the former and 
enable the latter. As Norwood & Lusk (2011) point out “almost everyone cares about the 
treatment of farm animals, to some degree” (p 5, Ch. 1). All else being equal, people would 
prefer animals receive better, rather than worse treatment. This means that this is an issue of 
moral concern. But we have limited resources available to us, and so are required to make 
decisions about where to prioritise our actions or interventions. All our actions come with an 
opportunity cost - that of some other action we could otherwise have taken that may have 
provided other benefits. Typically, we want to choose actions in such a way to have the greatest 
possible impact. If our goal is to reduce suffering, then we want to reduce suffering as much 
as we can. When considering animal welfare, making decisions like these then requires us to 
have an accurate understanding of the welfare of animals living under different conditions. 
Working to identify and implement our best interventions for improving animal lives requires 
accurate measures of animal welfare, in order to assess the current best and worst animal 
systems, as well as to compare different possible interventions for their effectiveness.  
Otherwise, we risk misapplying our resources to interventions that may fail to prevent, or may 
even increase, suffering. Although animal ethics has been well-explored by philosophers, 
animal welfare science and the measurement of animal welfare has largely been overlooked 
within the philosophy literature. The primary aim of this thesis has been to redress this 
oversight, and to make some steps towards opening up philosophical investigation into the 
measurement of animal welfare. 
In Chapter One, I introduced the study of animal welfare, looking at the three primary 
questions in the field: regarding the moral status of animals, which animals are moral subjects 
and how we measure animal welfare. I described the field of animal welfare science, which 
aims to objectively measure the welfare of animals using behavioural and physiological 
indicators to track changes in welfare under different conditions. 
Part One of this thesis aimed to establish the subjective conception of animal welfare, and 
its applications. In Chapter Two, I argued that we should understand the welfare of animals as 
consisting in their subjective experience over their lifetime. I argued that this welfare concept 
was able to fulfil both the normative and scientific roles required, as it is normatively 
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significant, fundamental and measurable, and defended it against some possible objections. I 
examined the other competing candidate welfare concepts – physical welfare, teleological 
welfare and preferences – and argued that they merely provide instrumental conditions for the 
realisation of welfare, important only with regard to their effects on subjective experience. 
In Chapter Three, I introduced two cases in applied animal ethics. First, there was the issue 
of management euthanasia in zoos, where otherwise healthy animals are culled for reasons of 
space or resources. Second was de-extinction projects, in which cloning or back-breeding 
technologies are used to attempt to bring extinct species back into existence. Here I examined 
how the subjective welfare concept influences our decision-making in these areas, particularly 
regarding how welfare interacts with other competing values when assessing the acceptability 
of these practices. 
In Part Two, I moved on to investigation of the measurement of animal welfare. Chapter 
Four examined whether subjective welfare is a measurable entity. Using measurement theory, 
I looked at the different types of measurement scales and argued that welfare would be best 
captured by either an ordinal or a ratio scale, depending on the necessary application. 
In Chapter Five, I turned to the problem of validating indicators of welfare. As we cannot 
measure subjective experience directly, we must rely on the use of indirect indicators, but these 
have to be validated to ensure they are really measuring our intended target state. I described a 
four-step robustness procedure to validate these indicators in the absence of direct correlational 
data about changes in the target state. 
In Chapter Six, I looked at the issue of making intersubjective comparisons of welfare. I 
pointed out that making comparisons of this type is difficult, as observed variation in the data 
can be explained either by variation in welfare experience, or by variation in individual 
responsiveness, with no way to tell between the two. I argued that in order to make such 
comparisons, we must make similarity assumptions regarding either scope of experience, or 
response level, justified by anatomical/physiological analogy and shared evolutionary history, 
and which assumption we prefer will depend on the context and details of the particular case. 
I finished by outlining some alternative decision procedures we might use in situations where 
these assumptions are not justified, such as in comparisons between species that are not closely 
related. 
Finally, in Chapter Seven, I examined the problem of heterogeneity of mental states and 
what this might mean for commensurability and integration into single welfare measure. I 
argued that we have good reason to think that there is some ‘common currency’ by which we 
could do so, supported by our intuition and introspection, use of trade-offs and decision-
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making, and the similarities in evolutionary role, function and structure. I described a process 
by which we might determine the relative weightings of the impact of different experiences on 
overall welfare, using a combination of whole-animal welfare measures and multi-criteria 
welfare assessments. 
This is all introductory work, and there is much more to be done. At present the philosophy 
of animal welfare science is basically a non-existent field; though it is my hope that the work 
contained here will help stimulate interest in what will be a fruitful area for research. As this 
work is just beginning, there are still many core issues to explore, and connections to work in 
other areas. As indicated throughout the thesis, one of the primary fields I believe will have 
important ties to animal welfare research is animal sentience research. Animal welfare and 
sentience are tightly linked, as are the research programs, and further collaboration could help 
them inform one another. 
Animal sentience research is a body of research that looks into animal sentience from a 
variety of perspectives, such as how it evolved, the mechanisms by which it develops and 
operates, and through which parts of the animal kingdom (or beyond) it extends. This is a multi-
disciplinary field, drawing on - among others - cognitive science, neuroscience, animal 
behaviour, ecology and evolution, and philosophy. The aim is to understand how, when and 
why sentience occurs, and what forms it takes. Animal welfare science, by contrast, is 
examining the experience of animals from the perspective of what makes their lives go well or 
poorly. Both are emerging fields. A recent meta-analysis of published research in animal 
sentience found an almost 10-fold increase over the 20 years from 1990 – 2011 (Proctor et al., 
2013). A similar recent meta-analysis of animal welfare publications over the past 20 years 
found an increase of around 10-15% per year, with over half having been released in the last 
four years (Walker, Díez-León, & Mason, 2014).  
These links between the study of sentience and welfare, and the overlap in subject matter, 
give reason to think that both disciplines have something to offer one another, both 
conceptually and methodologically. Proctor claims that “the science of animal sentience 
underpins the entire animal welfare movement” (Proctor, 2012, p. 628). I see this connection 
occurring in three ways – the empirical question of which animals are sentient and thus targets 
of welfare concern; a methodological link, where the methods developed within each discipline 
can be used to assist the other, and the conceptual questions of the evolution and functioning 
of sentience which underpin the assumptions used in welfare science.  
The most basic, and perhaps most important, way these two areas work well together is in 
identifying which animals should be the targets of welfare concern. As discussed, welfare is 
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taken here to consist in the subjective experiences of animals, their positive and negative 
experiences. It therefore follows that only those animals capable of such experience – those 
animals which are sentient – will be the appropriate targets of concern for welfare. 
“Acknowledgements of sentience would seem a prerequisite for concern about animals’ well-
being” (Walker et al., 2014, p. 80). Animal sentience research thus gives animal welfare science 
its targets – once there is sufficient evidence that an animal is sentient, and thus has welfare, 
welfare science will then work to investigate under what conditions the lives of these animals 
will be improved or worsened. We may also see the reverse effect – tracking those animals for 
which animal welfare science is successful or unsuccessful in measuring welfare can tell us 
something about whether or not they are sentient. Where welfare measures appear successful 
on an animal previously not considered sentient, or unsuccessful on an animal previously 
considered to be sentient, this would give us reason to revisit our assessment of sentience and 
perhaps revise methods accordingly. The current debates on the boundaries of sentience and 
the status of fish and invertebrates, as discussed in Chapter One, show how important use of 
strong established indicators is for both disciplines.   
This sharing of methods, which can go both ways, is the second type of interaction between 
the two disciplines. We are still a long way from identifying conclusive behavioural or 
neurological markers of sentience. Current work in this area thus rests on untested assumptions, 
some of which can be tested or justified through developments in animal welfare science. 
Looking to welfare science for their well-validated indicators will also assist. Animal welfare 
science has over the years developed sound methodologies for measuring welfare. Particularly, 
they have identified and validated a range of both casual and effect indicators. The large 
amount of work done in welfare science to identify and validate these indicators for welfare 
gives sentience research a good pool of measures to draw from. Further, looking into which 
indicators are used, and why they work, could help develop understanding of sentience and 
how it functions. Taking from welfare science the well-validated behavioural and physiological 
indicators, these form a good starting point for investigation into the mechanisms by which 
affective states can produce the effects, which helps then to answer some of the questions raised 
below. 
The final set of questions that animal sentience can answer, and which can assist welfare 
science, are some more conceptual questions about the evolution of and working of sentience. 
The answers to these questions will give us information both about the expected taxonomic 
distribution of sentience, and about the adaptive role sentience may have played. We can also 
learn about the structures and processes that give rise to different types of sentient experiences, 
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and the ingoing and outgoing pathways - both from stimuli to affect, and back from affect to 
physiological and behavioural responses. There are many areas of welfare science which rely 
on an understanding of the evolution and development of animal sentience, and the 
mechanisms by which it works, as have come up throughout this thesis. 
As described in Chapter Five, part of the process of validating welfare indicators involves 
embedding within the best available theory. That is, if we understand the mechanisms working 
between welfare experience and the measured indicators, we have more reason to think that 
our measurements are mapping onto the right state of the world. So, for example, if we take 
the vocalisations of goats, we will have more confidence that this is mapping onto welfare 
experience if we can understand that goats are social animals that communicate their distress 
to conspecifics. If we take blood cortisol measurements, we will be more confident with their 
reliability if we understand the hormonal cascade that creates changes in cortisol and under 
what conditions it is triggered. We will also have reason to think we have made the right choice 
of conditions from which to test indicators. For example, understanding the evolutionary 
history of a stoat will help us to think that provision of water is a relevant positive stimulus, 
while for a tamarin presence of an aerial predator is a negative one. Animal sentience research 
helps provide understanding of these mechanisms, both in their operation and their evolution, 
and thus can help welfare science with the right choice of indicators. 
In Chapter Six I outlined the similarity assumptions required for making comparisons of 
welfare between different animals. The justifications for these assumptions were based in 
appeal to evolutionary history and analogous anatomy and physiology. Here we can see again 
the role for sentience research. Understanding where sentience in general - or the particular 
types of affect or indicators in use - evolved will help us to know whether there were similar 
enough forces acting on the different individuals to create the same responses. Additionally, 
understanding the mechanisms by which sentience operates, how different affects and 
responses are created, will allow us to see whether these pathways are relevantly similar 
between individuals. 
Lastly, in Chapter Seven I discussed making comparisons between positive and negative 
experiences, and the need to find a common currency. The ability to find such a common scale 
relies on understanding the neurological underpinnings of the different experiences and the 
evolutionary conditions through which they evolved; as well as those for sentience as a whole. 
Similar brain structures or chemicals involved gives us reason to think there are similar 
experiences. Similarity of evolutionary conditions, such as all negative affects being used for 
aversive learning, gives us reason to think there is a common currency. Similarities in either of 
 195 
these areas supports the idea that we can be successful in comparing different types of 
experience in terms of their contribution to overall welfare. 
These are some of the ways in which animal sentience research and animal welfare science 
could aid one another. This is not a revolutionary idea. Animal sentience research and welfare 
science have been overlapping and working together in various ways for decades, often with 
the same researchers working on both. All I have tried to do here is indicate some of the specific 
ways in which they have, or could, help one another. Understanding the application of 
sentience research in animal welfare science may help guide research programs into sentience; 
while following work in sentience will help welfare scientists develop new measurement 
indicators and identify new species for study. Drawing on the work already done in welfare 
science on developing indicators and methods of measuring welfare can help sentience research 
for work trying to identify sentient species, as well as understanding the causes and 
mechanisms of sentience. This is merely a call for ongoing collaboration in this area. Both 
disciplines can benefit from the other, and working together may help more quickly solve some 
of the problems both are investigating. 
If we are able to accurately measure animal welfare, we will be much better placed to make 
decisions about when we should take action on behalf of animals, and of what type. We can 
compare the value of different interventions before deciding what to do. Philosophical analysis 
of the methods of animal welfare science is crucial for ensuring that the science is producing 
relevant results for use. The work in this thesis doesn’t tell us anything specific about what we 
should do, but gives us better tools for figuring it out. Some of the types of actions that can be 
assessed include advocating for changes in production methods to improve welfare and 
encouraging consumer shifts between or away from animal products to reduce numbers or to 
change types of animals used. In particular, a recommendation arising from this work is that 
funding would be well-used in improvement of research; to further develop the techniques 
described for empirically measuring welfare, particularly in areas like cognitive bias testing 
and neuroimaging.  
Accurate measurement of animal welfare is a crucial part of the process of making decisions 
for action to improve animal lives. This will require active engagement with the current science 
of animal welfare, as I have started to do in this thesis. Philosophical work in this area will 
examine how this science is practised: the concepts used, and the underlying assumptions in 
the methodologies. For the most part, this thesis has focussed on what is theoretically possible 
in the measurement of animal welfare; there are separate questions on what we should expect 
to be possible under our current pragmatic and epistemic constraints. There still remains much 
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more scientific and philosophical research to be undertaken in order to clarify and strengthen 
our understanding and measurement of welfare, but it is my hope that this thesis has played a 
role in opening up a new frontier for fruitful interdisciplinary investigation and developing the 
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